The Press. MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1869.

Press, Volume XIV, Issue 1852, 22 March 1869, Page 2

The Press. MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1869.

The legislation of the last session of the General Assembly was on the whole of an inferior character. JNot indeed in point of quantity. So far there was no reason whatever to complain of any falling off; rather, the addition of some ninety laws to the statute book in the course of a single session, the greater part of which was occupied in an obstinate struggle between the two great parties, the Ins and the Outs, suggests unpleasant apprehensions as to what may not be the unhappy condition of the colony in future years should the passion for law-making which now possesses our House of Representatives continue unabated. But the ministerial measures came to sad grief. The Government succeeded only in carrying one or two barren resolutions, but the further steps necessary to give them practical effect had perforce to be abandoned. i Among the dropped measures was one which appears to be a pet subject with Mr. Stafford (for, if we mistake not, he has brought it forward in some form or other on more than one occasion) namely, the Disqualification Bill. The object of this Bill was to prohibit any persons who have, directly or indirectly, an interest in the expenditure of the public money from having a seat in the Legislature, and therefore a power nf influencing the expenditure or taxation of the country. As to the general principle, there was not, nor was likely to be, any opposition. Every one allows that, for very obvious reasons, members of the Civil Service and other non-political officers of the Government should be debarred from holding a seat in the House, and the objection applies with greater force to persons who are temporarily receiving payment from the public chest for the performance of contracts or the like. The latter are invariably excluded even under the humblest forms of representative government—in the case of Road Boards, for instance, persons in receipt of payment from or holding any place of profit under the Board are ineligible for election. But the sting of the Bill lay in its excluding from the Assembly not only those who held places under the General Government, but also all office-holders under any Superintendent or Provincial Government. This, as was to be expected, was strongly opposed, but was supported by very weighty arguments. Under the present system of finance, it was urged, the provinces receive one-half of the consolidated fund, that is, of the general taxation of the country, the balance of which, after certain specific deductions, is applicable to the maintenance of their own establishments. Clearly then the officers of a Provincial Government are as directly interested in the taxation as those of the General Government, and there is just as much reason why they should be declared ineligible for a seat in the Assembly. Or—to argue the question on broader grounds— wbat chance is there of any reduction in the ordinary expenditure and taxation being fairly considered, so long as there is in the House a body of men whose interest it is to keep the expenditure and taxation at its present rate, because any diminution of it would involve a corresponding diminution in the revenue of the Provincial Government to which they belong? Can they be reasonably expected to apply themselves earnestly to the practice of an economy the immediate result of which would be to lessen their provin--1 ctal revenue, especially of that part

which comes to hand without any trouble of their own, and which they enjoy the pleasure and credit of spending while another body has to undergo the responsibility and odium of raising it ? On both grounds then, whether as being personally concerned in the distribution of the public revenue, since it affects their official emoluments, or as being representatives of financial interests at variance with those of the colony at large, it was urged that members of Provincial Executives, or holders of any office under a Provincial Government, should be excluded from the General Assembly. We admit the force of these arguments, which we have frequently had occasion to press upon our readers. They are unanswerable. But we draw a very different conclusion from them than that drawn by Mr Stafford. Granted that under the existing system of finance the presence in the Assembly of provincial office-holders is most unadvisable; what then ? What is the legitimate inference? That they should be kept out of the Assembly ? Not so, we think; but that the system should be altered. A system which can only be properly carried out by such wholesale disqualification must be a bad one. Mr Stafford's plea deals with, effects rather than causes. He attacks the symptoms ot the disease, not the disease itself. The right remedy for the evils that undoubtedly result from officers of the Provincial Governments holding seats in the Colonial Legislature is to be found, not in driving them out of the House, but in removing the cause which renders their presence there objectionable. Prima facie it is desirable that gentlemen who take a leading part in provincial politics should also be in the Assembly. They must be men of some capacity, who are considered by their fellow-citizens as fib to occupy places of trust and responsibility ; they must have had more than ordinary opportunities of becoming acquainted with the requirements of the country, and have gained some experience in the management of affairs. They are likely therefore to be among the most valuable members of the House. And, as we may conclude that their constituents have purposely selected them, on account of the qualities displayed in their local sphere of action, to take charge of their interests in the larger and more important sphere of the General Assembly, their ex elusion from the Assembly— or rather, the maintenance of a system which renders their exclusion necessary —appears to us an unfair and unjustifiable restriction upon the freedom which the people have a right to exercise in the choice of their representatives. Moreover, it is a serious blow to the efficacy of local government There is every reason, especially in a colony where the number of those who have the leisure and inclination to concern themselves with, public business is comparatively small, that the ablest men in the province should be induced to take a share in the superintendence of local matters—at least, that no obstacle should be put in the way of their doing so. Some of the provinces have hitherto been very fortunate in this respect, particularly Canterbury. Many of our most distinguished representatives in the Assembly have also taken an active part in provincial politics, either as members of the Executive or of the Provincial Council. But the proposed disqualification of provincial officeholders would put an end to this. Members of the Assembly could no longer take office in a Provincial Government, nor would they be willing to accept seats in the Council, lest they should some day place themselves in a position of being obliged to take office and so of forfeiting their seats in the Assembly. This compulsory ostracism of the foremost politicians of the province would tend to throw the management of provincial affairs into the hands of inferior men. At all events provincial institutions, which have been regarded as useful politicial training schools, would thenceforth be placed in a separate category, and be carefully eschewed by every one who aspired to distinction in the field of colonial politics. Admitting then, as we do most fully, the evils that arise from the presence in the House of Representatives of members of Provincial Governments, we hold that the right course is, not to bar the doors of the House against them, but to strike at the root of the mischief by putting an end to provincial subsidies, and so giving the provinces no further interest in the distribution of the colonial revenue. That would be a simple and effectual remedy. Disqualification deals effectively enough with one of the chief symptoms, but it leaves thereal disorder in the body politic untouched. But a malady is not healed because its outward signs are suppressed. Dr. Abernethy, it is said, was once consulted by a patient who complained of feeling

a sharp pain whenever he put his hand up to his head. " What a fool you must be," observed the Doctor, "to put up your hand!" A very Abernethian retort; but it was not meant seriously. Eor a man must often raise his hand to his head ; and if he cannot do so without suffering, the doctor's business is, not to recommend him to go through the world with one hand glued to his side, but to discover and cure the internal injury that prevents him from extending it.