THE PRESENT ASPECT OF THE NATIVE QUESTION.

Press, Volume III, Issue 185, 6 June 1863, Page 1

THE PRESENT ASPECT OF THE NATIVE QUESTION.

We have endeavoured, since the arrival of the ast northern mail, to present to our own minds, a we shall now endeavour to prosent to tho minds ,f our readers, the real aspect afforded by the nomentous position of Native affairs. In the first place, the colony is again in a state f civil war. The armed neutrality, which has lecn prolonged by feeble and vacillating counsels, i at an end, and the hosts arc gathering together j battle. Let us enquire who are our enemies. i"ir3t there are the Ngatirunnui and Toranak; ribes, dwelling to the southward of New Plyttoutli, who number in all about 2000 souls. !hese may be looked upon as inveterately hostile. )f tho section of the Ngatiawas who dwell all round New Plymouth, north and south, the umber does not probably exceed 1300 ; we have 0 special information what part they hare taken 1 the late attack, but unless they are satisfied by he recent abandonment of the "VYaitara, they must c regarded as amongst our steadiest enemies. Of ie Waikatos, tho most powerful and warlike ibes in the islands, numboring in all from 10,000 o 12,000, it is difficult to speak with accura/w Tie number we have, a?— includes the hole of~»s*Ji of the population, from Manukau to fokau, and eastward to the Taupo Lake. But ut of this the Lower Waikatos, that is, all hose about the mouth and great bend of the river, re not at all hostile, and William Naylor and his ieople about Wbaingaroa are friendly. Even the [ing Matutaora, and William Thompson, and Vata Kukutai, tho whole, we believe, of the Tgatihaua branch, have been, it is said, shocked md grieved at tho murders committed by the Caranakie, and are rather thrown into our ide of the scale than against us by ecent events. William King, our old intagonist, is understood to be in personal and riendly communication with Rewi, who may be Cooked upon as the leader of the extreme violent party amongst the Waikato Ngatimaniapotos, and ffho probably carries with him a great part of the strength of those tribes. But the fact we stated on good authority two days ago, that some of the Waikatos had already returned who were on their way to the scene of war, proves that very far from tho whole of this people can be regarded as determined to proceed to extremities in spite of all appeals to reason. We may confidently state, then, that of the 10,000 or 12,000 souls, not above 7000 or 8000 can be put down in the ranks of those entirely Hostile to us. The Wanganui tribes, in the same manner, are Terymuch divided in opinion. It is stated, on apparently good authority, that about 300 have actually gone to Taranaki to fight; at the same time Te Pchi has written to assure the Wanganui settlers that they are in no danger. Wi Tako, *c have heard, set out to go to Taranaki to endeavor to stop bloodshed, but was stopped in his journey. Taking, then, a fair "survey of all the tribes concerned, we may venture to assert that not *»« than 11,000 or 12,000 souls, men, women, *>* children, will join in hostilities, or will in any **yfeed the war; and that these could not send •* &c outside and under all circumstances, mor-

than from 2000 to 3000 fighting men into the field. We are not talking of what they will send: judging from what took place at the last war, wo do not believe that 1000 Maoris will at any one time be in arms against tho troops ; but we desire to point out that wo are dealing with a people whose whole military resources do not exceed more than 3000 fighting men. This ie what we have to deal with in tho shape of an enemy. Next we may state that these Natives are, speaking in a military point of view, very badly armed, and very ill furnished with ammunition. Wo know that towards tho close of tho last outbreak they were firing pellets of wood, having no more lead, and we are told by tho Nelson papers that they are already buying up cluldren's marbles to be used as bullets. They aro far from generally armed with rifles, {and old muskets and fowling pieces constitute a great part of their weapons. They are almost without bayonets, and the exertions which they aro said to bo making to get saltpetre shew that they are looking to gunpowder of their own manufacture as a resource, a**} x . -vase oi continuance earily a -»-*--' oi hostilities for any length of tune. Now what are the means at our disposal for meeting this formidable enemy ? First, wo have above 6000 British troops with a tolerably strong force of artillery, with every appliance of modern warfare, including a battery of Armstrong guns. Secondly, we have a militia not yet trained and armed, but which might be so and ought to be so, and which iv both islands must consist of from 20,000 to 30,000 men. Next, we have various corps of volunteers who, if not numerous, are \sell skilled riflemen, and who, we venture to say, were the call to be made by the Government, would in a few clays alono out-number any force the Maoris could bring into the field. And lastly, we have the use and assistance of two or three ships of war, whose crews would, as we know by experience, be far from the least effective part of the forces brought into action. Now we ask our follow colonists as Englishmen and as men to say, is this state of things one which justifies the absurd panic in which the Government lead the van, and set tho example, end which calls for the influx of more troops from all the surrounding colonies, and for submission to the deep disgrace of sending for Sikh Regiments from India? With one half of the force at present in the colony, and a great part of that force orientals, Sir Charles Napier won the Province of Scinde from the most warlike race east of the Euphrates. It would seem as if every spark of the honor and vigor of our race had died out, when we hear of Englishmen who outnumber by thousands a few tribes of half armed, half clothed barbarians, scouring land and sea for assistance in their dire distress. If it were not shameful it would be perfectly ludicrous. We came out from a nation Tvhich boasts itself to be the mistress of the seas, to found a new colony upon shores very thinly inhabited by Natives, and then we send for colored men from another country to defend ua from the inhabitants. What will these Sikhs think of it ? Mere hirelings and mercenaries, having no pride of country or love of hearth and home to fight for,

what can war bo with such instruments but butchery? War conducted in this wny loeee evory elevating every palliating feature. There is nothing wliich strikes us so forcibly in tho history of tho fall of the Eoman Empire aa this fact, that the Romans fought with mercenaries, not because they were physically weak or cowardly, but rich, luxurious, indolent, and in no wise ashamod of allowing others to fight whero it was their duty to fight themselves. If we submit to this, it will bo tho lost evidence wanting of how thoroughly corrupted tho colony has become by a systom which has taken from it all tho responsibility of self defence, and all power of independent action. I A paragraph has been going tho round of the papers, London «Spcotator, , which states that Sir George Grey had demanded 15,000 men to defend the colony. We do not believe tho report j not because Sir Georgo Grey would not ask for any number of troops if he could get them, but because we do not think ho would risk a refusal, which he would bo certain to receive. At the same timo we are sorry to perceive tho,«\mj' i policy at jvor|^-j^ erj Uie poli(jy of g oVeminff by a gwat military expenditure, extracted out of the pockets of English" ratepayers, and expendod amongst those whom he has to govern: Such policy can have but one effect, namely to corrupt and enfeeble the'people on whom it is practised. It is really astonishing to us how all tho Colonial press unites to uphold a policy of hanging in '.helpless dependence [on the resources of the over-taxed population of the Mother Country. We read article after article arguing for our right to be defended, utterly ignoring the obvious counter-argument, that if the empire is bound to defend us, we are equally bound to do our share towards defending it. In India, where England exercises a Government entirely of the sword, she asserts the doctrine that the dependency shall pay fonts own defence to the last farthing. In the colonies of Holland and Spain, the same principle is acted on. In the British colonies of North America before the war of Independence, the idea was never mooted that the colony was to look to external aid for its military defence. A feeble argument is indeed eometimes used in the latter case, that humanity requires the intervention of Imperial forces to interfere between the settlers and the natives; but, oddly enough, this view generally cornea from those organs who insist most vigorously upon the fact that all our difficulties with the Maories have originated with the Government not with the Settleis. But the argument is literally worthless, for the natives were not exterminated so soon in America, I where all relations with them were conducted solely by the Colonists, as in Tasmania and New Holland, where their management was made a matter of Imperial control. Of this result we are very confident. If the colony now does nothing to defend itself—for the Taranaki Militia and Volunteers cannot be called a sufficient colonial force—if, under the wily advice of the Governor, we continue to call for assistance from abroad, we shall co thoroughly and so righteously evoke the disgust and contempt of the Home Government, that by one of those reactions which are so common amongst political forces, we shall soon be left even without that assistance which a manly and selfdenying acceptance of our duties would certainly have secured to us.