THE NATIVES.

Press, Volume I, Issue 21, 12 October 1861, Page 1

THE NATIVES.

What are our present relations with the Natives of the Northern Island ? "We have endeavoured to . irl T U e the questions raised by this sad war, week after week, as regards the justice or injustice of Governor Browne's Policy. Subsequent history often explains passing events, and so it is now. Up to the time when the Government seized the Waitara, there had been no display of force; there cannot be said to have been the smallest fear of violence or outbreak by the Maoris. The seizure of the Waitara was the signal for the Maori outbreak. There was no formal declaration of war, and so now there has heen no ratification of peace; yet the fighting has been over for many months. Governor Browne's proposals for peace have been almost universally rejected, yet peace exists. This state of affairs proves that the Government was the aggressor: as soon as the Government commenced fighting, the Natives rose ; as soon as the Government left off fighting, the war was at an end. Now, what have we got by this war ? "We have paid a good deal of ready money, and run in debt to the tune of £150,000. What is the value of this investment ? "It was a war for land" say one party— " Not at all," says the Governor, "it was a war to assert the supremacy of the Crown." Accept the Governor's view. Suppose it were a war to assert the supremacy of the Crown; has not the result been a most miserable failure ? Is it not the patent and undeniable fact, that the Natives are beyond comparison less loyal to the Governor, and less friendly to the English than before the commencement of hostilities. There is something most sadly touching in the state of the Native mind as described iv our last news from the north. They know that they have no chance with the English. They know we can bring troops without number, and engines of war without limit to compass their destruction. But they are desperate. It is most singular, and most convincingly establishes the view we have from the first taken of native policy, that all the accounts represent the Natives as regarding themselves as the aggrieved and attacked party. They seem to have no wish to attack us. They are wholly on the defensive. They say if they are attacked it is bettor to die fighting ; better that, than to see their race, once the lords of these lovely islands, melt away like the snow on their hill-sides, or worse, degenerate into hewers of wood and drawers of water for the aggressive intruders. "It is a good death to die" they say: —that seems to be their melancholy language. Now, look at the state of the Native mind two years ago ; and can any unprejudiced man say that we have got the worth of our money in the way of establishing the Queen's supremacy in the Northern Island ? Is not the Queen's writ less respected ? Is not the Queen's mail stopped ? Are not the movements of European travellers in the interior more confined ? In every conceivable manner in which you can measure the increase or diminution of the authority and power of Government, and the influence of the law, is it not most evidently and most sadly true, that we are in a far worse position than when we took the fatal step of sizing the land at the Waitara ?

As an assertion, then, of the Queen's supremacy, the went daily proves more and more clearly that the war was a miserable blunder.

"ut it has had even worse evils —what is to come next t At present it is neither peace nor war. It is * state of armed neutrality. We are like the whole "dramatis persona" in Sheridan's Critic, with our daggers at each others throats, but unable to move. »' c surely cannot attack the Natives again. After this long cessation of hostilities on what pretence can jvc attack them again ? The Waitara is ours ; they . iave Emitted to force; according to their own laws it IS ours by right of conquest if not by purchase. That ° Wpter in history is closed. Are we going to attack

the king movement ? How can we consistently do so when we have left it unassaulted for some three or four years ? We do not believe for one moment that Sir George Grey will attack the Natives again. Diplomacy is his weapon—not war. Well then, what a condition we are iv. An enormous army saddled on us, and no chance of speedy release from it. Sir George Grey will never send a man away whom he can keep. We cannot speculate what his policy may be on other matters, but on this point we may confidently prophecy that, whatever else he does, he will never diminish the Military by a single man if he can help it. A large army has been the pecularity of his government whenever he could get it: This then is one terrible result of that imprudent speech of Governor Browne at the Waitara.

And the news by the last mail containing the recommendations of the Military Defences Committee of Parliament renders this result still more alarming. We ventured many weeks ago, in laying before our readers the report of the Departmental Committee on this subject, drawn up as is well known by Mr. Godley,—we ventured to predict that, in the main proposals, that report was certain to be accepted by Parliament, and by the public. Our prophesy has been fulfilled; for the Committee has reported in favour of laying the largest part of the cost of defending the Colonies on the Colonies themselves. The result could not be otherwise. The moment the question is put —shall the people in England be taxed, or the people in the Colonies be taxed, for the defence of the latter, it needs no conjurer to say what the answer is likely to be in the British House of Commons. Right or wrong, whether we like it, or do not like it, we must make up our minda to the end, namely, that we shall have the very largest part of the cost of this great army now quartered in the Northern Island charged on the colonial revenues.

Nor can the Middle Island claim exemption. No part of New Zealand is more guilty than Canterbury in upholding the war. Had the Northern Island stood alone we believe a majority of her members would have opposed the policy of the late government ; but the Middle Island was almost unanimous for the war policy. So then we cannot turn round now, and, when the question becomes one of money, repudiate our share of the burden which our votes and our influence has tended to create.

With Sir George Grey's inordinate love for military expenditure, with a large army on the spot, with the certainty of having to pay the greatest part of the bill, our financial prospects for the next few years are such as must cause the least prudent and most hopeful some considerable anxiety. And greatly will the burden be increased by the consideration that in return for this draft on our resources we have the consolation of knowing that the policy which cost so dear, has achieved so little. Truly Governor Browne had better not say this was a war for supremacy. That is to acknowledge a complete defeat. He had better agree with us that it was a war for land; because at all events we did get some land, although two or three hundred thousand pounds for six hundred acres is rather a long price. In real truth, this w r as a war for land and not for supremacy. Here again the history of events is a complete evidence of the policy. We did not fight to stop murders, or to put down the king movement: the moment the question became one of land we fought. So we left off fighting as soon as we got the land. The king movement is not put down; the Queen's writ will not run farther than or so far as it did; and yet we cease fighting. Can a native be so blind as not to interpret these omens ?

But even as a land policy, has it been successful ? Will the natives sell us more land, or be more willing to dispose of land than formerly ? We believe far less so. The war has tended to strengthen and enlarge the land leagues, because its whole history and

conduct has been su ch as clearly to prove to the Natives that the land, at the bottom of our hearts, whatever we may say to them, or even try to persuade ourselves, the land is -what we really covet and are resolved to have. Many years will elapse before we shall cease to feel the evil policy of this war. "We know well that the views advocated by this journal on the Native Question are not those at present popular in this Province, or generally in the Colony : hut it is not the first instance in English history in which a community has sanctioned a policy which some few years afterwards it came to regret and condemn. There never was a more popular war than the first American "War : yet its authors lived to hear it denounced and condemned by every great statesman and every rational man. So we believe it will be with us. The time ia not far distant when every politician in New Zealand will admit that for the sale of that contemptible six hundred acres of land at the "Waitara, we plunged the colony into vast useless military expenditure, alienated the native mind, checked tbeir civilisation and their amalgamation with ourselves, and stopped the progress of the country to art extent hardly credible. It.will remain as a permanent tribute to the great popularity of Governor Browne, and the great confidence reposed in Mr. Eichmond, that they -were able without serious opposition to inflict upon the Colony so great and enduring a disaster.

Since writing the above, news has arrived from the Cape which renders it highly probable that Governor Grey will be detained at that Colony. The Duke of Newcastle after his high encomiums upon Governor Browne will probably leave him in the government of this Colony. At all events there is now a pause in all action of the Government.: one chapter is at an end, another is to begin. There is a fair opportunity to commence a new era itx the history of the Colony, and we most earnestly hope and pray that the opportunity may not be lost.