Royal Navy's Part in Withdrawal From Greece And Crete

Bay of Plenty Times, Volume LXXVI, Issue 14711, 1 July 1948, Page 5

Royal Navy's Part in Withdrawal From Greece And Crete

Wartime Dispatches

MOST DISASTROUS PHASE OF WAR AT SEA FOR BRITAIN

(X.Z. Press Association) A supplement to the London Gazelle containing’ dispatches train Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham (now Admiral of the PI cel Viscount Cunningham o! {lyuohope, K.T., (i.G.8., 0.M.. D.SL.L.D.). reporting the operations ol; transport in;.'; British forces to (1 recce between Alarcn !- and April 24, 1941, and the withdrawal from Greece which began on the latter date and finished on April 40, was published recent Iv.

Hardly any details are given of the first of these operations, complicated as it was by the traffic having to run the gauntlet ol air attack from the Dodecanese as well as being a possible target for the main-Italian fleet to the westward; but it is. mentioned that during the whole period no men or equipment were lost at sea except fur a few casualties from bomb splinters in one ship. Some ships were lost or damaged, including the cruiser H.M.S. Bonaventure, sunk by torpedoes from a U-boat, and a few empty transports. The second of the operatic ns—known as Operation Demon—is reported in much greater detail, and includes dispatches and narratives from the two Admirals who conducted the withdrawal, RearAdmiral H. T. Baillie-Groham on shore, superintending embarkation, and Vice-Admiral H. D. PridhamWippell afloat, in command of the ships by which it v/as conducted. The Commander-in-Chief expressed high appreciation of the services of

both those officers. “'There is no more difficult task in war than that of conducting a retreat ami re-cmbarkation under pressure from a superior enemy force, in tins case the difficulties were increased by the fact tuai Um British aw cold rnsreiv* woefully inadequate m strength Irani t.Sie first, had come to the c-.iul of i + s rc-ttiirce,: and its aircraft and there was practically no opposition to the Luftwaffe, winch was present in strength and. able to do what it liked.

The rapid advance of the Germans and their use of parachute troops more than cnee disorganised arrangements improvised shortly before. One largo transport, the Ulster Prince, stranded across the fairway at Nauplia, whence; it had been planned to embark a largo number of troops, and prevented destroyers thereafter from reaching the whaAes. Fortunately a number of landing craft had recently arrived and were invaluable in effecting embarkation direct _ from open shore, and a number of caiques wore requisitioned locally and pressed into the same service. The Admiral himself did not leave the principal final embarkation point—Monem-vas-ia—until the beaches had been cleared.

Admiral Pridham-Wippell afloat had no less complex a task. His cruisers and destroyers, as well as the few transports available had to be used tor embarking troops, and the problems of protection afloat and hew to make the most effective use of ships were made all the more difficult of solution since information of numbers embarked was frequently not forthcoming. In spite of these handicaps more than 50,000 troops were withdrawn from Greece in the seven nights available. Losses Off Crete The battle of Crete and the final withdrawal are described by Admiral Cunningham in a despatch issued a week later. The object of the operations which took place from May 15 to May 27, 1941, was to defend Crete, where troops just withdrawn from Greece had been landed. On the latter date it was decided that the island could no longer be held, and from then until June 1 all efforts were directed to the withdrawal. Lord Cunningham, who was C.-in-C. Mediterranean, recalls that all his light forces had been at sea practically without intermission since March 4, and that the final phase of the withdrawal threw on them a strain which was well-nigh intolerable. Four cruisers and eight destroyers had been sunk and practically every ship of the Fleet had been'damaged, two battleships and the only remaining aircraft carrier —the Formidable —so severely as to be unserviceable for some months. Nevertheless, as the Admiral, remarked, “the Mediterranean 'Fleet could claim to have played a worthy * During the land fighting the had landed reinforcements for th>;. Army and had prevented any serL borne invasion. When the withdrawal was ordered some 17,000 British and Imperial troops were brought safely to Egypt and proprevisions and stores were landed for those who had to be left behind. The Royal Marines, after manning the island’s defences, fought gallantly with the rearguard and, had to' leave half their number behind. The British Air Force throughout the near East had been so reduced by operations that it was impossible to maintain any fighter force at all. The Navy’s task of preventing seaborne invasion of the island entailed the ships operating continuously within easy reach of the enemy's unopposed air forces, hut no enemy ship succeeded in reaching' Crete or intervening - in the battle.

Tiro German attack began on May 20 with intense bombing of the princioal British airfields at Malome, closely followed by the dropping of airborne troops. Half the fleet was already at sea south of Crete —the other half at Alexandria ready to relieve it when needing fuel or ammunition—and the heavy ships moved to the westward to guard against interference by the main Italian fleet while the cruisers and destroyers had the task of dealing with any seaborne invading force. At night they swept the waters north of Crete, and on the night of May 21 a large convoy cf coasting steamers, yachts, and caiques, estimated to be carrying 4,000 German troops, was destroyed by a force of British cruisers and destroyers. The next morning a similar convoy was sighted by another British force and some ships in it were sunk. The convoy turned back.

Cruisers and dostoyers continued to patrol Cretan waters at night and one or two more troop-carrying caiques were destroyed; but the

range of enemy air attacks was steadily extended and the Fleet’s losses during daylight began to mount. The military situation worsened steadily. Enemy airborne troops continued to be poured in while the landing of reinforcements, stoves, and ammunition became more and more difficult. At the same time, damage to the Fleet was moimling. On May 27 Genera! Wave!l informed the Prime Iviinr lev that Crete was no longer tenable, and the order to withdraw was given. As much embarkation as possible was carried out in the harbours of Suda Bay and Heraklion on the north coast, but that became impossible. Finally the rearguard had to withdraw across the mountainous backbone of the island to be embarked from open beaches on the south coast. That could be done only at night, and the ships had to leave by 3 a.m. to be clear of the 1 coast, and of air attack, by daylight. Some thousands of the rearguard could not be brought away. On the night of June 1-2, even if it had been decided that any more of those still remaining could disengage and bo embarked, the only ships available would have been two battleship:, and five destroyers; the rest of the Fleet was either too damaged or too slow. So ended what was, perhaps, the most disastrous phase of the war at sea for Britain.