HITLER-MUSSOLINI MEETING

Bay of Plenty Times, Volume LXXV, Issue 14259, 7 January 1947, Page 4

HITLER-MUSSOLINI MEETING

ALLIED INVASION 'OF

SICILY

Great Respect For

Russians

Attack On Italian Airfields

While Allied forces were invading Sicily back in July, 1943, the stillconfident Hitler and his somewhat deflated partner, Mussolini, met in northern Italy to discuss the worsening war condition.

The German record of that meeting and the conversation (or better, Hitler monologue) that occurred there has been made public by the State Department. In time, the Department. intends to publish all the secret German papers captured by the American forces in their battle toward Berlin.

Some interesting sidelights on history appear in the memorandum of that meeting, as well as confirmations of war developments and attitudes of the Axis leaders already known.

Secret Weapon Promised

For example, it was at this meet-ing-that Hitler ifirst broke to Mussolini the news that he had a secret weapon that in six months or so ho would launch against the British, and “against which there is no defence.” However, the Fuhrer wouldn’t tell the Duce any more about the V-l, “as he did not wish to give away any details,” the memo adds. That gives some indication of the trust Hitler had —or did not have —in his Axis partner. This document also confirms the exaggerated egotism that was driving Hitler to his doom. Explaining to the Duce “the basic falsity of the theory that disasters of the present could he made good by later generations,” Hitler informed the Duce “that no greater man was coming after him, who would be able to manage affairs better.” And. he added (in what must have been a martyred tone) : “I a.m sacrificing my whole time and personal convenience in order to obtain the decision in my lifetime.” This meeting, which lasted an hour or more, not only was dominated by Hitler, but monopolised by him. Only twice does the Duce seem to have figured in it at all: Once, when handed a message by an aide, he announced the Allies first air- attack on Rome; and another time when he begged for 2000 Luftwaffe planes to defend Italy and was told it was out of the question. Hitler in this conversation disclosed his great respect for the Russians and also for Marshal Stalin’s iron control of the Soviet home front. After a biting attack on the sloppy defences of Italian airfields that permitted innumerable planes to be destroyed on the ground, he told the Duce: “The Russians have exhibited such excellent airfield discipline, dispersing their machines, protecting them by shelters, repairing damage quickly that attacks on Russian airfields no longer paid.”

His expression of admiration, almost envy, of . Stalin followed a warning to the Duce about Axis doubting Thomases. The sternest measures must be meted out to such, he declared, adding; “Stalin, by the sternest measures, had completely restored the home front which had threatened to collapse.” The major topic of this meeting, it seems from I 'the minutes, centred around Hitler’s bitterness at the shoddy ground organisation of Italian airfields that was costing the Axis innumerable planes. He told Mussolini the field defence in Sicily were “intolerable,” that if the Germans had been as sloppy on the Eastern Front .as the Italians were they already would have been defeated by the Russians. Hitler also displayed the “depth” of the sacrifices he was -personally making to win the war by telling the Duce that he even “had not spared a village where his ancestors had lived when the land was needed to extend an airfield.” And added: “Only one thing counts with me—victory.”

Industrial Defences

The Fuhrer also at this meeting explained to the Duce one of the troubles with his military. They did not always understand “the industrial bases o<f the conduct of the w;ar,” and therefore did net always agree with his defence plans that included: Defending Nikopol for its managanese: defending Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for their chrome, Rumania for its oil. He could fight indefinitely, ho told Mussolini, if he held on.to these sources of war material.

The memorandum does not say whether Mussolini raised the question, or whether the Fuhrer, without prompting, decided to still suspions that perhaps Germany had started the war too soon, before the Reich was fully prepared. At any rate, he told the Duce that “it is wrong to say the war should have been postponed, until a higher degree cf armament had been attained.” It was a.t that point that the Axis leaders were told of the bombing of Rome.

Hitler also disclosed at this meeting that he knew that he was not always setting a true picture of the war’s developments from his .aides. In telling Mussolini to improve the morale cf the airfield ground forces in Italy and make them efficient, he told the Duce to check on it. himself. “Only when you check with your own eyes,” he said, “can you form a picture of the true situation.” And then he gave example after example from his own experience where “for-

tifications had been reported to him as having been completed, which on observation turned out to have been scarcely begun.” This Hitler-Mussolini meeting was hardly one of the major gettogethers of the chiefs of the RomeBerlin Axis. The German report of it, however, does illustrate the depreciating relationship between the two men, and Hitler’s consuming confidence in his own generalship—and his obvious despair that his partner and high command were not built of equally stern and able stuff!