NEW ZEALAND'S PART IN PACIFIC DEFENCE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 146, 22 June 1945, Page 4

NEW ZEALAND'S PART IN PACIFIC DEFENCE

By G. MILLS RODGER

Until menaced by the approach of the Japanese, New Zealand had always been in the happy position of being free from fear and, as a consequence, free from want. In early 1942, 300,000 to 400,000 Japanese troops were on the New Guinea island of New Britain. They were splendidly equipped. Their goal was invasion of Australia— Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria. Had that occupation been accomplished a hungry and successful snatching at the Fern Leaf would have destroyed us. Somehow we had never quite realised the value of strategical position. We realised it then. We became intensely and fearfully interested in places of which until then we had scarcely known the names. Are we going to maintain our interest?

The defeat of Japan will not mean the extermination of the Japanese. The Asiatic races, almost one-half of all humans, will remain. By present policy, the doors of Australia and New Zealand are locked against them; but one factor is overlooked. They are quickly assimilating the arts, sciences and industrial techniques of the West.

If, then, we are to preserve our entity there would appear to be an immediate pressing need of planning a strong policing of the Pacific. There lies the immediate threshhold to Australia and New Zealand and the more distant, but none the less dangerous, doorway to the European world. Three Areas Suggested It may be that Britain's future outfiung bases will be Hongkong, Malay and Australia. Subsidiary Pacific Island bases are, of course, essential. Even the combined forces of Australia and New Zealand are quite inadequate to provide for future Pacific defence. The armed power of a nation is limited by the power of the nation. Pooling of British and United States bases would provide us with a gratifying sense of security. However, we should play our part by contributing a share in those Pacific islands, in our proximity, which are likely to be important in the future. At least three areas, qualifying as potential subsidiary bases, appear to be of primary strategical importance. These would guard not only our own shores against aggression, but also the Island groups adjoining. The suggested areas are (1) part of the island of New Britain; (2) a portion of the Solomons; (3) Fiji. Let us look at them a little in detail. New Britain would form an excellent bastion for front-line defence, first, of the great agricultural hinterland and rich gold deposits of New Guinea; secondly, of Australia. As opposed to the mainland, New Britain has several good harbours. Incidentally, this island, which is the most important of the group known as the Bismarck Archipelago, is 370 miles long.

A base in the Solomons, flanked by New Britain and Fiji, could be made into a strong barrier to the invasion of Eastern Australia. As a matter of interest it has been said that a very large and excellent anchorage, much used by the United States Navy in the Solomons, was previously considered by Admiral Jellicoe to be of such value that he strongly recommended it as a second Singapore. Perhaps contrary to public thought, Guadalcanar is not really suitable as a permanent base. Throughout the entire coastlin. of this large island there is scarcely one safe anchorage. Handling of stores and equipment is costly, awkward and even dangerous in unfavourable weather. Fiji is so strategically placed that its value as a base is too obvious to be stressed. Also it must be remembered that it is an excellent bulwark for the protection of the practically untapped mineral resources of New Caledonia. Some may wonder why a base in the New Hebrides has not been mentioned. Please bear in mind that the bases suggested „ are purely subsidiary. The writer is of the opinion that the wonderful harbour and airfields of Espiritu Santo, together with most modern repair facilities, will already be on a higher priority list than "subsidiary." Uses in Peacetime When the tumult is over, what will happen to places like Guadalcanar? It seems certain that most ofthem will drift back into their former dull tropical apathy, for commercially they are of little value. Guadalcanar may be slightly different. The airfield, whilst out of the way of world routes, will doubtless be maintained as an emergency field and also will handle an increasing amount of inter-island traffic.

It seems very probable that the Solomon Islands, and .Guadalcanar in particular, will become attractive to overseas visitors. On Guadalcanar there are large cemeteries of Americans who paid the price. There is the site of the Battle of Bloody Knoll. There is the landing beach which marked the very first backward thrust of the enemy.

In the past the entire Solomon group was the Cinderella of the Colonial Office. Perhaps much could be done by expert examination of the country's possibilities. It will require money spent, but the powers that be appear to realise that the "old world changeth." The current visit of the assistant secretary to the Colonial Secretary is significant. He is to tour the territories of the Western Pacific High Commission. These embrace Solomon Islands, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Tonga, Condominium of New Hebrides.

Let us hope that in many of these the improvements effected by operational activities can be turned to eco nomic value in peacetime.