FRONTIERS AND THE SECURITY CONFERENCE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 119, 22 May 1945, Page 4

FRONTIERS AND THE SECURITY CONFERENCE

A CHANGE for the better has come over the situation on the ItaloYugoslav frontier, and Marshal Tito has now modified his claims to the extent that, following his withdrawal from Carinthia, he has now announced his readiness to negotiate with Italy cn the question of the sovereignty of Istria, Trieste and the surrounding regions. The Yugoslav leader declares that he has no intention of unilateral annexation, and that he is prepared, prior to the peace conference, to endeavour to find, in agreement with the Allies, a solution which will be satisfactory to both sides and not contrary to the interests of the populations of both territories. This is very different to the defiant attitude which Tito first assumed, and his new-born conciliatory spirit gives room for hope that an arrangement may yet be made which will avoid the necessity for the sterner measures of which General Alexander gave a grim warning when he ordered the evacuation of Rimini. Tito's suggestion remains an attempt to anticipate the general peace settlement, and it may still need modification, but one of the clouds shadowing the discussions at the Woild Security Conference has been lifted, and to that extent a war-weaiy world must be grateful. There remain other clouds on the horizon; their early dissipation is essential to the organisation of international society, among them is the Polish question, and associated with it the evident reluctance of Russia to agree to another conference of the Big Three, that differences which have developed since the Yalta conference may be finally settled and a complete understanding arrived at by the Triumvirs. Another is the stirrings of territorial rivalries in the Balkans, the claims of Rumania and Bulgaria for areas which they have held in the past; and still another is the French claim for sovereignty in the Levant. These open sores threaten the health of the Security Conference and of the peace settlement, as well as the security organisation, and the sooner they can be healed the better. The Polish question, though it has made progress, is still far from settled. The eastern frontier has been accepted on the basis of the Russian claims. On no other terms would she agree to treat the reconstruction of Poland as a joint responsibility of the Big Three, but the vital question of Poland's future as a national State will not be answered until agreement is reached between the three most interested Powers. At the Yalta conference the three leaders affirmed their "common desire to see a free, independent and democratic Poland" under a new Government formed by including "democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad, pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot, all democratic and anti-Nazi parties having the right to put forward candidates." These were the ideals, but how they are to be put into practice is still very much in doubt. The party leaders from beyond the frontier are apparently not being given any chance of assisting in the re-establishment of the republic, and from present appearances only the Lublin Governments is to have any voice in the immediate decisions. This is directly opposed to the Yalta agreement, and it is not remarkable that it has aroused strong feeling. The Russians are realistic; they and their allies have made explicit promises, and they should realise that if those promises are noi fulfilled there will be growing doubts all over the world on the value and stability of the world security organisation.