SUPPLIES A SECRET OF ALLIES' SUCCESS

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 118, 21 May 1945, Page 4

SUPPLIES A SECRET OF ALLIES' SUCCESS

By LT.-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS BROWNRIGG, K.C.8., D.S.O

A IRCRAFT operating over a battle-. ** field are more or less independent of supply arrangements in the field, because they go out and return in a short space of time. An army operating on the ground has neither the speed nor the range to enable it to return to its base after every battle; so there has to be a system of supply in the field. This system is apt to be shrouded in mystery because the terms used to explain it are alien to the lay mind—such as marshalling yards, refilling points, supply and ammunition railheads, and the like. But, if we apply to the supply of an army in the field the principles we adopt to keep ourselves supplied in peace, the arrangements in the field will become much clearer. The ordinary man in his daily life in times of peace has to be clothed,fed, housed, transported to and from his place of work, and to receive attention when he is ill. So does the soldier in war; and he therefore wants uniform and equipment, rations, transport (which requires petrol, oil, lubricants, and spare parts to keep it working), billets (or maybe and hospitals and their subsidiary organisations. But the soldier has an important additional requirement which finds no counterpart in civil life—arms and ammunition with which to put his enemy out of action. Further, unlike the individual man in peace, the soldier at war cannot buy his clothing in a shop, feed himself at a restaurant, house himself in a service flat, nor hail a taxi cab or passing bus to get him to his rendezvous. All these services have to be provided for him, and they are what we know as the supply arrangements.

It was the British success in the handling of these complicated arrangements that paved the way to Germany's collapse. The work of the Royal Army Service Corps as the supply and transport branch of Britain's army, of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps as the universal providers, of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers as the first aid repairers of vehicles, and of the Royal Army Medical Corps as the repairers of men, have played a mighty (and often unrecognised part in victory. The requirements of the Allied Expeditionary Force were constant in regard to certain supplies and variable in respect to others. For instance, a soldier could eat the same ration every day (although it was supplied in varied forms according to his immediate situation); but the amount of ammunition required depended on expenditure, or on the need for dumping prior to the opening of some major offensive. Likewise the quantity of oil, petrol or lubricants was dictated by the mileage performed or expected. Thus in the field there were, so to speak, two main streams —one constant (or constantly increasing as the army increased in size) and the other vari-

J able according to the amount of movement and the severity of the fighting. The Extra Link Germany started with one great advantage in the matter of supply to her forces in the field—railways could be used to take all her requirements from her bases to her railheads. Britain had to consider one complete extra link —the sea passage. Every article sent from Britain to troops in the field had to be handled on at least two occasions, on and off a ship. This entailed special packing for stowage in a ship's hold, and also necessarily wasted time in transit.

The Russians had one special difficulty in the necessity for changing the rail gauge outside the bounds of the Soviet Union to fit the broader gauge rolling stock of their own country (and it is estimated that a mile a day was a good rate of conversion where no extensive demolitions had to be repaired); but such delay was as nothing compared to the constant drag on the speed of transit due to the unavoidable delay at the ports (or beaches) on either side of the Channel.

I have said perhaps enough to explain in brief outline what supply to an army in the field entails; let me now give a very few figures to amplify the outline. On the average a British division required 500 tons of supplies a day, with an additional 100 tons for ammunition when it was actually engaged. These requirements had first to be brought to the ports in Britain, then sent across the English Channel in ships, then be unloaded on the beaches of. Normandy and finally dispatched to the fighting troops by lorry (and later by train). The number of lorries involved can be realised by remembering that their load is usually three tons. A single line of rail is calculated to be capable of supplying 9000 to 12,000 tons a day to a forward railhead, and this would be enough to nourish six to eight divisions. If there are more than that at the end of a railhead the balance of requirements must be made up by- local purchase (not very easy in a starving countryside) or by road transport. After the first landings in Normandy, until some of the French ports were put into partial working order, every commodity had to be landed on the beaches and then sent inland.

Mr. Churchill has said that the beaches in the Seine estuary made the port and harbour of Dover look small in comparison. Even readymade piers were floated across and then sunk in situ to facilitate the quick unloading of stores and the more rapid turn-round of ships. The British supply arrangements were so good that the administrative services were able to maintain the battle better than the Germans could do, despite the extra link— the Channel —with which they .had to contend. For this we must give first credit to the Allied airmen who had cleared the skies of most of the

Luftwaffe before the invasion started and had then set about the task of disrupting the enemy's lines of supply; but the British administrative services took every advantage of the air cover provided; and when history is written the supply arrangements on to and off the beaches of Normandy will, I am certain, be recognised as the most ambitious ever attempted in war. 22,000 Tons of Spare Parts A Month One of the most serious complications introduced by modern mechanised warfare has been the provision of spare parts. One division required 180,000 packing-cases to carry its equipment and took with it nearly 10,000 tons weight of vehicles. To keep the army mobile the Royal Army Ordnance Corps was faced with a monthly provision of 22,000 tons of spare parts and accessories for tanks and guns and small arms alone. At one time in Normandy the supply of spare parts had become so urgent that broken-down tanks were left by the roadside with notices attached, asking other tank crews to help themselves to any spares required to keep them going —a novel way of saving transport space in rear. Of course, in war, supplies at times, are late in arriving or fail altogether. A bombed convoy may mean a hungry division. But troops in an emergency (as in the retreat to Dunkirk) can be fed by the expedient of killing local cattle or using derelict dumps of feed; motor vehicles cannot improvise their needs. And it is undoubtedly true that the destruction of the German Seventh Army at Falaise and at the Seine crossings was largely owing to shortage of petrol and lubricants—due, not necessarily to an actual dearth at the German bases, but to the inability to get it where it was wanted.

Two things hinder an army on the offensive—the enemy in front and the limitations of its own supply arrangements in the rear. It follows that the less there is of hostile opposition in front, the smaller the demands on the supply services for petrol, oil and lubricants to make wide turning movements possible, and the less the ammunition demands to replace expenditure or to build up dumps. This inter-relation-ship between resistance and nourishment explains "the rapid advance of the Russians in July, and the quick over-running of France by the Western Allies in August and September, 1944. The system of supply governs the scope of tactics and strategy: and the crushing defeat of the German army in the field is as much a tribute to the efficiency of the administrative services as it is to the valour of the fighting troops.