THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 39, 15 February 1945, Page 4

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

'J'HE Atlantic Charter, it was learned recently, never existed as a formal document, but it had an existence in the minds of tens of millions of people. However vaguely, it expressed their aspirations, their longing for a world in which all nations would be able to live in safety within their own boundaries, free from fear and want. The declaration, moreover, has been officially endorsed by the countries at war with the Axis Powers; they have subscribed to its "purposes and principles." How stands the Atlantic Charter to-day? In the momentous declaration issued this week, after the Crimea Conference, it was not forgotten; on the contrary, the leaders of the three Great Powers reaffirmed their faith in its principles, and announced decisions (which are unofficially attributed to the influence of President Roosevelt) that, when carried out, should go a considerable way towards giving effect to one of those principles. The third principle of the Charter declared that the United Nations "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and selfgovernment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." These words were included in the statement issued from Yalta, together with an outline of the measures proposed to give effect to them. In every European country liberated from Axis rule, and in every "former Axis satellite State" the help of the three Governments is to be given, if it is deemed necessary, so that the conditions may be fostered in which the peoples may exercise their rights. The ideal objective is evidently the setting up in every European country, except Germany, of democratic political institutions of the kind familiar in Anglo-Saxon countries. Such institutions in the past have become deeply rooted in only a few European countries, for the basic reason that democracy is a slow growth, but the purpose of the Powers is to give them another opportunity, of which, perhaps, they will be better able to avail themselves because what may be called the external framework of Europe is to be thoroughly secured. It-is not intended that small European countries shall have much influence upon international affairs, which will be the concern principally of the Great Powers, who will among them possess overwhelming force. The other principles of the Charter are not specifically mentioned. In the first it was declared that the signatories "seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other," but nobody to-day expects that when the map of Europe, and the map of Africa, are redrawn after the war international boundaries will be found in the same places. The boundaries of the Soviet have already been extended, and if half the growing ambitions of some of Germany's other neighbours are realised the Reich will be much reduced, and by changes which will not "accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Though there will be no sympathy for Germany in such losses of territory, experience plainly shows that forcible annexations are not forgotten, and they are reversed, even generations later, when the opportunity offers. The other principles of the Charter, referring to economic policies, and to "abandonment of the use of force," may be the concern of the forthcoming conference in San Francisco, which is to shape the organisation of international security. There could have been little opportunity at Yalta to discuss economic policy, but declarations concerning it are needed to supplement the political declarations, which may not prove practicable and durable unless agreement can also be reached for the fullest collaboration designed to secure, in the Charter's words, access for all States on equal terms to trade and raw materials.