PROBLEMS OF LIBERATION

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 29, 3 February 1945, Page 4

PROBLEMS OF LIBERATION

far away, who have known only the minor hardships of war, find it almost impossibly difficult to imagine the state of feeling of people in those countries which, after years of German occupation, have been suddenly released. It would seem that among their emotions the dominant and persistent one would be that of thankfulness, for they have regained their freedom. Experience in the countries so far released suggests that thankfulness is dominant only for a short time. The liberating troops are greeted joyfully, and for some days, cr even weeks, there is great harmony. Then comes realisation that though the German invaders have gone, the economic conditions, which their policy of plunder has aggravated, are not easily or quickly removed, or even relieved. More important still, emotions long repressed come to the surface; there is a surge of hatred against those in the country who have collaborated with the Germans. There is a demand that they be punished; there is anger if the demand is not met quickly, and there is impatience with the slew working of the machinery of justice. Allegations that the Government as a whole, or some members of it, are not really anxious to punish collaborators are readily believed, and they become converted into sinister allegations that the Government is "reactionary." Mistrust of the Government, so inspired, deprives it of much of the co-operation which is essential to it in its administrative task, so that the work of rehabilitation, even the measures needed to meet the people's pressing needs, become ever more difficult to accomplish.

The attitude which the Allied Governments ought to adopt in such circumstances is exceedingly difficult to determine. If their military interests are at stake they must have a stable Government. Action which they may take, as in Belgium and Greece, to ensure that instability does not degenerate into ana::chy are likely to be denounced as dictatorial intervention. If they took no action, and military operations were prejudiced, they would be denounced in their own countries for net putting first things first. Yet acts of intervention, necessarily arbitrary in nature, may provoke the kind of trouble they are designed to avert. There is always the danger that the "men on the spot," however correct their intentions, may misjudge the local situation. If intervention takes the form of maintaining in office a Government which is unpopular, military interests may be safeguarded, but the country may make little or no progress towards recovery.

Such difficulties have faced, and still face, the British authorities in Greece and Belgium, and they will not be confined to those countries. They are made worse, and become a fruitful source of dissension among the Allies, because when the authorities and troops are wholly or mainly those of one Power, that Power can be accused of ulterior motives, in pursuing imperialistic policies and in "throttling democracy." Some of these accusations are so extreme, and so ridiculous, that they answer themselves, but suspicion remains. Nor does there appear any easy way of averting such difficulties, or destroying such suspicions. Joint Allied occupation is in theory preferable, but without thorough agreement among the responsible Governments as to the policies to be pursued it might prove worse. But the greatest need is for realisation that countries which have been long under German occupation are, upon thenrelease, not normal, and that in some it is impracticable to restore full democratic government immediately. In none of them can it certainly be said that the existing Government is the one which would be re-elected by the people on a free vote, but there seems no alternative to the policy of allowing sufficient time to elapse for conditions to be created in which that vote shall be really free. After that, unless military needs continue paramount, intervention should cease. /