LATE IN THE FIELD

Auckland Star, Volume LXXV, Issue 181, 2 August 1944, Page 4

LATE IN THE FIELD

it has been reported several times before that Turkey the point of breaking off relations with Germany, the latest reports 1.0 that enect seem likely to be supported by "the event. If so, it ze, 2n event which will cause satisfaction wiaere once it vrould have caused jubilation. The Turks have frequently declared where their sympathies lie, and, according to Mr. Churchill, "there is no doubt about it, "dul, the action they are apparently about to take now would nave earned the Allies' gratitude if it had been taken earlier. Taken now, it will invite the comment that it is impelled mainly by the desire to be on uie side of the victor. Such a motive, of course, must enter into the policy of any small nation, more especially when it has land frontiers and is conscious of being within easy bombing range of a .belligerent Power, and in the earlier 3 r ears of the the Turks could hardty be blamed for preserving their neutrality. Britain, indeed, was well content that Turkej 7 should do nothing to furnish a pretext for a German attack which might have resulted in the German armies descending upon Suez. Some daj 7 v.*e shall learn why they did not do so. Meanwhile It is charitable to suppose that German military policy was at least influenced by the firmness of the Turkish Government. The arguments which Mr. Churchill adduced to support his view that Spain rendered a service to the Allied cause, at a vital stage of the war, simpty D 3* inaction, are surel3 r applicable to the earlier inaction of Turke3".

. But, as tie Allies increased in strength, and at last demonstrated tneir capacity for offensive action, the validity of the Turkish arguments for continuing their neutrality became dubious. Remembering the fate of Poland and Greece, for whom the support of Britain had in the one case amounted to nothing and in the other to far too little, thev- had naturalty insisted on strong tangible evidence of the ability of Britain to go to their aid if they entered xhe w r ar. Such evidence was forthcoming. Mr. Churchill lias revealed that in 1943 alone Turkey received £20,000,000 worth, of British and American arms. The Allied forces also improved enormously their strategical position in the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill has said that in spite of these facts, and even after the collapse of Italy, Turkey maintained what he described as an "exaggerated attitude of caution." She would not enter the war in Februar3 r or March or give the Allies the necessary bases for air action. In consequence, the Allies ceased supplying her with arms, and figuratively washed their hands of her. Action by the Turks now, provided it amounted to more than the severing of diplomatic relations, would be welcome because it would drive one more nail in conm. It would multiply the anxieties of the High Command. It might lead to the speedier liberation of Greece and to th.e speedier defection of Bulgaria from the Axis. The impact of the forces of a fresh ally, now presumably well armed, could be of great importance. But we must w T aft to see what kind of action is taken b3 r the Turks. One of their objects has been to conserve and build up their forces bo that the3 T ma>' be strong when the war ends. Even though they now break off relations with German 7 that object ma3 7 still be influential in shaping their policy.