AMERICA AFTER THE WAR

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 270, 13 November 1943, Page 4

AMERICA AFTER THE WAR

peace settlements crme to be made the United States will play a part in the making of them commensurate with the part she will have played in the war, and with the enormous strength which her armed forces will then have attained. The policy which the United States is likely then to put forward is therefore a question of prime importance for her allies. Will it be a policy shaped by a Democratic Congress with a Democratic President, by a Republican Congress with a Republican President, or by a Republican Congress with a Democratic President? Nobody can yet supply the answer, but present indications are that there will be at least a Republican Congress. Consequently there is speculation concerning the possibility that Mr. Roosevelt if re-elected (for it is not suggested that any other Democrat, if nominated, would be elected) will find himself in a predicament similar to that cf President Woodrow Wilson. As to this, it may be said that although there can be a repetition of the situation it is unlikely that its consequences will be repeated. The consequences in 1919 were, first, that the United States, through the mouth of its President, insisted on the inclusion cf the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles, and then, through the mouth of Congress, rejected the Treaty because it included the Covenant; secondly, that the United States Senate also rejected Wilson's tripartite treaty with Britain and France guaranteeing the Franco-German frontier. In effect the nation in whose name the President had laid the foundation of a new world order repudiated both him and his ideals; it also drew back, as Britain then did also, from a guarantee which the French regarded as vital, and for which in later 3 r ears they vainly endeavoured to find an adequate substitute. Could there be a repetition, after this war, of these happenings? The strongest assurance against it is the knowledge that they occurred. The United States is not less anxious than any other nation to avert a third great war, and Republicans no less concerned than Democrats to devise means to avert it. It is significant that one of the prominent candidates for the Republican nomination, Governor Bricker, has declared himself in favour of American participation in a post-war international organisation to preserve the peace, and has said that the term "isolationist" is meaningless. This was regarded as one of many recent signs that the practical politicians of the Republican party had decided that the "isolationist" label was a serious political handicap, and that to defeat the President the3 r must concentrate public attention on his domestic policy and assert that they agree with him on the essentials of post-war foreign policy. Just as the Republican party of 1943 is not that of 1919, so there are important differences, of temperament and political ability, between the Presidents. Roosevelt understands the art of politics as Woodrow Wilson never did. In 1919 the Republicans were net wholly against the adoption of the League Covenant—a minority of them were willing to accept it in a modified form—but the President refused all compromise. The question was raised again in 1920, but again there was a deadlock. It is extremely unlikely that President Roosevelt would fail to foresee, and fail to prevent, such a situation. But more important than these possible factors in the determination of the ultimate United States attitude towards, and place in, the post-war world is the certainty that on both sides of the Atlantic it is realised, as never before, that international peace cannot be secured only by the establishment of political organisations, however idealistically conceived. They need power behind them, for without it they invite the aggression of those who glorify power as an end in itself.