MR. NASH'S REPORT

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 81, 6 April 1943, Page 2

MR. NASH'S REPORT

j\/TR. NASH, who - returned yesterday from Washington, had the honour and the great responsibility of becoming New Zealand's first Minister there. Save only the Prime Ministership, no other official post held by a New Zealander is so important, and when Mr. Nash was appointed to it there was a widespread opinion that in the circumstances no better choice could have been made. That opinion has been confirmed during the twelve months of his office. New Zealand to-day is more widely and favourably known in the United States than ever before. As Mr. Nash properly acknowledged yesterday, that is primarily attributable to the deeds of her fighting men, beginning with the participation of H.M.S. Achilles in the action against the Graf Spee, but it is attributable also to the Minister's own activities, in the course of which he has gained a wider audience than would normally be expected for the representative of a minor State. In consequence, the place of New Zealand in Pacific strategy, and its material needs, have had full and generous consideration in the United States, with results which have greatly increased the Dominion's sense of security and its ability to play the part it desires to play in the Pacific war. As Mr. Nash undoubtedly would have been blamed if these results had not been forthcoming, he is entitled to credit when they have become, as they have become, actual and visible. In his first public statement Mr. Nash expressed the welcome view not only that the conception of a "holding war" in the Pacific is wrong, but that it is recognised in the United States as wrong; and he declared that a force is being built up that will give the Japanese "a terrible shock." In this he repeats, in effect, the declaration of President Roosevelt at the beginning of the year. The frequent and urgentlyphrased representations of the Australian Government since then have created a strong impression in these parts that, whatever the intention may be, the air and naval forces allocated for the Pacific war are insufficient to do more than hold the Japanese, and that the enemy is being given time for consolidation of his conquests. Clearly in Mr. Nash's statements is the implication that forthcoming events will dissipate this impression. We shall await those events with hope, qualified by the thought that the United Nations have a colossal task ahead of them in Europe, and—as Mr. Nash himself said —it would be dangerous so to divide their forces as to make them ineffective both in Europe and the Pacific. But Mr. Nash may mean that the contention of General "Mac Arthur and the Australian Government —that a relatively small increase in strength in the Pacific could be safely authorised and would bring disproportionate gains—has been accepted. If events prove this to be so, it will be glad news. For the prospects, and the prospective duration, of the Pacific war are of grave importance for New Zealand. They are questions which far outweigh, in practical importance for the Dominion, those other questions in which Mr. Nash is keenly interested, and of Avhich also he has spoken. The relationship between Britain and the United States, the relationship between both and Soviet Russia, the needs of China—these are indeed questions of great weight, in which New Zealand is interested, but in which New Zealand cannot expect to have an influential voice.