VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE BATTLES

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 74, 29 March 1943, Page 2

VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE BATTLES

THE strength and tenacity of the Axis forces' resistance in Tunisia "*■ furnish a warning of what is ahead of the Allied armies before final victory can be theirs. It is evident, and not unexpected, that the Germans have made good use of the time necessarily allowed them while .General Eisenhower was overcoming the difficulties of organisation and supply, and while General Montgomery was assembling his strength for 'the attack on the Mareth Line. Rommel's prompt rejoinder to the opening attack made it plain that the Allies' "closing in" plan will not, if he can prevent it, be executed quickly or without paying a considerable price. Nevertheless there is an underlying confidence that the British, American and French forces will not for long be frustrated. This confidence seems to be based on the knowledge that Rommel's position is inherently difficult, and also on the expectation that the Allied air forces will make it impossible for him to sustain violent conflict. The heavy artillery duel which has been going on will swallow up enormous quantities of munitions, and their replacement, in the face of Allied air attacks, at sea, on the ports the Germans are using and on the lines of communication, will be excruciatingly difficult. However, the Allies also have a major supply problem. Though their supply line is better protected than the German, it is tremendously long, and this factor may result in a prolongation of the campaign.

Undue prolongation of the campaign is just what the Allies cannot ifford Their plans were completed at Casablanca for nine montns mead; three of those months have nearly passed. The Allies' interest lies n forcing the conflict, so that its preliminary phase may be ended as ;oon as possible. Hitler, it should be realised, has not turned wholly to the defensive. He is at this moment prosecuting a deadly attack, which if it should succeed, would win him the war, or at least make it impossible for the Allies to win it. The increasing battle at sea— the secret battle, as it has been called—is of crucial importance. Unless the Allies can maintain and increase the slight ascendancy which recent statements have suggested, then land operations on the Continent, on the considerable scale expected, cannot be launched. When the records are made public it may be found that the delay in launching the attacks on Tunisia was due in part to the U-boat warfare, which is being intensified and is likely to reach its height in the next two or three months. In this struggle, of which so little is heard, the course of the war is being decided. A great responsibility rests on the British and American naval forces, and on the merchant seamen, without whose unyielding spirit the campaign in Tunisia could not be carried on. The military campaigns and the air operations over Germany are regularly reported; we can form opinions as to how they are going. But the sea battle which goes on all the time, and on which the successful prosecution of the air offensive depends, as well as the successful conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, is invisible and unreported. It is, nevertheless, the greatest battle of all.