JAP. STRENGTH

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 40, 17 February 1943, Page 2

JAP. STRENGTH

UNDER-ESTIMATED

MR. GREW WARNS U.S.

JAPAN won't "crack" as Germany did in 1918, and as Germany will again—Japan won't be "mopped up" after Germany is defeated—there is 'no easy way of beating her—the Allies are under-estimating her, and they will not Tjeat ner until they exploit her weaknesses by determined and aggressive action Such are the views which the former U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, is ceaselessly impressing on his countrymen. He is-travelling throughout the country speaking everywhere as he seeks to arouse Americans to the realities of the Pacific war. . "There is no room in the Pacific for ourselves and swashbuckling Tokyo," he declares. "Unless our war production and fighting spirit increase, unless we abandon the hope of leading normal lives and leaving self-sacrifices to our soldiers we risk a stalemate in the Pacific. "It is my duty to tell the United Nations of the power of the Japanese Army and Navy, and the fighting spirit of the Japanese Empire. We are up against a powerful fighting machine whose morale cannot, and will not, be broken even by successive defeats, who will certainly not be broken vy economic conditions." Army "Trained in China" Mr. Grew declares it a great mistake to imagine that the long conflict in China has sapped Tokyo's strength. "The Japanese Army, because of the magnificent resistance of Marshal Chiang Kai-sliek,' eventually floundered in China, but it received invaluable training in tactics it could use in subsequent conquests. Mr. Grew is "completely shocked" by the supposition in America that Japan could be mopped up after Germany is defeated. He adds: ''The Germans will crack as they did in the last war, but the Japanese won't crack, even when eventual defeat stares them in the face. They will pull in their belts another notch and reduce their ration from a bowl to half a bowl of rice, and fight to the bitter end. "Those who have not lived in Japan cannot conceive the overweening confidence of the Japanese army and navy, their overweening ambition and determination to, conquer and subjugate portions of "the Occident, just as they have temporarily taken large sections of the Orient. In the months since his return to America, Mr. Grew has not grown accustomed to the sharp contrast between the Japanese and American civilian standards of living. He has consistently hammered at the point that the nation must strip itself of its last ounce of fat.

Diplomatic Trickery He particularly fears that Tokyo will attempt to catch the Allies off their guard with a peace offensive if the military campaign temporarily proves too difficult "They are even likely to form a seemingly Liberal Government to make peace and obtain a breathing space in which to prepare another savage attack for the domination of East Asia and the South Pacific," he warns. "I reiterate the conviction that the Japanese militarists seek the conquest of the United States,, so that the defeat of Japan, although difficult, is necessary. "I warn the Allies against Japan's employment of jiu-jitsu in the military . and diplomatic fields—deliberately retreating and allowing the adversary to take the initiative, lulling him into dropping his guard, after which he is destroyed in a lightning attack." Our Misbeliefs Mr. ftrew believes the Allies are suffering psychological handicaps in fighting the Pacific war, and are not exerting their full power because they still believe there is some easy way of beating Japan. He instances what he believes to be misconceptions: First, that the Japanese, a "slave people," will necessarily be beaten by free men exercising individual initiative. He says Japan is none the less powerful because the people are not free. Secondly, that Japan's cities burn like tinder with relatively few bombings. He explains that the enemy has highly-organised fire-fighting and A.R.P. divisions, and, furthermore, that cities which live in constant expectation of natural disasters can be rebuilt easily and quickly. Thirdly, that Japan could quickly be starved into submission by blockade. "Even assuming that the American Navy could hold the narrow and dangerous Straits of Tsushima, where the Russian Fleet perished in 1905, Japan has her own garden agriculture, and her own fisheries." Fourthly, that the Allies' superiority in industrial capacity will necessarily mean victory. "We must beat the Japanese in Japan. Ido not encourage the supposition that they will surrender because we attain statistical superiority of weapons or reconquer some occupied territories—if the Japanese were breakable they would not have started the war in the first place.

"It Has Everything" "Japan," says Mr. Grew, "is potentially a stronger military Power than the United States-. It is a new and terrible Power born in 1942; it has everything a great Power needs— food, rubber, coal, iron, electricity, and labour. All it lacks is time. She has everything else needed for victory. If Japan could beat indomitable China, organise her present holdings and consolidate her position, she could become "the strongest Power in the world." Despite his assessment of Japanese strength, Mr. Grew believes that the final victory in the Pacific will go to the Allies provided they are willing to fling in their last man and last ton of material. He is primarily concerned with awakening America to the need for marshalling her great resources and is content to leave military and naval exDerts to determine the way these resources should be employed. "Japan, despite ' her unparalleled expansion, has not succeeded' in removing the strong Allied positions on the flanks of her defensive chain. It is, of course, axiomatic that each advance creates the need for a further advance to protect the new position. Nevertheless, Japan hoped that by concerted campaigns, she could drive back her enemies such a distance that she would be able to halt her forces on a natural defensive line. "Finally it is a weakness that Japan's communications and transport must largely be by water, and as we have seen in America, these are always extremely vulnerable. "Japan is not a country able to replace shipping losses easily, and this may well prove a big factor in her ultimate defeat. "I emphasise that such weaknesses will not, of themselves, cause Japan's defeat, unless they are exploited by determined and aggressive octinri."