BATTLE IN TUNISIA

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 39, 16 February 1943, Page 2

BATTLE IN TUNISIA

DECAUSE it is the indispensable preliminary to greater activities, the campaign now rapidly developing in Tunisia is one that must be won, and won quickly. If, as is generally' assumed since the Casablanca conference, the Allies have agreed on a broad plan for an invasion of Europe, they have also agreed on a time, in which case they have calculated approximately how long it should take to overcome the Axis forces in Tunisia. Any serious setback there would theiefoic have consequences much wider than those immediately apparent. Iho CiCimans, of course, are well aware of the importance of then lunisiun "bridgehead." While they hold it they will stave oil' the threat of Allied operations on the Continent at a time when their forces in Russia arc suffering heavv reverses. It has become more important than evci before that they should avert as long as possible the necessity of lighting on a major scale on two fronts at once. Hence they \\ill defend the "bridgehead" with the utmost determination, and both President Koo.sevelt and Mr. Churchill have warned their 'peoples that severe and possibly costly fighting lies ahead. Mr. Churchill also said last week that the operations in Tunisia would soon advance to an important climax. The Allies' endeavour has been to hem in the Axis forces in Tunisia as close*]v as possible, to prevent Rommel's retreating army from joining them and to harass Axis communications on sea and land. The Germans aim has boon to resist this pressure, and if possible to press inland from the ports which they hold and establish themselves in the strongest natural positions. Now a severe clash—apparently on a larger scale than any before if—has occurred in central luntsia, and the Lniti.il States forces which were engaged have been forced back. I here need be no doubt that this reverse is temporary and that, it will be speedily retrieved If as appears, the Americans encountered Kommel s panzers as the spearhead of an attack, they encountered a force which the Eighth Army learned to respect. The Eighth Army also learned how to defeat it, but it had to "buy" the lesson at a heavy price. Ihe Americans, though linely equipped and full of spirit, will also have to bu> thou experience; there is no other way. in respect of this 1 excise it may be found that the Germans, through their possession of handier bases, were able to establish air superiority at the time and place it was needed. When the Allies can bring their air power to bear either the Tunisian campaign will end quickly or there will be a battle ro\ al which may decide the issue of air mastery over territories much larger than Tunisia.