THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 37, 13 February 1943, Page 4

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

THE Russians' great offensive has acquired a momentum which makes it exceedingly difficult to stop, and nearly every day centres long occupied by the invaders are being recaptured. Almost it seems that the Germans cannot now consider any place safe, and the tone of their commentators suggests that they are approaching that state of mind. The Germans, it must be remembered, have not been inured to defeats. They have had a long feast of victories, of which the great majority have been genuine, although some have been spurious. Their propaganda, which has dealt habitually in superlatives,- has sometimes emphasised the difficulties of the German armies, as it did last winter, but its cumulative effect has been to create an impression that the Wehrmacht always triumphs in the end, and that the enemy, although stupidly (and even unfairly!) resisting, has been rendered incapable of reversing the defeats inflicted upon him. Now, it seems, the Geimans are being shocked into forgetting much that they have been encouraged in the past to believe. Who, a few months ago, or even a few weeks ago, would have thought that the Berlin radio would this week be telling Germans that the whole of their force in South Russia is in grave danger, and retreating under "appalling conditions ? The effect of admissions of that kind, following upon the official mourning for the disaster at Stalingrad, is not easy to estimate. The effect of some comparable announcement in British countries would be great, but in Germany, following on all that has gone before, it must be vastly greater. The German leaders, however, do nothing without a purpose, and in admitting and even emphasising the magnitude of some of the reverses their armies are suffering in Russia their purpose undoubtedly is to arouse their people, already hard driven, to make even greater efforts for the Fatherland. Those efforts, we should expect, will be made; the possibility that shock, disillusionment and war-wearmess will have any decisive effect on the German home front at this stage is not one to be entertained. Nor should we exclude the possibility that the Germans, despite their apparent loss of confidence, are preparing fresh operations for the spring. The Russian offensive has been going on for almost three months, and the difficulties of maintaining it will increase. Great as its gains have been, it has still to reduce and recapture the line of strongholds upon which the Germans have relied, and hitherto successfully relied. The great importance of the offensive so far as it has gone lies first in its irrefutable proof of Russian strength, in spite of losses which have been cruelly great, and in the ability, sometimes doubted, of the Russian command to conduct offensive operations on an enormous scale; and secondly, in the world-resounding blow it has struck at German military prestige. Whether the disaster at Stalingrad and the collapse of the Caucasian campaign, which was in part its consequence, were due 'to ex-Corporal Hitler's faith in his intuitions, or to a major misjudgment of his advisers, the effect of the blow is the same. In the months of last year when Russia's plight was extreme there arose the demand for a "second front." It was premature, and everyone can now see why the Allied leaders did not, and could not, yield to it. But the need for a "second front," on a far greater scale than that represented by the operations in North Africa, is great to-day, though for a different reason. Then, the purpose was to create a diversion in order to relieve the Russians; now, its purpose would be to enable the speedier exploitation of the victories which the Russians have since won. German disquiet consequent upon events in Russia would be immeasurably increased if on another front the Wehrmacht were also faring badly. It is not faring badly to-day, and Mr. Churchill's estimate of the size of the Axis force in Tunisia emphasises the magnitude of the task which there faces the Allies. The Casablanca conference, and Mr. Churchill's report to the House of Commons, furnish an assurance that the task is to be tackled with the utmost determination and vigour. Upon the success of the forces under General Eisenhower must largely depend the ability of the Russian armies to sustain their offensive, and prevent the Germans from preparing a counter-offensive in the spring.