STRATEGIC VALUE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 236, 6 October 1942, Page 3

STRATEGIC VALUE

PACIFIC OFFENSIVE

Prevented Japanese Attack

On Siberia

NEW' YORK. Oct. "Although the campaign in the south-west Pacific seems infinitesimal compared with the clash of the hosts in southern Russia, it might be made almost as decisive as the latter, ' states the Herald-Tribune in a leading article, "since the southwest Pacific has strategic possibilities out of proportion to the numbers engaged.

'While it would be a grave mistake to regard the Pacific campaign as a substitute for a body blow which must sooner or later be delivered against Hitler in Europe, it would be an equallj r grave mistake to regard the Pacific purely as defensive holding operations. The defensive actions of the Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomons apparently had an unforeseen positive strategic effect. They probably saved India. An attack against India would require the use of the Bay of Bengal under cover of sea power, but the Japanese Navy has not appeared in the Bay of Bengal since its heavy losses in carriers and cruisers in the Pacific.

"It can be said, though with less confidence, that the Pacific operations have prevented a Japanese attack on Siberia. Meanwhile the threat which Port Moresby and Guadalcanar together represent to the Japanese bases and communications in the East Indies evoked a powerful Japanese counter-attack, which was repulsed with heavy losses. Japan either no longer possesses or is no longer willing to risk aviation for simultaneous operations in the Solomons and New Guinea

"If our commanders regard all this in a purely defensive spirit the Japanese will undoubtedly return. But if we are really denting the Japanese air and shipping strengths there are offensive possibilities which, pressed vigorously, could seriously upset the whole balance in East Asia."

Although neither the Japanese nor the United Nations have been able to build up an offensive superiority in the south-west Pacific capable of decisive results, the situation is unlikely to degenerate into a long drawn-out stalemate, writes Major Fielding Eliot in the Herald-Tribune. Both sides have shown ability to

fight and a willingness to take risks. One or the other will advance again soon. The indications are that it will be the Allied side.

Major Eliot quotes as an example General Mac Arthur's reported torpedo plane attack on Japanese shipping, probably hitting three light cruisers and two merchantmen. General Mac Arthur's torpedo planes are either land-based, which is a newdeparture, or else his small naval force has been reinforced by accretion, including an aircraft-carrier. Persistent air attacks on Japanese bases in the western Solomons also seem to suggest a coming offensive.

If the Allied forces in New Guinea can push the Japanese back north of the mountains and begin threatening Kokoda, it would be a suitable moment for our forces in the Solomons to advance towards Bougainville and Santa Ysabel Islands, to the north of Guadalcanar Island. The Japanese, menaced at their outposts both in the south-west Pacific and the Aleutians, must decide where tu concentrate and what to do.

If the enemy withdraws from tno Aleutians, the Japanese must expect, an immediate attack on their positions on the Kurile Islands, just north of Japan, which will bring pressure against the northern islands of Japan itself. If Japan decides to make a great effort to drive the Lnited Nations from the Solomons they must do so quicklv, before the Allies seize more of their present bases, and especially before the Allies succeed in outflanking them by driving them from eastern NewGuinea.