SAVING FACE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 134, 9 June 1942, Page 5

SAVING FACE

JAPANESE ATTACKS Recent Action Analysed By U.S. Navy Chief T , . „ WASHINGTON, June 8. in J statement concerning the oackground of events lead mg up to the Midway Sd battle Kine bee " Issued b y Admiral E. J. State's United raitf ft ™ B^& adier ;General Doolittle's raia on Japan General - Marshall Army Chief of Staff, and I both felt' knowing Japanese psychologv that ?n epi ?if al in kind was inevitable Vr SHm that they might save face em r ph S SeTihfrpota? ° f War " also was an additional reason to be on l U J r f 't fler ! he Coral Sea battle we lost touch with the heavy Japanese forces engaged. They disappeared f 6 radius of ou f immediate means of reconnaissance, but we have considerable numbers of submarines sprinkled about the Western Pacific which were able to give us a good deal of at least negative information. . 6

"It was apparent after the Coral Sea action that the Japanese would nave to go somewhere and do something. Among our various important outposts Dutch Harbour and Midway Island offered them the best chance of an invasion with some hope of success. At the same time we were fully aware that they might renew their actions in the Coral Sea even though they had recently been stung there.

America Was Prepared To this extent we were prepared for an assault on Midway and recognised that Alaska also might be attacked. You know generally the line of communications we have to protect toward Australia, but you probably do not realise the large forces needed to protect a line length. All these factors had go be evaluated. Decision to act had to be taken on the basis of the calculated risk.

"Midway has been greatly strengthened since the attack on Pearl Harbour. As the Japanese now know, the radius of our effective air scouting from that island extends for a distance of at least 500 miles. What they do not know, and I do not propose to tell you, is the actual limit of that aerial reconnaissance radiu<= "Certainly if we had known exactly when, where, and in what force the enemy intended to strike we might have afforded some diversion from our other vital areas of protection, but. as results will prove I believe we shall have nothing 'to apologise for in the present action. "I cannot give details of our forces engaged, or ready to be engaged The Japanese probablv do not exactly know them, but they have cause to know plenty." Admiral King said the full account of the Coral Sea naval battle would be made public shortly.