The Auckland Star The Auckland Star WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News,The Echo and The Sun. THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1942. VICHY AND MADAGASCAR

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 106, 7 May 1942, Page 6

The Auckland Star The Auckland Star WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1942. VICHY AND MADAGASCAR

IJNOER the instructions of the Government they recognise, the French forrps in Madagascar arc resisting the British forces sent to occupy the naval base of Diego Suarez, so that once again, as at Oran and Dakar and In Syria. Briti.-h and French are in armed conflict. It is a tragic spectacle, but an unavoidable one. The last opportunity to avoid it. was given by the British oflicer commanding, in the form of an ultimatum, but. this was rejected. So far as the French soldiers are concerned, they are obeying orders, and the British can but honour the foe while they strike him down. The responsibility for the conflict lies on Vichy, with tho Government which pretends that its policy is merely to protect and preserve French territory against all-comers. That pretence would bo more convincing if Japanese aggression in Indo-China harl been resisted; but Indo-China was surrendered. Perhaps it had to be surrendered, in tho face of the greatly superior forces which the Japanese had at hand. If so, Vichy could have explained to its German overlords that Madagascar, too, must he yielded, for the reason that the British force was overwhelming and the defenders could not be reinforced. But no, the Vichy Government, knowing full well that if the British were forced to fight there could be only one outcome, has condemned French soldiers to a conflict which can serve no purpose— except the purpose of Germany.

The cc.nflicts of Oran, Dakar and Syria naturally promoted ill-will to the Hritish among many Frenchmen, and German propaganda did its best to intensify it. But the conflicts did not lead to a state of war between the former Allies. What will be the outcome of the conflict in Madagascar? The British Government has done much to avoid giving V ich.v any excuse from moving further from passive submission to the Germans to active collaboration with them, but under Laval it seems certain that Vichy requires no excuse. Laval is willing, and eager. How far h* will go nuv-now that the conflict in Madagascar furnishes him with a propaganda weapon—depends perhaps most of all on the state of French feeling. <,n the ability of Frenchmen Mho are neither proGerman nor pro-British to perceive through the fog of war where lies the iM'ue interests of their country. Nothing suggests. that Laval has been able to Instil his hatred of Britain into a substantial number of lu ol " that if he attempts to lead them into a war against the British he will find nearly as many followers as resisters. In these circumstances it may not suit even Eaval's German masters to encourage an open breach with Britain and the United States. Such a breach might result In throwing a heavy strain on the German army of occupation an <' ; v ® n in an enforced extension of the area occupied. Simultaneously with tie British move against Madagascar it was announced that the actio* had the full approval and support of the United States, and "any warlike act permitted by the French Government . . . would be regarded by the United States as an attack on the United Nations as a whole." To that strong intimation of Allied solidarity Vichy has given a weak and equivocal reply. We may hope it is equivocal because Laval realises tnat, although he has long since made his choice as between the United Nations and Germany, he knows that the French people will not make th*> same choice.