"ELIMINATE THAT SUBMARINE!"

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 212, 8 September 1941, Page 6

"ELIMINATE THAT SUBMARINE!"

THERE is no occasion to magnify the importance of the Greer incident or to suggest that it brings American participation in the war from the background into the middle distance, but that its effects will grow becomes more plainly evident each day. President Roosevelt has already left little doubt as to his extreme concern over the matter. In the course of a few days he will tell the American people exactly what he thinks about it, and he will probably be very outspoken in summing up the effects on the policy of the United States of such a challenging attack upon its Atlantic policy. The German authorities' reaction to the attack followed the fantastic course which they have habitually adopted in both the last war and this. First they made the usual dcclai ation that a British submarine must have fired the torpedoes in an effoit to bring America into the war. That was so promptly and emphatically dismissed by the American naval leaders that Goebbels changed his ground and asserted that the destroyer attacked first and the submarine fired in self-defence. A four-hour inquiry was sufficient to utterly disprove that, and the Americans lost no time in telling the Germans that they did not expect lying statements from the High Command of the German Navy. The effect of this sharp criticism was another change of front and an assertion that as the destroyer was not sunk the incident was of no importance. President Roosevelt will have his own opinion upon that, and he will no doubt reject it as firmly and as finally as he did the first three brazen excuses.

No one can foretell what form the rejection will take, but the reference already made by Mr. Roosevelt to an attack in "American waters" is significant, and the chances are that it will at least have the effect of intensifying the United States patrol not only in the western Atlantic but right up to the limits of the neutrality zone into which American vessels are not to-day permitted to penetrate—it may soon result in those limits being pushed stiil further eastward. When the President announced the landing of his forces in Iceland he declared that this was in accordance with American policy of refusing to permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack on the Western Hemisphere. The occupation of Iceland by Germany, he said, would constitute a serious threat of great dimensions, for it would be a threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American continent, a threat to shipping in the north Atlantic and against the steady flow of munitions to Britain, which was a matter clearly approved by Congress. It was imperative, he added, that the approaches between the Americas and this strategic Atlantic outpost should remain open and free from all hostile activity or threats. Consequently he had issued orders to the navy that all necessary steps be taken to ensure the safety of communications and approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

The phrase "all necessary steps" is capable of a very wide interpretation. Without any strain it might lead to a complete crossing of the Atlantic without a declaration of war; at its widest it could mean an acceptance of the challenge implied in the attack, and instead of merely reporting the presence of U-boats the American Navy may be instructed to adopt a much firmer attitude. With complete candour the President admitted when authorising the landing at' Iceland that he had taken a serious step which might precipitate fighting—but he did not think so. He was right, but the Germans are now getting close to starting something which they may find it difficult to finish