Mystery Of Air Reserves

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 205, 30 August 1941, Page 11

Mystery Of Air Reserves

jhere ; s much talk about British and German "reserves of aircraft," but little attempt to explain the term to the public. Why, when the production of aircraft is counted in thousands a year, do we see comparatively few warplanes in action at a time on either side?

That is what the average citizen wants to know, and doesn't find out, states Air Commodore P. F. M. Pellowes, D.5.0., in an article in the paily Herald (London). I will try the mystery—but first, I am afraid, I must add to it by saying tnat there is a multiplicity of factors in this question of reserves—and tney are all pulling in different directions. fighter Reserves Consider one type of aircraft—the This type, because of its Junctions, its high speed, its small 2, and consequent ease of reproaK, ~1 1S regarded as an "expendfr.ie type. A very large reserve of _ ty P. e of aircraft is needed, wnetner it be employed in defence or 10 offensive sweeps. aiJil < i? ens ' ve sweeps the reserve of nw? would be higher—though not nvi* because fighters which crash recovered my territory cannot be

air^V°™ der the P i,ots for these r employed in defence the comnl ?■ P llots required would be small, except in a rpop®' But ln _ offensive sweeps the Sp v. must b e. larger. In the first if <?Vin^ U i SeG ' P' lots our aircraft, ahlp" aro "recoverare n«t »i e ln second case thev the enemy y remain in the hands of site°^rl ak r aircraft at - the oppoland T h " f th , ls scale—the Sundercomnidvit Planes, because of their r enlacen-ion't Hlze " c ' X!)ensG and slow exDenriahl ♦ are not regarded as an riot ype - anc l are therefore used on uneconomic missions. aircraft they are comfortable same qtroo y ,n ', and do not put the Sfler m° n their cre jP s that the faster air, • unc °mfstable and Question nf impose. Hence the crews fnr thi CS , Grves of aircraft and cannot ho S i i ge type of aircr aft standards ged al all by fighter

flamaeo i.? ok at another aspect— aircraft ff rc Sed lr V a fi 6 ht or by antiWeatW ir 0r by landing in bad varies tohi, re again the problem ternsH w type of aircraft conthe Dart^fp o *? affected greatly by damage is done. world in which the

For instance, in and around Britain larger reserves of bomber aircraft are required to maintain first-line strength than would be required in the Middle East. Weather conditions are more difficult here— and, of course, the opposition from Nazi fighters and anti-aircraft fire is much fiercer.

On the other hand, reserves in the Middle East—though less affected by these factors—must be large enough to meet the greater difficulty of replacement. Fortunately, the technique and maintenance of the R.A.F. and the quality of its machines, are oi" a high order.

Our planes, then—subject to the fortunes of war—have a reasonably long life. This factor, by itself, reduces the size of the reserve we need. But the very excellence of the aircraft makes repair work a lengthy business, and so, paradoxically, increases the needed reserve again.

Again, because we are a widelyspread Empire, the time required to pack, load and transport—and then to unpack and re-erect in the land where operations are in progress — enhances the need for a large reserve. And there are still more complications. We must not forget that pilots and air crews are only human beings. Living under high nervous stress, they must be treated and considered more like accumulators than normal routine workers. They can only be used a certain number of times and for a certain length of time before they use up their nervous energy, and have to be given not only prolonged rest, but change of occupation. Front Line Craft Probably the most expensive form of warfare in reserves is the blitz system, where everything is thrown in "regardless"—particularly the dive-bombers. To maintain a blitz over one week, the reserves of crews for front-line aircraft may be twice as high as it is for ordinary bombers or fighters.

The fully-trained crew of a bomber may take a year to train, and of a fighter, three-quarters of a year. Aircraft of either type, of course, can be built in a much shorter period.

It follows, therefore, that the production of trained men needs even more intensity of effort than is required for the production of aircraft. And this situation complicates our question of reserves yet a lrctle more raising the demand for training aircraft.

From all this—without going into figures which must be secret—we can at least see one thing plainly:

If we hear of a country producing, say, 30,000 aircraft a year, we can safely assume, after deducting training aircraft and the necessary reserves of all types, that only a very small proportion of that number is available at one time for first-line operations. One-tenth is a fair proportion. I think—and of that reduced force, 50 per cent must ordinarily be kept for defence.

All the same, this rather comforting analysis must not be allowed to affect our judgment of what could be done in one great moment of carefully prepared, intensive effort, such as an invasion of Britain.

In such a moment —though the effort could not be sustained for long—the Germans could effectively bring a very large number of aircraft, supplemented by gliders, into action against us.

If we knew how many gliders or troop-carriers they had built, we could forecast their intention with confidence—for it is against these islands alone that this particular £prm of aircraft is vital to any chance of success.