The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evrning News. Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1941. TURKEY'S DILEMMA

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 109, 10 May 1941, Page 8

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evrning News. Morning News, The Echo and The Sun.

SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1941. TURKEY'S DILEMMA

For the caute that lacks attittanet, For the vyrong that need* retiatanc*, For the future in the dittanee, A nd the good that we can do.

The disclosure in the House of Commons by Mr.'Lloyd George that Turkey had permitted German ships to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and seize islands in the Aegean Sea is disturbing in its implication that the Turkish leaders are disposed to interpret loosely the terms of their country's alliance with Britain. Mr. Churchill, as reported, "reminded Mr. Lloyd George that Turkey had no right, under the Straits Convention, to prevent ships passing through the Dardanelles while at peace'; but it could hardly be contended that the possibility of such a passage being permitted was ever foreseen by anyone at the time the alliance was signed. It was not foreseen, because, under the terms of the alliance, it was assumed -that before this Turkey would be fighting against Germany, in which event the Germans could not have hoped to get ships through the Dardanelles for any purpose. But the weight and speed of the German military machine, and, before the machine began to move, the success of German diplomacy, have caused the Turks to take an increasingly restricted view of their obligations, not only to Britain, but to Turkey's partners in the Balkan Entente. When the Turks were notified that Bulgarian troops were taking part with Germans in the aggressive assault on Yugoslavia they should have gone to the aid of that country, in which event probably the Balkan campaign would have been neither brief nor one-sided. But the Turks were evidently deterred by the odds, and they decided not to fight except on their own soil. Now, the danger which they would not go abroad to meet appears small compared with the danger that confronts them at home. Their policy was designed above all to prevent Bulgaria from driving a wedge between them and the Greeks. The wedge has been driven, not by the Bulgarians but by the Germans, and Greece is no longer available as an ally. This hesitation of neutrals in the face of the German menace, this failure to join with their friends while those friends are still strong, to resist the menace, is unfortunately a familiar tale. Its explanation is to be found, not in perfidy, but in calculation (influenced by years of German propaganda) of the power of the German Army as against the strength of the forces which Britain could send against the Germans at the hour of trial. If that strength had been greater (or if there had been hope of support from Russia), no doubt the Turks' decision would have been different. When Britain is stronger, the decisions of neutrals will be dif-j ferent. There could be no greater' mistake than to think that because a succession of neutrals have yielded to Germany they wished to do so. Some of them, if not all, did not and do not doubt that Britain will be strong enough ultimately to; triumph; but what weighed with them decisively was that British strength was not great enough at the place and the hour when they needed it. Therefore it is futile for us to deplore or denounce the actions of small neutrals, which are in part a consequence of Britain's unpreparedness for war. Instead of repining, we shall be better occupied in increasing and accelerating our own war effort, so that in the future, when neutrals (or even the people of occupied countries) have to make a decision, they will not hesitate, because they will know that Britain's strength is at last at its peak, that it is no longer something in prospect, but something which is available when and where, and everywhere, it is needed.