LOSS OF FRENCH.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 150, 26 June 1940, Page 6

LOSS OF FRENCH.

DEFECTION EFFECT.

STRATEGIC POSITION

MEDITERRANEAN. OUTLOOK,

qOMBINED NAVIES' POWER.

With the French Fleet passing to German and Italian control the strategic situation of the war stiffens a violent change, although the power of GreatBritain is still greater than the combined fleets of Germany, Italy and France. However, the results of the powerful units of the French Navy passing to enemy control will be far-reach-ing and will complicate a situation already foristlinjr with difficulties. Even before the war Britain's strength was greater than that of France, Italy and Germany combined, in most classes. She had six aircraft carriers against one (French). Her capital ships numbered 15, compared with seven' French, four Italian and five German, and. 15 heavy cruisers, compared -with seven each in the French Italian Navies and two Ger-

Britain's destroyers numbered 179. Germany's 22, Italy's 01 and Frances 50. It was only in the smaller and undersea types of eraft that Great Britain was outmatched. She had 57 submarines, while France 'had 7S, Italy 104 and Germany 65, a total of. 247. She- also had 26 motor, torpedo <boats against 94 torpedo boats arid 103 motor boats owned hy the three Powers. ■ ; War Losses. -After 10 months of warfare tile position has changed materially. One factor has been the practical elimination of the German Navy' «s a separate entity of effective striking value. It was estimated last month that Germany's existing fleet, including badly damaged ships, was two battleships, two pocket battleships/ two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, between nine and 17 destroyers, 30.torpedo boats and-a doubtful number of submarines. Since then the battleship . Scliarnhorst has suffered serious damage.

. It is difficult to know what losses the French Navy sustained since the beginning of the war, but, generally speaking, France still has eight capital ships, one aircraft carrier, IS cruisers, about o0 destroyers, 75 submarines and 13 torpedo boats. She may also have launched some 20 smaller vessels in the last nine months.

Apart from submarines the French Xavy is about a third the size of tlie British Ntivy, and is about equal to the Italian Navy. Most of it is concentrated in the Mediterranean, for the outer French colonies are not strongly held against attack by sea. and the bulk of the naval work in the North Sea fell to the British Navy. : Italy's Strength'. Italy's . fleet in May comprised six battleships, seven heavy cruisers, M light cruisers, 50 destroyers, CS torpedo boats and 112 submarines, according to the naval correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph." Since her entry into the war Italy is reported to have lost seven submarines.

Britain's naval strength is still enormous. Only one capital ship flias been lost, and a recent estimate "ives her 14 battleships, 5S cruisers and 174 destroyers. Four battleships are nearing completion in addition to numerous vessels of smaller classes.

It is worthy of note, however, that Great Britain has a double advantage over all her possible naval enemies, almost unlimited financial resources and an enormous ' building capacity This capacity was only 55 per cent utilised even after the huge buiMhi" programme of 1037. At the ■bcinniuS of 1937, when he was still First Lord of the Admiralty, Samuel Hoare declared: "Wo are still in a. position to build better and more powerful" ships, and to build them more quickly than other countries." . .

Hector Bywater, naval correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph. ,, stated that when thebuilding programme was completed (the schedule at that time ociii" 1-942, but since advanced) the British Navy would have. -25 battleships, including 10 newly-built vessels, 70 cruisers and nine big aircraft carriers. The building programme aimed at exceeding the combined programme of three potential enemies, Germany, Italy and Japan. It was estimated "that British warships built in 1037-41 would have a greater tonnage than the entire Italian Navy,

Strategy in the Mediterranean is reviewed at length by "Max Werner" in his book published' last year, "The Military Strength of the Powers/ , He save: "If Britain is prepared to"send the necessary forces she is in a position to establish her superiority in the Mediterranean in battleships and cruisers, and in the long run the fulfilment of her naval building programme will still further increase her advantage. . . .

"The Italian Jfavy ivill have an advantage in lighter vessels, in destroyers and flotilla leaders, ami also in submarines and aeroplanes. On the other hand, Italy has no aircraft carriers at all, so that in the important weapon of aero-naval warfare the advantage is entirely on the side of Britain. With the exception | of the eastern coasts, however, Italy' will have an advantage !in favourably-situated naval bases." Grave Position. The British position in the Mediterranean would become one of the greatest gravity if the French Fleet, for fear of punitive action by Germany against Franco itself, were handed over "as a fighting force to Germany, wrote an overseas military correspondent several days ago. It might even then become necessary to evacuate' that, sea altogether, lie eaid, despite our clear perception that this would mean opening Africa to Italy, closing the Balkans, anil 1 placing the oilfields of Iraq in serious jeopardy, to say the least.

Under such, conditions our cue would bo to hold the eastern Mediterranean for as long as possible, but a disaster of such magnitude would, in coniiiionscnsc. necessitate a concentration of all our available naval forces on the outer 'blockade of Germany and Italy on the high seas. It would then be a question of the watere beyond Gibraltar and Suez, not those-within.