NO DEADLOCK.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 84, 9 April 1940, Page 6

NO DEADLOCK.

WESTERN FRONT.

CONTINUAL SUSPENSE.

CHANCES OF NAZI ATTACK.

Is war coming In the West? After half a year of war, not only is this still the crucial question, but it is still as difficult as ever to answer (wrote John Bouverie in the London "XewsGhronicle" on March 18).

The soldiers themselves, the men in positions of responsible command, differ in their opinions almost as much as laymen at liomc. Some believe that a Nazi offensive this spring or summer is highly probable. Others, though admitting the incalculability of Hitler, think it most unlikely that the German High Command will try conclusions this year.

"If Hitler attacks this spring, I should consider it a sign of weakness," is how one general recently put it. Meaning, of course, that only desperation would drive Germany to the risk of a costly and doubtful onslaught on the Allied line.

How to Weaken Hitler? This reasoning confutes the complacent view one still hears expressed too often at home —that time is on our side, and that each successive month of inaction brings the defeat of Nazism automaticallv nearer.

The soldiers do not accept this. They know that unless we can somehow force Hitler to use up his reserves of men and material we cannot hope to weaken him; •nd that if he is given sufficiently long to reorganise the industries and supplies of Russia he may even, in time, grow stronger. This, incidentally, is the view expressed by M. Paul Reynaud, France's Minister of Finance. By one means or another, then, Hitler must in due course be forced to fight. How, where and when can this be done? An Allied offensive in the West this year is out of the question. The only way in which victory can come to Britain and France in 1940 will be through Hitler defeating himself— through his destroying his regime by a ruinous failure.

There are many who argue that the way to force Hitler to take the offensive in the West is for the Allies to threaten his resources elsewhere. Allied support for Finland, for example, would have diverted potential Soviet supplies from Germany to Russia's own defence. More dramatic, an offensive launched from the Near East against Russia's oil bases in the Caucasus might so endanger vital supplies to the Nazis as to compel theni to accept an immediate decision in the West.

So runs the argument. It is significant that in both these plans the enemv would be Russia. Is it unfair to suggest that political prejudice is warping military judgment? You will not find many soldiers, on the Western front, at all events, willing to support such strategy. They know in the West, whatever their "private political opinions may I*. that their first and last enemy is Germany, and that all available means must be concentrated on defeating lier. Even a successful offensive against Russia would leave us, our powers materially weakened, still face to face with an intact Germany—still with our main task untackled. And would an offensive against Russia be successful? The difficulties, with long and threatened lines of communication, would be prodigious. Anyone with knowledge of the strength and disposition of the Nazi nrmievs in the West must that not a man nor a tank nor a gun can be tpa red this year from the Allied defences in France.

I can imagine nothing that Hitler would like more than to see the Allies dissipate their forces in a diversion against Russia. He is subtle enough e* en to attempt to entice them into it —and thereby to enforce a hard and military alliance between himself and Moscow, which so far he has uot got.

For both Nazis and Allies the same thing is true—the war must ultimately be won or lost in the West. Ludendorff knew it in the last war. -he British High Command knows it in this. Both sides _ must concentrate tl-eir main offensive and defensive preparations between the North Sea and Switzerland. Because nothing has happened so far on this front, people «t home have begun to talk of the "deadlock"' hi the West. It is a dangerous fallacy to talk of deadlock in the West. There can only be deadlock when two sides liave tried conclusions and been unable to force a decision. Neither tide has vet done this. There is no deadlock "or stalemate, only suspense. And this suspense may be ended at any moment by a Naj'-i offensive.

Hitler May Wait. Hitler, may, on the other hand, decide to wait, knowing the immense diflicnllies and dangers of a head-on clash with the Allied armies and hoping for some advantage from delay. We should be wise to «llow for similar calculations in the enemy mind as in our own ]f Hitler remains supremely confid .t in his strength and his destiny he mav estimate that the Allied morale will "be the first to crumble under the suspense of waiting and that another full rear of inaction will bring about vital economic and political ehanges in the public opinion of 1-ranee or Britain. In that case he will delav. He mi-lit decide to delay, too, if he 'were increasing his reserves of aeroplanes, guns and oil and were turning ollt large quantities of improved types i„ excess of Allied production. To this conundrum no one on the Allied side can be in n position to give an accurate answer. But this much may be said—his is not a temperament that takes kindlv to pro'°D£f • I . nact '" n an , d ** ™,ld be running a considerable pohtical risk with his totalitarian regime in plaving for victory by deferment.

"'® y he ; a? ? in ' that hc so JhJ tr* *v„ ? f tT > ,n e conclusions in the West that he hesitates out of she* r fear or the consequences. But if this U fact or' 6 Un, ' k<? , l - V 10 act a * a restraining factor much longer, for he is not the n.an to j?o down without fighting. an d L,c? '% w at " l? out of "™knoss he must act before long to prevent his weakness increasing. If he orders a supreme offensive whore will ,t fall and what are likely to be its results? ' (To be concluded.)