WAITING GAME.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 14, 17 January 1940, Page 5

WAITING GAME.

WINNING THE WAR.

NEW FORW OF FIGHTING.

HO TIMB FOR APATHT.

(By C¥EIL FALLS.)

Here and there one still meets people wlio are doubtful about the present strategic policy of the Allies. If you aek them whetJher or not tame is on our side .they generally agree that it is. If you call for their opinion regarding the relative resources of the combatants they generally reply that the balance is in our favour. I suspect that the doubt arwest chiefly because the character of the war has so far been completely different frwni what they anticipated. They find it outside not only their expectations but β-lso their experience. If nation* have never fought before in thie manner, they argue, then this cannot l>e the way to fight, and the absence of large-scale fighting either on land or in the air nrust be due to lack of resolution and determination.

Well, in the firet place, this ie hardly In logical sequence, because a* warfare changes in nature and in weapons it ie possible that the ideal policy of Mie past may not be suitable to the present. In the second place, it ie not altogether eound historically. At leaet one war of the past—which, curiously enough, also began with an act of aggression against Poland—resembles to a remarkable extent the present struggle as it has so far been waged. The eighteenth century war of the Polish succession was mainly fought on the Rhine, where it resolved itself into a campaign of blockade, without a single battle. The result* were on the whole favourable to the French, whose policy dictated the nature of the War. ' The War at Sea. T!h e present struggle is being fought •t sen, in the air and on landVes well •* in eniihaesies, in banke, in factories, hi the presses of the world and in broadcasting stations. At eea the state of Affaire is so far what was expected. If

there have been any surprises they have arisen because the successes, of the Üboats have been comparatively small. Our Admiralty always thought that it had their measure, but I fancy it was prepared for initial losses (heavier than have actually occurred.

The new weapon of the parachute mine, lawless and inhuman as it was. was also ingenious, end it achieved the temporary success which could hardly fail to be gained by methods contrary to the rules of warfare. This weapon aas now been measured, and though it will cause further loss it will be mastered. The counter-attack on German exports will in any case prove equally damaging. As things are going at present we are winning the war at sea. That is not "wishfulthinking," and it is not ruling out future difficulties or oven shocks. It ie sober calculation. As regards the air, our position is strong enough for us to admit that there have been two schools of thought, one in favour of our present strategy and one not so favourable. I personally can see the strength of both points of view. Undoubtedly we could have caused great damage to Germany's munition factories in the early stages when so large a proportion of the German fighting aircraft was occupied elsewhere if w<> had attacked "all outV» We refrained from doing so "because there was hardly one of these objectives situated far from a centre of population, and we did not desire to initiate a form of warfare which would probably have developed into slaughter of civilians on both sides. But we know these factories, and if ours were bombed we should certainly retaliate. Success in tbe Air. Reinforcing this moral consideration was the firm confidence that the Allied output of aircraft—certainly when American purchases are taken into account—is far superior to that of Germany. We also believe that our resources in pilots are greater in quantity and better in quality, especially with the aid of the Dominion*, who produce some of the finest in the world. Meanwhile the most critical observer must admit that the balance of success has up till now been well on our side in the air war. On land the decision has not lam wita us. Our Expeditionary Force, wellfound and mobile as it is, represents but a fraction of the forces arrayed on

the Western Front. Obviously, therefore, we could, not have the first say in the matter. But the Allied policy in this sphere has unquestiona/bly been correct. By next spring we shall have a considerable army ready for active operations. To have begun an assault on the German "West Wall" with so much potential strength undeveloped would have been madness. That this war can be won by blockade alone I am not, however, by any means prepared to say. It is not certain that Germany will crack without being struck a violent blow. Where, how and when that blow, if required, will be dealt, I think it useless and somewhat unwise to speculate. The international situation may change considerably in the next few months. And it is possible that the blow may take the form of a riposte hitting back after a desperate effort by Germany has been met and fought down. In preparation for either alternative our strength is growing day by day. Grimmer Days Ahead? Yet let us look frankly at one aspect of the situation. Warfare such as that waged in 1914 causes intense suffering, but it likewise automatically stiffens the will. There exists a. certain danger I that, if we do not remain awake to tbe issue, the present form of warfare may induce easy optimism on the one hand or unreasoned depression on the other. Both paths lead to apathy. At present the British Government, the French Government, the Governments of the Dominions and all the peoples they represent are united in their resolution to end the intolerable menace which has turned Europe into a madhouse. But the will of each Govern-1 ment reflects that of its people and that 1 of each people reinforces the others. Let > ■ us look upon the situation of to-day as 1 but a preliminary phase, fortunate in ' general for our arms, in a struggle whieli ' may become far grimmer in future, but ' which must be seen through if the world ' is again to be fit for decent folks to ' live in.