WHY IT CRACKED.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 109, 11 May 1939, Page 14

WHY IT CRACKED.

LOYALIST SPAIN. COMMUNISTIC INTRIGUE. FACTORS THAT LOST THE WAR Tim part playod by Communist intrigue in JilH.nt thr downfall of the Spanish I.ip.vnlist Uov«rnm<*irt is , fHuclnned hen , l>r a. SpuuiHh-burn, AnK'ri'JiM-trainorr nPW.*paprr man, who has just rrtnriiMl to Ni-w York after spending wort than two years on Hie Loyalist side .Just prior to the full of Ban-dona he was in charge of the I'ri'ss aiul Puliliclly Ki-partmpnt for Iho Catalan recruitinp offices and had ample opportunity to view tho situaton from belliu<l the st-enes.

(By JOSEPH M. ESCUDEK.)

Why did the army of the Spanish Republic collapse —apparently so suddenly—in Catalonia, losing Barcelona and bringing tlie probable end of the war? Why was it that Barcelona, eo long known as a city of stubborn rebels, fell no easily? Why did not it resist, like Madrid? How was it that none of the skilled observers, Spanish or foreign, foresaw such a possibility, or, in any case, gave no hint of it in their dispatches? These are questions all the world is asking. I was at the front on December 25. two days after the Fascist offensive had begun. * At that time all Barcelona believed it \va« utterly safe; every announcement that was made by the Government, every pie<-e of news published, underlined the idea that the army was strong, well-equipped, well-supplied, and perfectly capable of stopping the insurgent onslaught, no matter how powerful. False Confidence. For month* officers and men coming from the front had, privately, remarked on the shortage of food and war material*, and on the growing disorganisation of many vital services. Such talk had left a slight undercurrent of uneasiTiess, but the strict censorship of the Press and even political persecution of whoever voiced any criticism or doubt, no matter who it was. eerved to lull army and people into a state of false confidence that was shattered into panic when it was no longer possible to hide the retreat. The first break came at the bridgehead of Soros, where a brigade of "Carabinercw?," internal revenue guards. win) had been on police duty in the rear, '.'iive way to the Kawirits in the first few hours of tin- offensive, many of them •veil going 'nor to General Franco's lines. ""•ciiiie of them straggled beyond Tremp. vi-ere I was stationed, begging excitedly to be incorporated into my detachment, and .ilttoet weeping that they "didn't wnnt to rim, but the oflieers broke and went over, and after that the whole tiling fell to pieces." Franco had attacked at three points simultaneously. Two held out, but, because of the fall of Seros, the Fascists reached the village of Maynl", eight or nine miles beyond the linos, on the first day. They hud successfully driven a wedge at a vit.il point, and they threw their whole formidable nrmv behind it. The eky became <"i'si*elp-e.ly black with ■heir li'iiiiili.ta, protected j,y cloudrt of i-haser-s. and thei' - artillery pounded jvery inch of no-iuuuVs land with nerveracking regularity. Our observers reported an artillery line of one cannon to every fifteen yards. This was so overwhelmingly superior to anything wo could muster that the thin second line behind Seros*, held by the Twelfth Army C'orpe, simply crumbled. Morale Sapped. How could it happen that a whole !iriny was evvet't away simply because it cracked at one point? The answer s that thirs episode came at a crucial moment, when many factors coincided ■t-aiiL-it the loyalists. First of all. there ■.as the immense superiority of supplies ind equipment on the nicle of the I'ascmts. Hut there was no betrayal of a military character. There was, however, a gradual general undermining of morale, due to the political manoeuvring. This manoeuvring in the army wag supposed to have stopped after the reorganisation of the militia into the popular army, when units that had been controlled by political and trade union organisations were militarised under one general staiF. But the struggle for power in the [ Government went on for control of the army, too, and the group which was most determined to control the army was the Communist party. Though the party was very small before the war, Russian aid and incessant machinepolities bad swollen it greatly, so that it had become a ruthless, efficient machine for power, willing to etop at nothing to gain its ends. In the army, such a situation was necessarily disastrous. Hundreds of faithful and able non-Communist officers as, for instance, General Asensio, one of the best war technicians, were pushed aside and even imprisoned on false charges, in order to make way for faithful party climbers and top-sergeants. Thus, key posts were time and again in the hands of mediocrities who gave way in panic in any crisis.

Hamstrung by Intrigue. The constant shifting of leading army positions, the political favouritism practised in these combinations, and the distribution of food and armament, both always insufficient, along these same political lines, were gradually translated into cynicism and demoralisation among the rank and file. I have seen many reports made to the general commissariat, emphasising the serious dangers in this situation. Indalecio Prieto, former Minister of Defence, gave warning of it in a report to the Spanish Socialist party last year. President Companys, of Catalonia, also time and again urged the Government to curb this "army within the army" before it was too late. It was done many times —on paper. Every army office and barracks had signs and slogans, such as "the army belongs to no party —only to the people." "The army rights for all the people." But months passed, and the army was etill hamstrung and fcut to pieces by political intrigue. Toward the end, when Premier Negrin was shown some of the serious consequences of these conditions, he said, shrugging helplessly, "What can I do? The democracies are not with us. I cannot choose my friends. They are handed to me." —(N.A.N.A.) (To be concluded.)