N.Z. AND JAPAN.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 142, 18 June 1938, Page 16

N.Z. AND JAPAN.

FRIENDLY POLICY.

LORD ROTHERMERE'S FEAR.

DEFENCE CONSIDERATIONS

(By SENEX.) Tjord Rothermere's pronouncement on New Zealand vulnerability to attaclc from Japan, coming as it does at a time of discussion of the general problem of defence, raises some interesting questions. In the first place it may be said without qualification that New Zealand's policy is one of friendship with Japan. It is a policy which is shared with Britain and Australia, and it is not new. For years it has been frankly indicated by Whitehall to Wellington and Canberra as the only possible course. The British Foreign Office did not hesitate to express itself candidly on this point at the time of the scrap iron trouble last year. But that policy, which is dictated by good feeling and commonsense regard for interests, is not necessarily influenced by any fear of Japan. Britain may be willing to show forbearance towards attacks on her investments which she would not have revealed half a century ago, but to-dav Britain has had recent experience of a calamitous war and it is her opinion that even investments are not worth that. Forbearance is not fear. And Lord Rothermere's attitude (which apparently takes it for granted that a Japanese base will be established at Sydney) is based on little more. War Policy Unrevealed. It is, of course difficult to demand information from the Government as to its plans for the defence of New Zealand, because the revelation of those plans I would involve the whole question of war i policy, and to disclose this would be | most unwise. Would New Zealand, for instance, send troops overseas again if Britain were attacked? Frankly to admit this would be to have the admission filed away by the intelligence service of a Power which might then plan to destroy the transports. A good deal of the work of intelligence, as the last war should have taught us, consists in reading the foreign newspapers. But it is possible to reveal that what I is being done in the matter of defence I is based on the considered opinion of the Admiralty and of the British War Office to New Zealand's special needs. And it is the opinion of the Admiralty that attacks on New Zealand, such as those pictured by Lord Rothermere, are not possible. The attempt by one country to conquer another 5000 miles awav is no light undertaking. It can be achieved only by the establishment of lines of communication secure against interruption for the whole of that distance, otherwise the invading force may starve or find itself with empty ammunition pouches. It can be done only bv immobilising a considerable force of men and many ships for a long period of time. And it can meet with success [ anly if there is absolute command of the seas. In which condition of affairs it would be unnecessary to come within a thousand miles of the New Zealand coast, for a long-range blockade of the New Zealand coast would accomplish the same result by paralysing the export trade and by cutting off essential supplies. Possibility of Raids. The naval threat to New Zealand is thus reduced to one of a raid. And since the cruising range of even the biggest battleship is limited, the ships dispatched on such a raid might get here, but are unlikely to get back. That means they would be a total loss, unless there was some provision for giving them the thousands of tons of coal which would be necessary to take them back to Japan. The Japanese Admiralty would have to balance the factor of the damage likely to be inflicted by a raid against the probable loss of the ships engaged in it. The last war proved again and again the reluctance of admirals to risk their ships. If we accept the British Admiralty's belief that some sort of raid is the utmost that New Zealand would'have to fear, we can proceed to consider the way in which the threat is being met. The New Zealand Government, it is obvious, has placed its faith in bombers as a means of defence, an attitude which is challenged by those who still believe that forces are as strong as the numbers of men in them. It is argued that bombers are useless against naval ships (an argument which reads strangely in light of what the Japanese have done to the Chinese navy, and of the careful manner in which the Spanish rebels have kept their naval vessels out of the way of aircraft since the Loyalists bombed the Baleares and sent "her to the bottom), that more men are necessary, in some way that is never explained, and that compulsory military training would meet the case. The wea' ness of this argument is the failure to appreciate the growth of fire power -since the last war. In that war one crew of machine-gunners frequently stopped a brigade of nominally 4000 men. Certainly the brigado was fighting

on a narrow front, but the fact shows the effect of modern arms, and fire power and control have both risen very much since the last war. That fact ha's been recognised in Britain, where Sir Auckland Geddes, who was first Director of Recruiting, then Minister of' National Service, has recently declared in a lettor to "The Times" that he thinks that conscription (the provision of the ultimate in man-power) "added little or nothing to the sum of (Britain's) national effort,'' and where the Secretary of War has said that to send one extra man to the battlefield beyond those needed to serve weapon* is to increase the target and complicate the question of supply. One aeroplane, mounting n machinegun firing 000 rounds a minute, is vastly superior in mobility and as strong in fire power as half a battalion of troops, and does not have to be mobilised and brought into position by prodigious efforts. Half a dozen aeroplane* dropping mustard gas could rout a raiding party. Isolation a Source of Strength. From the point of view of actual defence, then, New Zealand is one of the safest places in the world. The isolation and small population which are seen by some as her chief weaknesses are also her sources of strength. She is hard to strike, hard to escape from after striking. She has no great stores of mineral wealth to entice Powers hungry for war materials. (If she proved to contain rich oil wells things might be different.) She is equally vulnerable at distant range as near her shores, once the British command of the seas has gone, and she offers such an unpromising target that the effort required to deliver a blow at her is not worth while. That, of course, is looking at matters from the point of view of defence. What the position should be if New Zealand contemplates sending forces abroad ia another matter.