AID TO PEACE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 138, 14 June 1938, Page 6

AID TO PEACE.

i I ANGLO-FRENCH AMITY, THE RECENT CONVERSATIONS. i (By JEAN MISTLER.) !• . — Belief that Anglo-French solidarity, as a result of - the conversations in London, will help to ease the tension in Central Europe and strengthen peace on the Continent is expressed here by the President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the French . Chamber of Deputies. The foreign policy of the French nation is. in part, determined by this commission. PARIS, May 1. The outcome of the conversations in London, now concluded, has been impatiently awaited in Paris, as in every European capital. For, ja few weeks after the "Anschluss," in a shaken j Europe, when every one of the States counting j within its territory a German minority is concerned and on the alert, it is indeed necessary to kripw with precision the position England and the British Empire , will take in tlie case of a possible conflict. In that tragic month of August, 1914, the very few hours in which Franco-British solidarity was made certain decided in fact the outcome of the war. There are too many analogies between to-day and 1914 for us to j forget that fact and for us to discard a | solidarity which could this time make the i democracies 'not win hut prevent a war. If one considers the political world not as a network of treaties and limited obligations but as a world where moral and material necessities of nations do count, one grasps immediately the parallel between the position of France and that of Great Britain. Only partisan preoccupations, exigencies of home politics, have sometimes hidden this deep concordance. England, because she is instinctively hostile to social disorder and agitations, has been rather long to understand that, behind the facade of their anti-Communistic declarations, Berlin and Rome were realising an imperialistic project ever so much more threatening for London than the ambition of Napoleon ever was. But now British eyes arc opened. At the same time, in France, two years ago, excessive feelings were working on the oppoj site trend. Too many minds were forgetting the fact that one cannot base the foreign (policy of a nation on sympathies or antij pathics of a political or philosophical nature, | and that diplomats have to be above political iparties. .But France, too, has undergone a j happy evolution, and every one of the successive Governments that France has had in the .last two years has been able to maintain a j policy of non-intervention in Spain. If the .French policy lias been less realistic than that ; of the British, and will not bring France, once j'the Spanish civil war is ended, the advantages .that Great Britain can expect, it has nevertheless limited the conflict to the Iberian Peninsula. | Age of Speedy Decision. To all those whose desire for peace is sinjcere, the necessity for France and England to synchronise their diplomatic activities is more | and more obvious. We have to deal with <lieta- ; tors, with fighters whose efficacy rests more Sin the speed witii which they strike than in | their real strength. The old-type diplomacy was slow, for, by definition, it was necessary to consult each time the situation changed in any way.' The Geneva system which followed this old-type diplomacy has not proved itself much more swift. Confronted with the speed. ' with which the remilitarisation of the Rhine ! was realised or the Anschluss accomplished, the Council of the League has been unable to act. . . . The peace-loving nations are confronted with the necessity of deciding immediately certain common policies, if all of the limitations they must impose on the dictators, and in every domain—not only military but financial and economic as well—arc not to be mere idle words. The London conversations represent an important step toward the accomplishment of .this aim and thus-are a real contribution to j peace. Not only has the British Government again affirmed that peace is the goal of British . policy, but it has also stated that its desire j for pcace docs not mean "peace at any price.": j Important declaration indeed in a country where conscientious objectors were, but a few months ago, so openly heeded. Affirmation that England would be faithful to her Allies, the mention of the vital British interests which England cannot allow j to be menaccd—all this is but the more important since at the head of the British Governjmcnt is the man, calm and cool, who himself , initiated British rearmament. The words and acts of the London conversations will carry I with them in European policy the weight of | British aviation, which now comprises 123 j squadrons, while in 1934 it was only 52 strong, of the 00 warships which will be put in service this, coming year, of all the aviation factories j working day and night and of the two capital | ships and four cruisers now being built. A Warning to Germany. The most delicate problem of Franco-British relationship is the determination of the policy to be followed in case of German aggression against Czechoslovakia and French intervention jin favour of her ally in Central Europe. Great | Britain is somewhat reluctant to make any i engagement which would automatically make I her part of the conflict, but the Prime Minister I has said in no uncertain terms that, in matters :of war or peace, legal obligations are not the [only ties between nations and that, if a war should be begun, there is little probability that it would he limited to the nations tied by such legal obligations. Tnis affirmation is in itself an indubitable warning to Germany; but* in London, the French and British Governments have also advised Czechoslovakia to be moderate and tolerant toward her minorities. But if aggression should come, it is a strong safeguard I for democracies to know that technical details (can be studied and decisions made in the fatmospliere of friendship and complete understanding -which-the London conference lias j created.-—(Copyright: N.A.-Sf.A.)