BRITISH POLICY.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 126, 31 May 1938, Page 6

BRITISH POLICY.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S AIMS

EFFECTS OF AUSTRIAN COUP. (By SIR ARTHUR WTLLERT.) LONDON. The Anglo-Italian agreement finishes the first stage of tlio great offensive which Mr. Chamberlain is planning for the appeasement of Europe by reconciling the pacific democracies and the dynamic dictatorships. He had originally meant to negotiate simultaneously with Germany and Italy. But Germany's rape of Austria made it difficult to approach her for some time to come. Hence Britain readjusted her policy. Her principal object now is the building up of the preparedness, both material and diplomatic, of the democracies. Diplomatic preparedness means the consolidation and strengthening of the democratic group so as to make it more difficult for the dictatorships to flout it. Better relations with Italy are obviously an important part of that programme. It is felt here that the dictatorships are somewhat less advantageously placed than they were recently. The Austrian business has obviously strained the Italo-German connection. In the Par East things are not going well for Japan. There are no signs as yet that England means to take advantage of Japan's difficulties to try to secure settlement of the Chinese war. She still considers that she cannot play first violin both in the Far Eastern and the European orchestras and that Europe claims her [prior attention. In Europe, on the other hand, she does see a chance of action. General Franco at last looks like winning in the course of a few months, anyhow to the extent of reaching Madrid. The German boa-constrictor is expected to remain inactive for some time until it has digested Austria. At the same time, the reactions of the Austrian coup upon Italy continue to be calculated to make Signor Mussolini anxious for new friendships and new diplomatic successes to counter-balance the growing disparity of strength between Italy and Germany. Last, but not least, there is a chance that France under M. Daladier may regain political stability. Mr. Chamberlain's next move, indeed, is likely to be with France, especially if M. Daladier makes good* It will take the form of a suggestion for FrancoBritish conversations in order to increase the solidity and efficacy of what is already practically an Anglo-French defensive alliance. Anglo-French Understanding. One of the most important results of Herr Hitler's Austrian coup in England has bfeen the weakening of the pro-German group just when it seemed to be gaining influence, and the strengthening' of the conviction that the most important foundation for permanent peace is the closest possible Anglo-French understanding, as advocated by Mr. Winston Churchill. The reason for this is simple. Mr. Chamberlain has indicated that England is' not prepared to fight for the protection of law and order in Eastern Europe. But France is pledged to do so. Were German aggression to force France to keep her pledges, there would be war between her and Germany. To'win the war Germany would, in all probability, have to invade France. The closer the understanding between France and England, the less likely would England be to stand aside on the ground that a German attack upon France was not really unprovoked aggression, as she can do under tjie letter of her Anglo-French agreement, and therefore the less likely would Germany be to risk a European conflict. Italy's Concern. Another reason why Anglo-French conversations are expected to be Mr. Chamberlain's next move is that fresh developments between him and Signor Mussolini are improbable for some time. It is to be feared that a settlement of the Spanish question will not quickly be reached. With the best will in the world, the evacuation of Italian troops and material will take time. Those who agree with Mr. Eden that preliminary guarantees of good faith should have been demanded from Signor Mussolini are doubtful. They note, as Mr. Chamberlain has been reluctantly compelled to confess, that Signor Mussolini has been reinforcing !Franco since negotiations started. They note that Franco has not yet won, and will probably need outside help even if he does get Madrid. -Also will Germany allow her partner to slide out of Spain?

On the other side of the led.trer is the fact that Germany is already receiving fat dividends from lier Spanish enterprise in the shape of cheap supplies of minerals and other primary products from General Franco, and she may therefore feci that the exploitation of Spain has gone far enough. Sijrnor Mussolini also needs the British recognition of Ethiopia to regain the prestige which liis enforced acceptance of the Ocrmanisation of Austria cost him. and a new friendship would help him to avoid becoming the satellite instead of the partner of Germany.—(Copyright: N.A.N. A.)