GERMAN AUSTRIA.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 98, 28 April 1938, Page 6

GERMAN AUSTRIA.

ITALY'S ATTITUDE. LITTLE DANGER OF WAR. (By SIR ARTHUR WILLERT.) ROME, March 15. Various things account for tlie calmness of the Italian reception of Ilerr Hitler's pounce upon Austria. Much as Italy might have liked Austria to remain an independent buffer between herself an<l lier powerful neighbour, she recognises the futility of protests against an accomplished fact. She wants to remain on good terms with Germany. She philosophically realises that whatever disadvantages the new situation may bring must be regarded as the price to be paid for her share in the successes which the dictatorship have had over the Western democracies in recent years. So far Italy has drawn full dividends from these successes. She has got Ethiopia, and she counts for far more in the world than she did a short time ago. Now it is Germany's turn to exploit the political weakness of France ami the obvious determination of England not to interfere actively on behalf of law and order east of the Rhine in Europe. Finally the shrewd brains which control Italian policy doubtless realise that there is not much danger of war arising out of Herr Hitler's latest week-end coup. This does not mean that Rome is as comfortable in its mind as the tone of the Press would indicate. The Kalians do not like the prospect of having Nazi expansionists in Austria cheek by jowl with the Italian Tyrol and its discontented German population. Xor do they like the prospect of further increase of German influence in countries near the Adriatic. Czechoslovakia. And if Herr Hitler's present move is expected to pass ofF peacefully there is considerable nervousness regarding the next move. It is feared that Herr Hitler may soon try to bring- Czechoslovakia under his thumb. It is realised here, as elsewhere, that that might be a very different business from the Austrian venture. It is pointed out that the Czechs are a virile ration with a strong army and that they have been intimating lately that they do not propose to yield to Germany without a struggle. France, moreover, has a defensive treaty with the Czechs, whereas her only treaty obligation to Austria is under the now defunct Treaty of Versailles. And if Franco invaded Germany after Germany had attacked Czechoslovakia, the danger of general war is obvious. It is therefore satisfactory to find that the Italians who have studied the German mind closely are inclined to question the soundness of this nervousness. They believe that Berlin is as anxious to avoid a big war as anyone, and has only gone into Austria because it knew that the indignation aroused by the action would be confined to words. They think that if it decides to tackle the tougher Czech nut at all it will do so in ways which would make it difficult for France to march. They see in Russia's interest in an independent Czechoslovakia another reason for their judgment. Meantime. Italy's course of action is fairly clear. While keeping the Rome-Berlin relationship intact, she would evidently like to minimise the disparity between her strength and prestige and those of Germany by developing her relations with England, and, if possible, with France. The best proof of this is that her talks with England continued, untroubled by news from the north. The question of economic and financial help for Italy has not yet been raised. If any such suggestion is made, it will almost certainly be for credits-. For one thing, both the Italian and British experts feel that a loan is hardly a practical proposition with the exchanges in their present condition. Four Power Pact Proposal. Tt is, of course, believed here, as elsewhere, that the Austrian crisis is a bad setback for Mr. Chamberlains plans for a general European appeasement by bringing the Western democracies and dictatorships together. This disappoints Rome. As shown by last week's conversations with the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck. Italy was getting ready to try to act as an intermediary between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other. The original Four-Power Pact was suggested by Signor Mussolini in 1933 as a means of bridiging the gap l>etwcen Germany and the Western democracies which the Disarmament Conference had revealed. It failed mainly on account of the opposition of the small Powers. It would be difficult to create 'now. if only on account of Russia's position. ! But Heir Hitler's move in Austria has evidently put progress on those lines out of the question. It is expected here that Europe is in for a prolonged continuation of the present period of disturbed and confuted politics, with Germany steadily consolidating her domination of the centre of the Continent, with Italy keeping the Rome-Berlin friendship intact, but reinsuring herself by trying to reach a Mediterranean and African understanding with England and France. Tt is not believed that Germany will object to this flirtation of her dictatorial partner with the democracies, if only because the more suspicious Russia and France are of her, the more valuable she finds good relations with Italy.— (Copvright: X.A.X.A.)