WARLIKE TRIBES.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVIII, Issue 270, 13 November 1937, Page 16

WARLIKE TRIBES.

BRITAIN'S PROBLEM.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

| COMPREHENSIVE POLICY.

"Tho Tliitish public nt intervals nnfaslly awaken to the consciousness that it bus a vulnerable rnntinentnl frontier," wrote Sir James I'rernr, K.C.S.T., CM.K., in the "Siuuliiy Times*' recently. "The great Canadian frontier linn been settled wisely nnd. as it may well be hoped, for ever. But there is another which has not. been nu settled. Tt is a line extending for upward of 1200 miles from Capo Mon/e toward the western abutments of the Himalayas. At some point in this line every important invasion of India that tins been recorded, nnd many are beyond record, was effected. It is the North-Western Frontier of India.

"We did not invade Tndia. We entered it peacefully by sea tor peaceful purposes, which destiny transformed. But the routes which were followed by the fndo-Aryans themselves, by Alexander the (treat, by obscure hordes from Central Asia, by the first Arab eon(|iierors, and by all the (ireat Muslim dynasts, who came after, have still the interest of pregnant lessons from the past and warnings for the future to ourselves.

"[t would not be to the present purpose to deal with the intricate and somewhat obscure position in Wnziristan, which is merely one of the recurrent manifestations of a larger problem; but some examination of the major issues involved in this, problem limy be opportune. Two Dangers. "We are, by law and treaty as well ns in fact, directly responsible for the defence of India. India can only be safe so long as the British and Indian navies defend her oceanic trade- routes and possibly hostile approaches by sea, arid so long as our arms and administration secure her North-Western Frontier. This frontier has to be made good against two dangers, different in kind but both of great gravity. "The first is chronic internal trouble in the independent or semi-independent tribal areas which fringe the settled districts of the Punjab and North-West Frontier provinces. This ferment results, at the best, in lawless and insolent incursions into British territory, looting, murder, kidnapping—affronts which no Government can tolerate and of which, incidentally, the Governments of the neighbouring provinces, now endowed with a parliamentary constitution but not directly responsible for defence, are likely to be markedly intolerant. "The second and the connected danger is that of invasion on a much more formidable scale from the direction of Afghanistan and Central Asia. This, in present circumstances, may seem remote, but it has been very near in the past and serious deterioration in the tribal fringe might bring it very near again. A Hard Question. "As things stand, the problem may reasonably lie limited to the first of these, with a wary eye upon potential developments, which have, indeed, often in the past been the first preoccupations of our diplomacy and strategy. The highvoltage section runs from Southern Waziristan round the Kurram salient and up to the Molimand country, Bajaur and Swat. There, as elsewhere in these marches, you have a country of a sullen and shrewish beauty, sterile in crops but fertile in men, and a population, armed and trained to arms, whose social institutions are raiding and blood feuds, fanatic in religion, and with all the avarice of an energetic penury. What comparison except that of the wolf and the lamb Is to be made between them and the settled, peaceful, prosperous communities within the herder? A hard question, but not incapable of an answer.

"In the long history of frontier policy three projected solutions appear and reappear. The first is the cohquest and direct administration of the country up to a close frontier with Afghanistan. The second is withdrawal to a hypothetical 'scientific frontier' behind our present positions. Few will now advocate either of these courses, which leave intact the root of the trouble, and would merely take different ground, probably at terrible military disadvantage, for a future of perennial warfare. Neither as the warden of India's marches nor as the custodian of the peace and content of ninety million Moslems could we accept either alternative. Whatever of this kind might once have been practicable is now no longer possible.

"The third course aims at the reclamation of the country to the rule of law and peace—what Wade and Wolfe did beyond the Highland Line and what Bandeman did in Baluchistan. It is the policy which holds the Held, and which few in these days are likely v to question. The problem is economic, in the widest sense. In the initial stages (perhaps at all stages) there must be roads and accessible military bases, but the essential objective is not a garrison. An ancient and inveterate predatory economy, in which private or public war is the main occupation of the adult male, must be gradually replaced by an economy of peace. Looking Forward. "Rifles must bo made dearer and ploughs cheaper, land a better investment than lost. Whatever in this way muy he (lone—roads, irrigation, markets, industries—it is possible that the natural resources of the country, may be inadeqiittto for a settled population based mainly on agriculture. In that case the tribesman must be Riven not only a stake in his own country, but wider opportunities beyond it. If we are to impose, as wo must, the way of peace, we must provide the means of peace. "This aspect of the problem is fundamentally economic, but it must not be forgotten that thee are other factors— questions of foreign relations and an integral system of strategical defence--which are of vital importance and which are inextricably connected. These must all be reconciled in a coherent unity. It would, moreover. 1,,. folly to ignore that liny pacific settlement of the frontier nuM itself have a sound and stable military basis.

"Tli'ih in Hip i turned in to question of the moment, hut nil military measures' must lie <o-onlinutod to a comprehensive, long term policy. The ultimate, objectives must lie clearly conceived and pursued by methods that are firm, friendly (when this is possible) and consistent. And, looking forward, if the voluntary licccHgioii to nn Indinn Federation of a civilised frontier State or States seems now a Utopian vision, let us avoid, by either extreme of temerity or irresolution, the certainty of making it impossible."