The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News The Echo and The Sun MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1936. TREATY WITH EGYPT.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVII, Issue 206, 31 August 1936, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News The Echo and The Sun

MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1936. TREATY WITH EGYPT.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the icrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that tee can do.

If ever before a crowd in Cairo enthusiastically shouted "Long live AngloEgyptian friendship," as it is reported that crowds did on Friday, the occasion was long ago, and the enthusiasm was ephemeral. There appears now good reason to hope that AngloEgyptian relations will be such as to furnish a firm basis for the "treaty of alliance," the terms of which were published on Saturday. Without such a basis the treaty might be worse than useless, for it has been well said that "a friendly Egypt would be worth many battalions to a British commander in the event of a Mediterranean war, and if an Egyptian alliance is so untrustworthy that we still need 101 per cent security for our own forces in that country, it scarcely seems worth while to discuss a treaty at all." The first important test of the treaty, therefore, is its reception by the Egyptian people, and this test it seems to have passed with honour.

The purpose of the prolonged negotiations which preceded the agreement was to discover a basis for the final settlement of the four "reserved points" which were left over when Britain declared Egypt independent in 1922. The points were: (a) The security of British Imperial communications in Egypt; (b) the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression; (c) the protection of foreign interests and of minorities; and (d) the future of the Sudan. Military arrangements were discussed first of all, and they form the backbone of the treaty. Those arrangements, as outlined in the treaty, do not suggest that the British position is to be weakened, but as a concession to Egyptian national sentiment the British forces, except those at Alexandria, are eventually to be withdrawn to the Canal zone. The mobility of aircraft, and the improved means of land communication which are to bo provided, make it certain that if and when British forces are required in Egypt again they will be quickly. But there will be no British garrisons in the chief towns in peace-time, and the suggestion to which the presence of these forces has given rise, that Britain's main concern is not the defence of Egypt, but the political domination of the country, will be removed. The Egyptians themselves will now have a greater opportunity to prove administrative capacity, and in particular to demonstrate that they can maintain the law and preserve order with their own forces.

It is doubtful whether the Egyptian negotiators would, some years ago, have agreed to the military arrangements in the form in which they now appear. That the arrangements are acceptable now is due to the realisation, sharpened by the events of last year, that Egypt cannot hope to stand alone, and that Britain, in protecting her own interests in Egypt, as she must, is protecting the interests of Egypt too. It is to be noted that the treaty apparently settles nothing regarding the Sudan, which is under joint Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty. It was on the Sudanese question that the negotiations between Britain and Egypt in 1930 broke down. Since then the situation has been altered by the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. For hundreds of miles along the Sudan border the neighbour now is not a backward native people, but a modern European Power. It may be that Egypt in the future will renew her demand for a greater measure of control in the Sudan, but meanwhile her Government will be more comfortable in the knowledge that the defence of that vast territory will continue to be primarily the responsibility of Britain.