WAR OVER MONGOLIA.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVII, Issue 136, 10 June 1936, Page 6

WAR OVER MONGOLIA.

THE. SITUATION REVIEWED

(By WALTER DUE ANT Y.) The factors in the war danger in the Far East that hovers over the border flashes between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia aie discussed here by a distinguished foreign correspondent who is a recognised authority on Russian affairs. NEW YORK, April 4. The war danger in the Far East seems greater than ever. The latest clash between the forces of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia lias been of so serious a character as almost to convey the impression that war is already begun. According to the Japanese, there have been more than a hundred sucli clashes in the last year, and everything'seems to indicate that they are increasing rather than diminishing in violence. Does this mean that war is imminent between "Manchukuo" and "Mongolia"? Vast issues depend upon the answer to this question, because the world knows that "Manchukuo" means Japan, and now knows also that "Outer Mongolia" means the U.S.S.R. In the historic interview which Stalin gave to Roy Howard recently, it was stated that the Soviet Union would regard aggression against Mongolia as a casus belli. Stalin never speaks without meaning what he says, it is clear, therefore, that it' Japan really wants to attack Outer Mongolia the result will be war with the U.S.S.R. Docs Japan want this war or not? Japan's Motives. In an attempt to answer this question one has to consider briefly the motives that impel a nation to so hazardous a step as war. First, one may put greed, the desire for new territory, or expansion, as it is called. Does this motive animate Japan? The answer must bo yes, because in the last five years we have seen the Japanese deliberately invade North China and complete the seizure of all Chinese territory north of the Great Wall. A second powerful motive is internal unrest, the fear of social disturbance which might be counteracted by the patriotic fervour which war produces. A singularly dangerous experiment this, but oiu? that has been tried before and may well be tried again. .A third factor which makes for wars is pressure of population, when living conditions become so difficult tlirou»li overcrowding that an outlet —or a blood-let—is necessary.

In Japan all these three factors arc evident. As a result of a greatly-increased population, the living conditions of the Japanese peasantry - —and for that matter the Japanese workers —have become nearly intolerable. Not even Japanese peasants like selling their daughters into brothels. War as an alternative could not be worse than that. Finally, there exists in Japan a militarynaval clique whose influence is extremely great. They are reckless men whose ambitions are unlimited. It must not be forgotten that this powerful section of the Japanese leaders has a fanatic belief in the power and invulnerability of Japan. In the last forty years they have fought three victorious wars, first, against China, then against Czarist Russia, and then against the Germans at Tsingtacr in 101."). That the China they defeated before the end of the last century was a mere shell appears to escape them. "That the Russia they defeated in Manchuria was utterly corrupt and inefficient, without adequate transport and with comparatively small forces, does not enter their calculations. They forget, too, that the small German colony of Tsingtao was a very different thing from the Kaiser's armies that stormed across France in 1914. Therefore they have an incredible confidence in themselves, and it is this fact that makes the present situation so dangerous; at first si«rht it seems that war is almost inevitable in the near future. On one side. Japan, impelled by the motives I have described, on the other, the U.S.S.R., firmly determined to resist Japanese aggression. Soviet's Strength a Deterrent. This is a gloomy picture, and it might seem that the risks of war outweigh the hopes of peace, but there are other factors to be considered. First of all, there is the Red Army. Even the most reckless of Japanese militarists must face f.icts, and it is ridiculous to suppose that the Japanese intelligence service is not aware of the colossal strength of the Soviet military establishment in the Far East.

Three years ago the Vice-Commissar of War, Tukhaeheveky, who ie regarded bv the French General Staff as one of the leading strategists of Europe, and who will probably lie field commander of the Red Army in event of Wai-. =.iii<l bluntly that, owing to the weakness of Soviet transport and the vast extent of Soviet territory, it was necessary to increase the Red Army in order to form two great camps, or "permanent military establishments, as eoldiere would express it, at the points of danger. The danger points are the maritime provinces of the Far East and the north-western Ukraine.

I estimate that at present the U.S.S.R. has fully half a million soldiers in ite western establishment, on a curve from Kiev to Dvfnsk. In the Far Eact the permanent forces must total four hundred thousand nowadays, amply equipped with the supplies and munitions of modern war. As far back as the spring of 1!)33 I saw a list of Soviet cargoes that were paesing through the port of Constantinople at an average rate of r>ooo tons a week. They were invoiced as salt and consigned to Vladivoetock, about which there i<s nothing further to be said. That was three full years ago, and since then the trans-Siberian railroad has been double-tracked and the new North-Baikal line to the Okhotsk Sea is virtually completed. Soviet Will. Not Attack. It is difficult to speak definitely about military affairs, especially in the case of the Red Army, which knows how to hide its I secrets, but I venture to state that the Soviet Far Eastern army hae not only all the supplies of food, guns and munitions, tanks, oil. fodder, aeroplanes, gas and other requirements of modern War, but has enough of them for six months. Of this the Japanese are well aware. It may be accepted as an axiom that the Soviet Union will not fight unless it has to; I mean that it will not attack Japan. Therefore, in the final issue, the question of war or peace rests with the Japanese themselves, and it is hard to conceive how any soldiers, however arrogant and reckless, can attempt a war against so strong a Power as the U.S.S.R. in present conditions. The Japanese have occupied a great and hostile territory. True, most of the inhabitants are peaceful Chinese coolies from the south, but there are still the Manchue, a bold and warlike people, who do not love the Japanese invaders. The Japanese occupation of Manchukiio and Inner Mongolia is far from consolidated. It is also far from the sea. In other words. Japan hae already bitten off one mighty big mouthful, which* is still undigested. To add to that, a war against the U.S.S.R. would appear the height of folly, or an act of desperation. Nevertheless, there ii? always the thought —so present in the mind of the French General Sfaff to-day—that to-morrow the potential "enemy" will be stronger, that it is better to strike now than wait. To that I can only answer, not "now" but "yesterday," and yesterday is past. The Japanese have waited too long, and their strategic must know it. Therefore, despite these frontier incidents, I war unlikely, unless the internal situation of Japan is worse than generally supposed.—(Copyright: X.A.-N.A.)