BASIC WAGE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVII, Issue 134, 8 June 1936, Page 13

BASIC WAGE.

DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

"NO COMMON STANDARD." POSER FOR THE COURT. Commenting on the provision in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act for the making by the Court of Arbitration of a general order fixing a basic rate of wages for adult male and female workers, the "New Zealand Law Journal" states that the amendment has apparently sot a problem for the court, the employers and the workers. The court is asked, in effect, to make of equal application throughout the Dominion, a definition of the measure of comfort that it is fair and reasonable for workers in any industry, to enjoy.

It is submitted, says the "Law Journal." that the Government Statistician will not be of much assistance to the Court in its finding and answer to siu'li a conundrum. Though his index numbers can, from time to time, deal with commodities purchasable by the wageearners, he cannot ever effectively supply material for determining the ratio of "fair and reasonable comfort" to which those wage-earners are entitled under the new Statute. It is pointed out that, in making an order fixing a basic rate, the Court must have regard to the economic and financial conditions affecting trade and industry, the coat of living and any fluctuations in the cost of living since the last order, if any, was made. The Family Unit. The "Law Journal" had nothing to say regarding the family unit of a wife and three children, because this unit is the as was adopted in fixing a living wage in West Australia and in South Australia, and in the Queensland legislation. It also approximates that laid down by the Commonwealth Arbitration Court ("about five persons"). But, providing that the basic rate is to be referable to a "fair and reasonable standard of comfort," the "Law Journal" is of opinion that the Legislature has provided a difficult problem for the Court, and that great difficulty will be found in providing a solution satisfactory to employers or to workers. "Basic wage" and "living wage" are not synonymous iji tho context of the amendment, and both differ from "minimum wage." Viscount Snowden in his book, "The Living Wage," says that the trend of all industrial and social legislation for more than a century has been in the direction of establishing a living standard. "The living wage," he says, "is a principle which will take a thousand different forms in the concrete." But the idea is, he adds, that every workman should have a wage which will maintain him in the lushest state of industrial efficiency, which will enable him to provide his family with all the material things which are needed for their health and physical well-being; enough to enable him to qualify to discharge liis duties as a citizm. In other words, the living wage is the manifestation of the ethical principle that the worker has a fundamental right to a living wage as the least reward for his labour.

A Famous Judgment. At best, "comfort" is no more than a. relative . concept and "fairness" and "reasonableness" must relate to some standard if tlicy are to be applied with any precision. But tlie "Law Journal" points out that none of these words in the statute, "fair." "reasonable" or "comfort," is controlled by any context. The famous judgment of Mr. Justice Higgins (1007), known generally as the Harvester judgment, dealt with the meaning of "fair and reasonable" in the Commonwealth Excise Tariff Act, 1000. The judge said that his first difficulty was the meaning of the Act. The words were few, and, at first sight, plain of meaning, but, in applying the words, it was found that the Legislature had not indicated what it meant by "fair and reasonable." The judge asked what was the model or criterion by which fairness and reasonableness wns to be determined. Judge Higgins came to the conclusion that lie must adopt some standard as a living wage, and he defined it as "the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised community," and, having so determined a standard, ho declared it to be "the primary test in ascertaining the minimum wage that would be treated as 'fair and reasonable' in the case of unskilled labourers."

After leaving, undefined the terms "normal needs" and "average employee," lie arbitrarily fixed the amount lie 1 deemed fair and reasonable at 42/. He j allowed for food, groceries and fuel, 25/5; rent 7/, and other expenditure 9/7. . But later he expressed his difficulty in coming to a conclusion as to what was "fair and reasonable." Average Necessary Expenditure. In his book "A New Province of Law and Order," Judge Higgins said that at the time and in the place of delivery of the Harvester judgment he found the average necessary expenditure on rent, food and fuel in a labourer's household of 'about five persons, was £1 12/5, but thai as these figures did not cover light, clctiies, \boots, furniture, utensils, rates, life insurance, accident or benefit societies, loss of employment, union pay, books and newspapers, train or tram fares, sewing machine, mangle, schoo3 requisites, amusements and holidays, liquors, tobacco, sickness or death, religion or charity, he could not certify that amy wages less than 42/ per week for an unskilled labourer would be fair or reasonable. It is seen, therefore, that he was not considering "comfort," but "necessary expenditure." Yet, in coming to his determination of 42/ as "fair and reasonable conditions as to remuneration of labour," as he afterwards admitted, he fixed that wage on incomplete and inconclusive evidence.

The "Law Journal" shows that in determining the living wage, the Courts in Australia have failed to reach a common standard as a basis of computation, and it asks whether the New Zealand Court of Arbitration can fix any standard when the terms "normal." "fair'" and "average" show that the Industrial Courts in Australia cannot find a common standard upon which to base a living wage that is conditioned by necessities and not by comfort.