The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1935. FRANCE'S ATTITUDE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVI, Issue 219, 16 September 1935, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1935. FRANCE'S ATTITUDE.

For the came that lacks assistance, For the lorong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

The -world last week awaited anxiously the disclosure of the attitudes of Britain and France to Italy's aggression-in Ethiopia. About Britain's attitude there had been little doubt, and it was defined with commendable frankness by Sir Samuel Hoare. Britain will stand by the League, and it is implied that she is prepared to use force, but she will not act alone. She invited the co-operation of the other members of the League. The Soviet, and also the smaller European nations, have promised co-operation; but these are not sufficient. Britain's stand being known, the key to the situation is France, and it fell to M. Laval to set forth the policy of his Ministers. It cannot be said that M. Laval's declaration was unambiguous; indeed, it was remarkable for what it did not say. Assurances of "collaboration in an atmosphere of solidarity for the realisation not only of international, but of European peace," were to be expected of a senior member of the League: such phrases are common currency at Geneva. Nor was it to be thought of that M. Laval would neglect to say that in the present crisis France "stood by the League." What M. Laval omitted was s, reference, even a guarded reference, to the measures which France is prepared to take, in co-operation with Britain, if conciliation should fail.

We must be thankful for the measure of support France has given Britain, but it is Mussolini's strong conviction that national democracies —-and still less the diverse nations assembled at Geneva — cannot make up their minds to support a bold and resolute course. The successive orders for the massing of Italian forces upon the . borders of Abyssinia clearly have been and are based on the belief that although the Powers at Geneva would and will appeal, suggest and exhort, they will not act — at least they will not act in time. Thus even while the deliberations at Geneva are proceeding Mussolini is accelerating Italy's preparation for war. It may be said that Mussolini, being a dictator whose personal reputation is at stake in this contemplated military adventure, cannot withdraw now; but it must be admitted that if there are signs of vacillation at Geneva they will serve only to increase his belief in his own shrewd judgment and far-sightedness. Meanwhile the Emperor of Abyssinia must wonder whether the Powers think that noble words are a useful substitute for the munitions with which they have declined to supply him.

Mussolini, it seems probable, will not be induced to withdraw or even to compromise by anything which has been said at Geneva, or in London or Paris. There remain only two courses for the League—an admission of powerlessness and futility, or a decision to apply sanctions. The latter decision would bring the Italian leader to a real test; his own threat of force would be matched and he would be faced, inescapably, with the choice of accepting a compromise or plunging his people not merely into a "conflict of a colonial chai-acter," but a modern war against a group of Powers fully armed. Nothing in Mussolini's record (as apart from his words) leads us to suppose that in such circumstances he would not accept a compromise. Indeed, he might welcome the opportunity, particularly as he could then justifiably call upon the League to take steps to provide Italy with access to the supplies of raw materials of which she undoubtedly stands in need.