TENSION IN FAR EAST

Auckland Star, Volume LXV, Issue 307, 28 December 1934, Page 9

TENSION IN FAR EAST

NO WAR IMMINENT.

RUSSIA FRIENDLY TO JAPAN.

GOOD UNDERSTANDING VITAL,

(By K. K. KAWAKAMI.)

MOSCOW. Last year I was in the Orient and watched the developments of the ominous Russo - Japanese - Manchukuo situation, and I came to the conclusion that, whatever the apparent symptoms, the three nations would not come to blows, at least in the conceivable future. Now I am in Russia, observing further developments of the same situation, and I see no reason to change that conclusion. I have found Russians greatly exercised over strained relations with Japan, resulting from the breakdown of negotiations over the North Manohurian railway. Newspapers give great prominence to disquieting news from the Far East. In Leningrad I happened upon demonstrations by Comsomols, or young Communists, of both sexes, parading through the streets in columns six deep and miles long. I stood for hours among the milling crowds on the sidewalk. Here and there I noticed pictorial posters held aloft by the marchers, apparently depicting Japanese aggression in the East. Yet the surging crowds were friendly and showed no visible signs of animosity toward me. In Moscow I find officialdom seriously concerned with Soviet-Japanese relations. The situation obviously is tense. Yet one need only look behind the scene to discern silver lining to the dark cloud. One feels there is an undercurrent of hope and desire that the Manchurian railway cnibroglio may yet somehow be adjusted. My observations, though naturally limited, load me to the conclusion that the U.S.S.I*. still conaiders it wise to liquidate the last vestige of Czarist Imperialism in Manclmria. No responsible men here think that Russia and Japan have parted company simply because- the Soviet and Manchukuo failed to agree on the railway issue, now only a question of a mere 40,000,000 yen. The impression prevails in certain circles here that the momentary unhappy disagreement between Tokyo and Moscow on the railway issue is largely a matter of sentiment. , Equitable Compromise. However this may be, few deny that equitable compromise is not only possible but probable. One recalls that Yurin, in 1918, and Kaiwlian, in 19——, openly declared that New Russia, true to its professed ideals, would unconditionally and without compensation return the North Manchurian railway to China. Although such uncompromising idealism has since been greatly modified by the exigencies of changing circumstances, it has never Dccn entirely abandoned. I feel that far-seeing Soviet statesmen still recognise the wisdom of washing their hands of the Czars Manchurian legacies. The only question now is how to make the exit gracefully and without compromising their dignity. They believe that Russia and Japan have nothing to gain but much to lose by playing cat and dog toward each other. This feeling, I believe, is reciprocated by many Japanese statesmen. Of course, ono must not expect that Soviet-Japanese relations will have smooth sailing once the North Manchurian railway is disposed of. There is perennial fishery trouble. A new fishery agreement must be made within two years. Then there is the nonaggression pact, conversations for which havC been long in abeyance, but which is considered hero still oil the tapis. Russian statesmen, quite apart from the railway issue, are fully aware of the difficulties ahead. But they believe, and I think Japanese statesmen share their belief, that the railway solution is a long step toward a genera! and fundamental readjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations in a spirit of friendliness and co-operation. This Soviet attitude may be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, Russia still sits uneasily between two worlds —one dead, the other emerging from the pangs of birth. One may concede that eventually Lenin's idealistic world will be firmly established upon Russian soil. But, while it is still a tender growth, it must not expose itself to, much less invite, external trouble. The most gigantic industrial and agricultural scheme ever conceived by man has been more successful than was generally anticipated by the capitalistic world, but with what appalling sacrifices! The scheme, moreover, is still in the stage of experiment. Not until this stage is definitely passed can Russia be considered entirely secure. Must Redeem Professions. Secondly, Russian statesmen feel that they owe it to themselves to redeem their professions of peace, fraternity, and military and economic non-aggres-sion. Russia, only last year, intiated and concluded an agreement with her neighbours whereby a State is to be termed an aggressor when it sends into the territory of another State armed, land, sea or air forces, even when that other State violates engagements, repudiates debts, practices boycott against the aggrieved and attacking nation. Suppose, as a pure hypothesis, that Manchukuo, upon plausible pretext, seized the North Manchurian railway administration. Russia could not, without eating her own words, send armed forces into Manchukuo, even if she were capablc of doing so. Russian statesmen are not so shortsighted as to throw away their reputation, built upon their idealism. Thirdly, Soviet leaders, in their hearts, know that good understanding with Japan is vital to Russia's well-being and prestige. They are beginning to realise that a French alliance or entente is impossible and that the yet unborn Eastern Locarno is an uncertain quantity. Russia's better relations with Japan are essential to her closer understanding with France. France, for various reasons, wants to maintain friendship with Japan. She would hesitate to cast her lot or to form too close a friendship with Russia unless she were convinced that relations between Russia and Japan were such that there was little probability of her being called upon to take sides. • Fourthly, the Russian apostles of Lenin know that Japan has many admirers of Soviet social-economic policy 'and Soviet industrial methods. Russian

newspapers make much of the fact that such admirers arc found even in the Japanese Army. Granted that sueli Russian reports are more or less coloured, it is an open secret that not a few younger officers in the Japanese Army are enamoured of Soviet idology, and that some of .the Japanese officers in Alanchuria itself express admiration for the Soviet theory of equitable distribution of wealth. Rapprochement Probable. This Japanese admiration the Soviets consider their great moral asset in the East, and moral assets to the Soviet mind are more important than material. They know also that this Japanese admiration is based primarily upon the Japanese assumption that new Russia will be faithful to her idealism and will uncompromisingly follow the course of peace. Should the Soviets deviate from that idealism for the sake of some material advantages, Japanese admirers would be disillusioned, for the Japanese, whatever their economic views, are traditionally patriotic, and Soviet leaders know this. Such are my observations, gathered since my arrival in Russia. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the North Alanehurian railway negotiations will be resumed in due course, and that when these negotiations are happily eoncludcd further steps will be taken toward better understanding between Japan and Russia. One recalls that, in 1022, Russia concluded with Finland an agreement virtually demilitarising the Finnish-Russian border. One wonders if a similar plan is included in Russia's diplomatic cards vis-a-vis Japan and Alanchukuo. There is, at the moment, no indication that either Russia or Japan will take the initiative in this direction, but LitvinofT has so often surprised the world with idealistic proposals that one may well be prepared for many another surprise. One may also reasonably presume that demilitarisation along the Amur and the Ussuri is a step toward the nonaggression pact. Despite disquieting surface indications, one feels that a Russo-Japanese rapprochement is within the realm of possibility, even probability.—N.A.N.A.