THE NAVAL TALKS.

Auckland Star, Volume LXV, Issue 277, 22 November 1934, Page 15

THE NAVAL TALKS.

DISARMAMENT SHAMS.

THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL.

(By PAUL MALL OX.)

WASHINGTON, October 9.

The coming London naval conversations already are heading toward the same old game. The delegates seem to be practising ventriloquism and imitations, as usual. Your hair will stand on end when you hear the Japanese proposal. If the United States diplomatic grapevine is still as trustworthy as it used to be, the Japanese —these same Japanese who have been slyly hinting that they want naval parity with Britain and the United States —are going to take the lead for disarmament —yeS, disarmament. That should be the best peaceloving imitation yet offered oil the international stage. Japanese Programme. The explanation, of course, is that the proposal will be grossly unacceptable. It will be the kind of disarmament which might help Britain and Japan, but would pinch us. At least that is what President Roosevelt's naval experts have heard. They understand that the Japanese offer will be based on a reduction in the size of capital ships to around 25,000 tons. It is designed, apparently, to call our bluff about eliminating offensive weapons of war, and also slyly to gain Britain's support. Britain favours the smaller shi])s, which she considers more effective for her purposes. The Japanese programme also includes a status quo on auxiliary ships. The answer to that is the Japanese are built nearly to full treaty strength in that class, while Britain and the United States are about 100,000 tons deficient. Diplomacy and Insight. Our experts have no private criticism to offer against the Japanese. We know very well that we ourselves will have to concoct some similar programme to satisfy the public demand for disarmament and yet protect our own interests. So will everyone else who joins the conversations.

The only point to be made about it is that the world has not changed since the last disarmament gatherings. Everyone wants disarmament, but wants his own particular kind of disarmament, which will leave his navy more efficient than the navy of the other fellow.

That is the explanation of why Mr. Roosevelt chose otir naval chief of operations, Admiral Standley, as a United States representative. No one will put any tricky naval technicalities, over on Admiral Standley. Everyone close to him in the navy knows he is opposed to giving away anything. He advocates a treaty strength navy, yet he is not among our naval extremists. He would like to see the world navies reduced, on the ground that nations (mainly ours) would then be able to support them efficiently. That is safe enough.

This is the first -time we ever sent a chief of naval operations to a disarmament conference. The fact that we did this time affords a clear insight into just what Mr. Roosevelt expects.