MOTOR COLLISION.

Auckland Star, Volume LXV, Issue 277, 22 November 1934, Page 11

MOTOR COLLISION.

NEW TRIAL REFUSED.

COMMENT ON VERDICT.

CHIEF JUSTICE'S RULING. (tty Telegraph.—Own Correspondent.) WELLINGTON, Wednesday. In the Supreme Court to-day the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Myers, dismissed a motion for a new trial in a motor collision case in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, even though his Honor did not agree with the verdict

of the jury. The motion was a sequel to the jury's verdict for the defendant in a case in which David Sidney Needham, Government messenger, sued William Taylor, City Council employee, for £600 gen-

eral and £130 special damages, for injuries received by Needliam as a result of a collision between his motor cycle and Taylor's car. Mr. Sievwriglit, who, with Mr. MacDuff, appeared for Needliam, submitted that the verdict was perverse and against the weight of evidence. It seemed clear, he said, that the jury could not have understood his Honor's directions, and that it had given consideration to matters it was not entitled to consider. The evidence did not show in any one particular that plaintiff had been negligent. His Honor: I think you might, with some justice, suggest that the jury may have been misled by a certain way in 'which *I:put a certain'direction to them. I referred to the amount of damages being claimed. Don't hesitate to mention that, Mr. Sievwriglit.

Mr. Sievwright said lie accepted some responsibility as counsel for the way he had put in a doctor's accounts, but Mr. Mazcngarb, in addressing the jury for the defendant, had' spent a good ten minutes on the point.

Mr. Mazcngarb said the grounds he had to oppose did not include anything about misdirection or influence, yet Mr. Sievwriglit had raised such questions.

"I frankly endeavoured to find reasons if I could for the granting of a new trial," said his Honor, delivering oral judgment. "I adopted that course because I did not agree then, and do not agree now, with the verdict of the jury. -Therefore, it was my duty as I conceive it to ascertain if an injustice had been done, and if so to remedy it if possible." It did not necessarily follow that a jury was wrong when the judge did not agree with its verdict, nor was it a fact that if a. jud;;c disagreed with a jury that was sufficient reason to set the verdict aside. In conclusion, his Honor said: "I cannot speculate as to the. jury's verdict. It is my duty to uphold the verdict if I can reasonably, f am compelled to dismiss the motion with £3 3/ costs."