WINNING THE TEST.

Auckland Star, Volume LXV, Issue 144, 20 June 1934, Page 14

WINNING THE TEST.

WQODFULL'S PART. " A TOUCH OF GENIUS." OTHER FACTORS IX VICTORY. (From Om Own Correspondent.) SYDNEY, Juno 14. The first innings of England in the Test match helped to confirm the high hopes already taking shape here. For though only four wickets were down for 128 at the close of the day, Walters, Hammond, Pataudi and Leyland had all failed, and it was evident that, with the wicket j beginning to wear the rest of the team (would be in serious difficulties with our spin bowlers. As things turned out, only Sntclifl'e, Hendrcn and Geary, all veterans, allowed themselves able to hold their ground for long, the last four wickets falling for two runs, and the .total was only 268, or 100 behind Australia. It was now the obvious duty of our men to score as rapidly as possible, before the wicket got worse, or the weather Changed, anS at this stage Woodfull had to face a very difficult situation. The general opinion here was that Australia's only chance of victory lay in rapid scoring, and it was therefore expected that Woodfull would keep himself and Brown, both comparatively slow opening bats, follower places on the list. On this point Mailey, who is with the team in England, and Dr. Barbour, one of our ablest local critics, are entirely agreed. As a matter of fact, after Woodfull and Ponsford had gone for a few runs, and Bradman disappeared a little later, the presence of Brown, who played correct but slow cricket, was rather a hindrance than an advantage. For McCabe was batting with all his wonted brilliancy, and the relative inactivity of Brown held Australia back. So strongly marked was this that when Walters missed an easy chance from Brown, Archie MacLaren, the famous Test veteran, is reported to have complimented th; English captain on his good judgment in keeping Brown at the wicket. The Captain's Dilemma. The day closed with three wickets down for 159. and though the runs were "on the board," Woodfull was in an even more difficult position than before. There was only one day left, and though, if this match were to be played out, there was little doubt that Australia would win, th>; problem was to make enough runs to prevent England from winning on the second innings, and to prevent a draw. Indeed, Woodfull had to face a curious dilemma. If he prolonged the Australian innings so as to ensure us against defeat, he might not leave our team enough time to get rid of the Englishmen before stumps. On the other hand, if he applied the closure early, the Englishmen, in spite of our Jead of over 100 on the first innings, might manage to hit off the runs required before time was called. All this was plain enough to the many thousands following the game so intently on this side of the world, and Woodfull was simply deluged with advice, which, fortunately for his peace of mind, he could not hear. Mailey, in his cabled notes on the play, said frankly that the Australians already had the game "in the bag," if only they would score as fast as possible, regardless of everything else, and such first-class judges as Kelleway, Clem Hill, E. L. Waddy and Noble all publicly expressed the opinion that if the Australians could make 100 more runs at top speed and then declare, our spin bowlers on a worn pitch would bo too much for the Englishmen and we would win. No doubt Woodfull summed up the situation accurately enough, and when our men went to the wickets again on the ! last day, it was evident they had instructions to "force the pace." McCabe (who | had batted magnificently throughout), Darling and Chipperficld, all threw their wickets away in an 'effort to hasten the run-getting: O'Reilly, who made 17 in one over, including a great sixer, showed some of the more highly reputed batsmen how to hit when "time is the essence of the contract," and with the score at 273 for eight wickets Woodfull closed the innings, leaving England with 380 to get, and less than five hours left for play. Chipperfield's Catch. It was evident that to escape defeat England must play for a draw, and when only one wicket had fallen for 51 runs it seemed that this policy might succeed. But the wonderful effort with which Chipperficld closed Sutclilfe's career—it is said that the fieldsman, diving for a ball going away from him, was "standing on his head" when he held the catch—seemed to turn the tide. Walters played a real "captain's innings" for 40, but after O.'Reilly had bowled him the innings degenerated into a rout. The last • five wickets, fell for 31 runs, the total was a miserable 141, and Australia had won the first Test by 238 runs, a bare ten minutes before, closing timet Of course many readers have read nearly all that can be written about the wonderful bowling of O'Reilly and Grimmett, and the splendid fielding—including Chipperfield's three great catches — which backed it up. Cricketers here are particularly glad that O'Reilly has at last compelled his English critics to admit that on a patchy wicket he is a great bowler, second only to Grimmett, who is still though ho is well past 40, "the best slow bowler in the world/' The only fear is that Grimmett and O'Reilly may be bowled to death before the tour is over. For though Wall is bowling well, Ebeling has hardly fulfilled expectations, and the other men seem scarcely up to Test standard. However, there is something still to be said about another factor wiiicli went a long way toward securing victory for Australia Woodfull s captaincy. In Sydney a good many people thought, and said, that he ought to have given orders to his men earlier to force the pace; that he ought not to have put himself or Brown in so early in the second innings; and this contention may be well founded. But it has also been said that Woodfull might, with advantage, have closed our second innings earlier; and here the local critics can quote the high authority of Jardine on their side. Jardine, in his comments on the last day's play, says:—"Jt seemed to me that Woodfull had to give England a possible chance to win; to give his bowlers the advantage of bowling against batsmen who would go for runs"—of course on the assumption that a win for England was possible within the time. But here, one ventures to suggest. Jardine's judgment was inferior to Woodfull's. For the more runs the Australians made before the closure, the less chance had the Englishmen of winning, and the less time they had for run-making. Therefore, by delaying the closure Woodfull positively compelled the Englishmen to adopt the policy of "stone walling" to avert clefcat. Forced to Their Own Destruction. Now it is the opinion of most critics— indeed, of everyone who has played or even watched cricket intelligent!}—that the only safe and sound policy against spin bowlers on a wearing wicket is to attack. Passive defence is simply suicide, as the previous experiences of English batsmen against Grimmett might have taught them. Therefore, by making a bold offensive useless—for the required runs could not be made in the time—and by thus forcing the Englishmen to adopt a defensive attitude Woodfull won the Test for Australia. The helplessness of the batsmen against pottering around against two accurate spin bowlers, backed up by keen and alert fieldsmen and the miserable total score, are sufficient proofs of the soundness of this argument; and they also justify Marley's contention that there was "a touch of genius" about the way in which Woodfull handled this delicate and difficult situation. For if he had declared earlier he might have encouraged the Englishmen to "give it a go," in the hope of knocking off the runs, and thus, by attack, disarming Grimmett and O'Eeilly, whereas by holding olf as he did. he forced them to "play the rock" to their own 'Cpstrjjction. J