MUSSOLINI'S MOTIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXV, Issue 2, 3 January 1934, Page 7

MUSSOLINI'S MOTIVE.

Attempt to Weaken French Prestige. SMALLER STATES BOGY. The reported plans of Mussolini for "reform" of the League of Nations were discussed by Mr. F. Alexander, head of the department of history in the University of West Australia, in an article recently published in the Melbourne "Herald." After reviewing the European events of the last nine months, he wrote: — By withdrawing from both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations and, by implication, threatening rearmament, Hitler played straight into the hands of those in Paris who sought security, not in additional pacific understandings, bu£ in a tightening of existing military commitments. With British opinion more sympathetic to France than it had been for years, the Government of that country looked with renewed interest upon her Little Entente allies. By consequence, Italian prestige suffered and the diplomatic strength of Mussolini rapidly declined. It is in the light of these facts that last month's reports of Mussolini's suggested attack upon the of Nations are to be considered. He is said to be contemplating either withdrawal or a revision of the Covenant seriously restricting the powers of smaller States members of the League. The motive for the latter proposal is obvious; it is an attempt to deprive France of the diplomatic backing which Italy feels «that the Frcnch always obtain at Geneva from the representatives of the Little Entente States.

In other- words, the Duce's opportunism is onco more to tho fore. By exploiting the disrepute into which German and Japanese withdrawal has, quite naturally but unwarranteclly, thrown the machinery of the League of Nations, the Italian leader proposes to strike at France under the pretence of "reforming" an institution whoso weakness has been openly demonstrated.

' Weakness of League. The questionable motive behind the proposed reform renders the project suspect from the start. It is not that the League's machinery does not stand in need of strengthening; he is no true friend of international co-operation or of the League who will deny this. But to place tho blame for its present weakness upon the small States of the world is absurd. On the otner nand, it la equally undeniable that those Great Powers, as permanent members of the all-important Council of the League, can always block an undesirable project, because of the requirement of unanimity. The time that is wasted in fruitless discussions can also be exaggerated; it is useful to have some place where small States can "let off steam," and it is a well-known fact, soon appreciated by anyone who has served as a delegate at Geneva, that the influence there of a small State is directly proportionate to the ability of its representatives. Finally, it may bo argued that the occasional subjection of Great Powers' agreements to able, outside scrutiny is more likely to prevent than to cause war. Sweeping "reform" of the League, relegating the smaller States to a position of utter insignificance, and making the League merely a close preserve of Great Powers, would thus be highly dangerous. The close co-operation between Great Powers, which is so eminently desirable, should be incidental to, and not the exclusive feature of, tho League's work. But such "reform" is not really likely to succeed. It may be doubted whether the reported Italian proposal is of more than tactical significance. It is in a sense a sequel to the abortive attempt made from Rome a few months ago to negotiate a FourPower Pact which would effectively exclude the Little Entente from participation in all the more important diplomatic discussions in Europe. Would Risk Italy's Isolation. The reason for the probable failure of the project lies in the fact that the Duce cannot afford —at all events, not as yet—to follow the Japanese and German lead to make withdrawal from the League an ultimatum. If Franco were then to call his bluff, Italy would be placed, for aft unknown period, in a position of isolation which only Germany could share —and Germany to-day is an uncertain ally of doubtful value, even to a country in Italy's difficult position. The course of the Nazi Revolution has, in sober fact, enormously strengthened France's diplomatic standing, a fact of which Mussolini cannot fail to be aware. For, just as we must interpret that gentleman's latest actions in the light of a policy spread over many years, so are we forced back_ to an appreciation of the Duce's realism and proved political ability. He may well seek without ceasing to find Italy her place in the sun; he can, nevertheless, be relied upon to await the most favourable meteorological reports before actually venturing out into the open.