WAR GUILT.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIII, Issue 182, 3 August 1932, Page 6

WAR GUILT.

GERMAN CASE STATED.

(By W. K. KINGSTON.)

This week's anniversary of the declaration of war in 1914 coincides with the election gains of Hitler's "Nazis," who have as a prominent plank in their platform "The refutation of the war guilt lie." Hence a brief statement of what the majority of German people are being told by their .political leaders and writers about the origin of the war might be of interest, especially as the demand for revision was brought up at the Lausanne Conference a few weeks ago and will undoubtedly be aired a good deal in the future.

The German case for revision of the war guilt blame is many-sided, but three leading points are: Firstly, the much smaller expenditure- on military preparation by them than by the Allies; secondly, the diplomatic encirclement of Germany by France and Russia; and, thirdly, Germany's efforts to localise and moderate the Serbian trouble in July, .1914.

The theory implicit in the German argument is that France thirsted for revenge at the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and her defeat in 1870, and was also jealous of the growing wealth and population of her neighbour. France became allied to Czariet Rtiseia, which also desired war, partly .to secure Constantinople and the access to an ice-free port, and partly to restore her diplomatic prestige in the Balkans after defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905. To secure their aims, these two countries built up huge armies, much larger tlfan those of Germany and her ally, AustroHungary. In 1907 the armies ofi France and Russia were 1,813,000 men, while those of the Central Power* were 1,011,000, an inferiority of SOO.OOO. In 1911 the margin against Germany and her ally had risen to 1,000,000 men. Further, the Germans say that in 1913 France had conscripted 75 per cent of her man-power, wJiereae Germany had raised only 55 per cent, and, later, C 5 per cent, of hers.

•Concerning the diplomatic events after the murder of tne heir to the Austrian throne at Serajevo, and until the actual outbreak of war some weeks later, the contention of the German writers is that their Government was right in trying to localise the trouble. The cold reception to England's proposal of bringing the row before a Conference of Ambassadors is justified on the ground that it meant taking a Balkan squabble before the general assembly of European Powers, thus raising the danger of turning a Balkan war into a European war. They are particularly insistent that had Russia not "butted in" the Austro-Serbian dispute, when she was not in dangee herself, but was merely seeking diplomatic prestige, the whole thing would have been settled very quickly. When it became evident that Russia was determined to support Serbia at all costs (which meant that France was brought in against Germany also, through being a military ally of Russia), the German diplomats altered .their attitude and strongly urged -moderation in Vienna. But the sudden Russian mobilisation on July 30 against Germany ae well as Austria completely altered the position, and placed the Germans on the defence.

The Germans claim most emphatically that it was this unexpected and unnecessary Russian mobilisation which precipitated the conflict, just when they were urging moderation in Vienna, and the Austrians had at last announced that they would uphold the integrity and eovereignty of Serbia.

It is curious reading for an Englishman to find how little the ideals of his own .country enter into .the German diplomatic writings of this period. The invasion of Belgium is never mentioned in Continental history books as the. reason for England's declaration of war, but we are treated as practically military allies and subordinates of France, and the invasion as an unfortunate but unavoidable military necessity. (Some writers go much further than this and say that if Germany had not invaded Belgium, Britain and France would have had to do so, but I am referring here to the generally-accepted and moderate writers..)

The eudden hatred of England that flared up in Germany in the first few months of the war typified in the song, "Gott Straff England," arose when they unexpectedly found England, the most liberal nation, against them along with Slav nationalism and the autocracy of Czarist Russia. Sir Edward Grey is usually attacked for permitting himself to' become tied to one of the two armed camps into which Europe had drifted, thus losing the freedom England had always possessed to adjust the balance of power and not allow any one group to become predominant.

Their most general contention is that the war would not have occurred had England, and particularly Franco, restrained Russia aud urged moderation in St. Petersburg, as the Germans were doing with their ally, Austria-Hungary.

But most interesting is this paragraph in an important book entitled "From Bismarck to the World War," by the professor of history in Berlin University (and. incidentally, used as a standard history text book of the period at the University of London). The author says in his chapter "Conclusions": "No one can "maintain with any show of reason that at any given time Germany either wished for war or strove to bring it about. In spite of all the sounding words that have been spoken, German policy was, in fact, too anxious and too peace-loving, rather than too militant. Can as much be said of the other Powers concerned?"