SNOWDEN'S SUCCESS.

Auckland Star, Volume LX, Issue 246, 17 October 1929, Page 8

SNOWDEN'S SUCCESS.

RETURN \IN TRIUMPH. DOMINIONS AND OPTIONAL CLAUSE. MacDONALD'S "MOMENTOUS AIM." (From Our Own-Correspondent.) LONDON, September (i. The return in triumph of our "Iron j Chancellor" has been likened to that of Disraeli when he returned fi'om Vienna bringing "pence with honour." But it was far different. There was a spontaneity and a sincerity in tho public greeting of Mr. Snowden quite lacking in •that of Disraeli's homecoming, the picturesque description of which was the Victorian darling's own invention. There was no worked-up, stage-managed enthusiasm in the reception of the Chancellor on his return from The Hague. There is, still some critical feeling, made vocal to-da," '*e "Saturday Review," as to wden's work. "If Mr. Snowden' •<-' and brilliant defence of na« ..crests should encourage other cor. . io suppose that the British Government have abandoned or weakened the policy of working first for international ends, and should thereby encourage nationalist and jingosit tendencies hi those countries, the result of his victory would not be all good. This is a dagger he mustguard against. There is, of course, no change in the British attitude, and the Government must seize every occasion that offers to make that clear. It is plain from comments that have appeared, not only in the foreign Press, but in a section of our own, that Mr. Snowdeii'a policy has been imperfectly understood. At The Hague an unseen struggle was going on between nationalism and internationalism. It may be that both have won."

A Broadcast Address.

But Mr. Snowden's broadcast address should have cleared the air. It was notable in every way for effective delivery and for lucidity and interest. But even that, clear statement has. nut escaped some misapprehension. One feature of it escaped public comment at least—the emphasis 'with'which in his I introductory remarks he condemned the whole post-war system of reparations and inter-Allied debts. "Three years after the end of the war," he observed, "some wiser.heads began to realise that the whole idea of receiving reparations and discharging inter-Allied debts was financially and economically impossible without inflicting injury on debtor, and creditor alike." Later he stiffened this up to "'disastrous consequences"; and it Avas fairly clear that it was of reparations ■ that he was chiefly thinking '. in this, connection. Accordingly; he proy ceeded: "I made it clear in my speech at .the; conference that, the British Government not only accepted, but welcomed the reduction in German reparations proposed in the Young. Report." :

': "In giving . so. much prominence to these opinions," says the "Nation," "Mr; Snowdeh may have been partly influenced ■ by a desire to put himself right \yifch his-international critics; but they are opinions which, of course, lie has long .l held \yitli. an intense . conviction; and, paradoxically enough, they may well have served to strengthen his bar gaining-.'position at The Hague. The most . obvious . and • concrete • danger attaching to a .breakdown of the conference was a collapse of the whole reparations system. Formally the position would have been that, failing some other arrangement, the Dawes Plan would have continued to operate. But the Dawes Plan would have required a large i ncreasei (say, £30,000,000 to £40,000,000) in the German annuity; Germany would certainly have revolted against paying on this scale merely because her creditors had failed to agree as to how the smaller Young annuities should be allocated. A revolt against reparations might well have ended iii refusal to pay at all. This would have been extremely disagreeable to France, to Italy, to anyone (including the Conservative British Government) really anxious to receive reparations. It would not -, have been nearly "so disagreeable to Mr. Snowden; and in this fact, we may suspect, lay a large part of the strength of his position."

Britain at Geneva. ' After the day to day excitement at The Hague, Geneva falls somewhat fiat. British prestige there under the late Government had sunk to a low" ebb, but Mr. Snowden's handling of things has provided a real asset to the British delegation at Geneva in its rebuilding of our prestige. The Prime Minister's speech on Tuesday had that note of authority and decision that has been too long absent from the spokesman of British policy.

' Curiously enough it is the Conservative "Saturday Review"'which points to repercussions of Empire responsibilities in respect of Great Britain , * part in the League. It says: "There is indeed only one factor that can attenuate the full measure of support for the purposes of the League that should: bo forthcoming from Great Britain. That factor is the British Empire. We cannot sacrifice the League- which is represented by the British Commonwealth of Nations "to the League at Geneva. In no circumstances ought we to be asked for any such sacrifice. The British Empire can have no interest, of any kind that is not entirely consonant with the interests of the League. At the. same time the novel compulsion under which we,act—to take no important decision in foreign policy unless and until each of the self-govern-ing Dominions agrees to it in advanceis one that may prove a serious limitation on our freedom of action.- .

• What exactly, then, will be the course of action with regard to the Ontional Clause? Mi;. MacDouald announces that Went Britain will sign it, and that he ' believe?-.' the Dominions will authorise their representatives to sign' it, This is independence in full measure'. The "Xatiou" remarks on this: '•Some of the Dominions, notably Canada and Ireland, have, of course, long been advocates of adherence; but, unless rumour lies, the Australian Government, at least, ha? been protesting: with some warmth to the Foreign Office against the decision winch Mr. Ramsay MaeDonald has an iipunced. The significance of Mr. MacDonald's words is that lie expects that Australia will prefer to sign along- with .the rest of the Empire than to stand out by herself. This is good news, for the position would be highly anomalous and undesirable if different "parts of the Empire were to be subject to different obligations on a matter'of this 'importance.

The Libenil weekly, the "Xation." reads into the Prime Minister's speed) ;i monieiilbi.,-5. aim—to .employ "'sanctions" agaiust a disturber of the peace rather than to provide for security by agreements, and it concludes: "It would

not be discreet or teloful hT question further. Ww prol)B 'tiu emerge without any re 7 H L ■"*•>»»' to h that Mr. 4 to take sanctions out of X > Kk e and that this motive make for the {US J* t to associate itself with thSf amounts to a new,depar& first importance; andit Sjll? 6 !? ing to observe, whether anv fi V nterest -' to follow it up d«2tf ** ar « Assembly. It will cLrlyM matter to- persuade the other If" of the League to toTf * eabe « of endeavour is »till.i n s».Sj£?«f t on; and a proposal for e USUr n !' rec> rial assistance to a State victim of advanced stage of prenaraS d ' true that most of tV Ifc h » sanctions commitments do°E v"1 to tins proposal; none the lm H> P ? lyt <> ' nature- of an. extension 5 and it would.not be ver v easv f° li < cile support of it with -tELSi?" ,, of Mr s.derations and such difficulties ,f n ' i however, to strengthen the ™' rfe ' that Mr. Macßondd is'££»' very big-prize." c ; . Ul sa«era