"TWENTY-FIVE YEARS."

Auckland Star, Volume LX, Issue 11, 14 January 1929, Page 6

"TWENTY-FIVE YEARS."

A NOTABLE REPRINT.

There are certain books that must be read if one is to understand the causes of the war in general, and in particular British pre-war diplomacy, and to appreciate Britain's difficulties during the struggle. "Twenty-Five Years," l<y Lord Grey of Fallodon, I would place first on the list for British readers, because it is by the man who was British Foreign Secretary for eight years before the war began, and because it is" conspicuously clear and honest. Yet there is good reason to believe that there are many Britons who express decided opinions against 'England's diplomatic record without having read Grey'e own account of his xtewardship. They have the" excuse that the book hitherto has been* very expensive— two volumes nt two guineas net. At such a price "Twenty-Five Years" could never have anything like, the wide circulation it deserved. The publishers have now done a national service by issuing it in three pocket volumes at half-a-crown net apiece, and no doubt this edition will have a very large sale. It is not necessary to go into details about the book itself, but something may be said of the introduction that Lord Grey has written for this edition. He points out that the book is intended to be a trite account of British foreign policy before and in the earlier stages of the- war, and he refers to the "unreasonable criticism" which complain* of it not taking notice of foreign documents that have come to light only *inee the war ami were not known to him or his subordinates while he was in office. "Neither my own thoughts and actions nor British policy before the war could be influenced by things we did not know nt the time. Such documents and revelations must be studied by the general historian who wishes to write an account of the policies of other countries; but this book dots not pretend to aim at anything so ambitious" This, Lord Grey adds, applies to later revelations that are unfavourable to Germany as well as to those that his critics have in mind. He goen on to refer briefly to the problem confronting Britain before the war, whether to continue the policy of isolation or to break with it. "It is by the nature of things much easier to see what hae happened than to predict what will happen." British Governments had preferred isolation, but pressure of events made them feel first that isolation was uncomfortable and then that it w.»a unsafe. To those who think that isolation would have kept Us out of the war he puts the«c questions : "Would you. before 1014, have denounced and withdrawn from the guarantee of Belgium? Have you considered what would have been the effect of such a step in Europe? And if the guarantee had not been denounced what answer would you have given when Belgium, who had behaved with irreproachable correctness and innocence, was invaded and appealed to Britain for help?"

The main purpose of the book, say 6 Lord Grey, "is not to make the vindication "or condemnation of any country the final word," but it was impossible to avoid the subject of war guilt nltopether. Hβ ia not afraid to admit that he may have been wrong. He thinks there is eome force in the contention put to him by a German that he (Orey) should have put pressure upon Vienna, and that Germany could not control Austria. He also thinks the ex'tortion from Germanv of admission of war fjuilt in the Treaty of Versailles wa* a mistake, in that it is of no moral effect to nmke individuals or nations sign confessions l>y force, and that "tho article has so worked upon German feeling as to hinder impartial and diapassionato examination in Germany of war guilt and the true causes of the war. It has concentrated national opinion in Germany upon efforts to throw the blame for the war upon other nations; it has even led to passionate assertions that Germany alone of all those engaged in the war hud no war frufll." The introduction concludes with observations on the effect of the war on Western preetipc in the East—in the eyes of tho East war responsibility rests on Western civilisation as a whole—and with the hope that this civilisation "may yet attain more ncarlv than ever before to the standard of international ethics which we have long professed and in which we believe. The best antidote to depression is renewed aspiration." —CYRANO.

Pnllodi.n. KG. Ponpip-K Library In tl.ro.> v,,lm,cs (Hoiliier and Stotightoii.)