SOVIET ARMY STRONGER

Auckland Star, Volume LIX, Issue 71, 24 March 1928, Page 19

SOVIET ARMY STRONGER

EQUIPPED WITH MODERN

WEAPONS.

TRAHVX2VO SYSTEMATIC.

The Soviet Government's participation in the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations at Geneva has revived interest in the organisation, equipment strength of the Red Army. With the exception of the Russian Church, no Russian institution has survived the revolution with as little change as the military force. Most of its ablest officers served under the Czar. The essential lines of its organisation are the same as those of ita predecessor. Its oaths of allegiance are sew, and many of its younger officers are proletarians brought in to democratise the service. But the system is based directly on the old Czarist Army and, without underestimating Trotsky's share of the credit for ita present efficiency, it can only be understood when it is realised that Trotsky's ableet helpers weTe senior officers who served under the Czar. The Russian soldier is essentially unchanged. Like the old Czarist Army, the Soviet Army of to-day is considered a stubborn defensive force and poor in the offensive.

The peace establishment of the Czar's army in 1914 amounted to 1,300,000, I •11 ranks —a number swelled during the J annual training period by about 500,000 : reservists. The peace strength of the ; present Soviet Army, including the air tnn, is about 1,124,000. Of this number 562,000 are provided by the regular army, including the military-political Ogpu force, a special category resembled in some respects by the Spanish Guardas Civiles and the Italian CarabinierL The rest aro supplied by the first line territorial divisions. In time of war the Soviet would probably have at its disposal about 10,000,000 men between the ages of 18 and 31, all of whom would have had some degree of military training, but it could not, of course, equip more than a limited proportion of them. The Ogpu Troops. n In 1026-27 the cost of the army was 1 634,000,000 rubles (317,000,000 dol), but 1 this does not include grants for the 1 maintenance of the Ogpu troops. This 1 is a counter-revolutionary arm used for 1 the detection of espionage, the guarding 1 of the frontiers and the protection of ' the Government in power. The majority of its personnel are communists, and are trained and equipped with special csre. One of its regiments is stationed at Leningrad, two in Moscow, seven in the rest of the country, and it also has 100 sections, each consisting of three infantry platoons, a machine-gun platoon and a troop of cavalry, which guard the frontiers, escort prisoners and control doubtful areas. As In Czarist days the Soviet Army Is recruited by conscription. Preliminary military training begins at the age of 16 and 160 hours of drill and physical exercises are required annually of boys between the agei of 16 and 18. This requirement is increased in the higher schools to 180 hours, in which is included a certain amount of .theoretical training. Women students are also included. Beginning this Fall, two months' practical training in camp.is also required of boys in the higher schools, but not of women. At the age of 18 pre-con-scription training begins, and between the ages of 18 and 20 each man undergoes a yearly total of ten weeks' military training under army instructors. At the age of 21 he is called up and medically examined. According to the number that he draws at this examination, he is allotted to the regular army, the regular cadre of a territorial division, to the territorial, or is thrown out of the conscription list. Administration of the Army. Including the Caucasus, there are ten military areas in the country, "each controlled by a commander with a staff of 800. The training and administration of all military formations, both regular snd reserve, are allotted to these commanders. Their areas are subdivided into divisional, regimental and battalion areas under commissariats charged with the -duty of registering men, animals and transport for army use. The army -t present is organised into twenty-one infantry and three cavalry porps. As a general rule each corps has three divisions, and a gas regiment is added to the otler corps troops. Infantry divisions number abcut 18,595, all ranks, on a war footing, and have three regiments apiece, each consisting . of three ba«..- .ons—artillery, engineers ard signal formations. There aie - -i.ynine Infantry divisions in all, tmity of which belong to the regular army and the rest to the territorials or reserve. Cavalry divisions number twelve, with one Cossack division in reserve. Tie cavalry arm of the Soviet Army always has been highly efficient. Its mobility has been increased by the reduction of its impedimenta,,and its firepower has been enhanced by the addition of ninety-six light machine guns to the ninety-six heavy machine guns that it ' - always has ' ad. Cavalry divisions now have a war strength of 8500, all ranks. These are organised into six regiments, saeh M 0 strong, with a mechanical ioree and a cyclist company. ■J Infantry regiments number 1803, all Mnkij They are composite bodies, conr listing of three battalions apiece, with mounted and dismounted scouting comRnka and a close support brigade of 'ft three-gun batteries of 76 mm. guns. Bach regiment has about 150 machine funs, light machine guns and automatic riflss. The great number of automatic weapons used is remarkable. The dependence on machine guns as indicated by the numbers supplied to units is explained partly by the indifferent shootr- * B f °f the Russian soldier and P*'tly ■ by the nature of. the country and the diflcnit means of communication. Transit port, indeed, is one of the Soviet Army s Boat serious problems. Under present conditions an infantry ,i ; < division has 3000 vehicles andrftOOO horses «nd very little mechanical transport. Th is number of vehicles and horses

Iff /X re *tfy exceeds that of any other flrstarmy. Steps are being taken to M?,incre*ie the supply of the mechanical fafWtniport, and much use is being made ®f the Fordao: tractor, which can be 111 l ;i«ed on the farh.s in peacetime and in Wmb army in wartime. v 'm The Mobilisation Schedule • ■|§|p|;The expansion of the army in the of war won id l» throi > the .Vaßpitorial army. the' regular" ' army be the covering force, and the S«P' ,, l r y the striking force, the terriserve as the nuclei- from which '•w divisions would be formed. In vie# PP|iP>> Soviet's system of compulsory fpPw'J training, the territorials could fill «°«plet« their trainiaf with great Iff,"

The air foroe is an organisation apart from the regular army, although it is U » m direction of the Commissar ?L i*", UnMk ® th ® *my as a whole, tne air force was permitted to die after the revolution, and had to be created over again, its reconstruction beginning about 1021. It is only now beginning to attain a recognisable degree of efficiency, the most skilful units being stationed along the country's western *01*. Many airplanes have been purchased abroad and some have been built at home.

Young personnel is usually chosen for * force, and there is a marked preference for young men whose communism is oound. These are drawn from ser-ndary schools and undergo special courses in the air normal school. There are now about ninety squadrons of twelve machines each. Of these squadrons, about fifty are reconnaissance squadrons, twenty-five are fighting squadrons, and the rest bombing. There are fourteen schools for pilots and observers.

Tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains are under the direction of the inspector of artillery and armoured forces, the personnel of this branch is carefully selected, and none but professed Communists are admitted. Each man must have had a preliminary training in mechanics. There are a few tanks in the anny and none is modern. Plans are being made to equip tanks with antigas devices and also, as a measure of defence against enemy tanks, to lay anti-tank mine fields with gas as well as explosive mines.

Ga* warfare is regarded as highly important, and efforts are always being made to devise new gases and expand the means of production. At present th® supply of gas masks is deficient both in quantity and . quality.