RADIO IN THE WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume LVI, Issue 224, 22 September 1925, Page 7

RADIO IN THE WAR.

GERMANY'S WORST ENEMY. INTERRUPTED SIGNALS. SECRET CODES WELL KNOWN. The deadliest enemy to the German fleet during the World War and which cost it several important battles with heavy casualties was the wireless telegraphy. This has just been revealed by N. yon Koch, of Sweden, who has made a long study of the service of radio intelligence and radio security in the British and German navies during the late war. Yon Koch claims that the ability of the British to intercept wireless signals and by means of direction finders to establish the locality of the sender enabled them to prepare for several attacks, the success of which depended on complete surprise. Lord Fisher, Admiral of the British fleet, bears out the statement of Yon Koch in her memoirs, in which he says: "Wireless telegraphy is the strong man's weapon. But wireless telegraphy is a dangerous weapon; rightly used, dangerous for the enemy; but carelessly used much more dangerous for one's self. The English recognised that fact, but not so the Germans, even at the beginning of the war, and that is why the English wireless organisation became something entirely different from that of the Germans." "From the very beginning of the World War," says Yon Koch, "the listening-in to the wireless communications of the enemy prepared in advance by the English, was in working order. In order that not a single message should be missed, no matter on what wave length, they had a large number of receivers, to each of which yas assigned a certain wave section. Everything received was sent direct to the Admiralty, where a special dei/xling office for the Allies had been established. Learn German Code. "Thanks to this arrangement of paying attention to everything received, an enormous and extensive mass of material became available, and before long the Associated Nations were masters of the German code, just as much as the Germans themselves. This knowledge was augmented by the chance discovery of German secret documents. For instance, the Russians, after the stranding of the small cruiser Magdeburg, near Odensholm, found an iron safe sunk near the cruiser containing several C!erman secret documents and books, including the key to the code, signal book and charts. The collection was increased still further by mine charts of the North Sea and the English coast, when about January, 1915, the U-31 was driven ashore at Yarmouth, undamaged but with the crow all dead.

"Apart from the listening-in stations referred to, the English, as far back as the fall of 1914, were getting good results from wireless directional stations. The directional stations were established at suitable points on the English coast line and their duty was to get the bearings and the direction of every German sender. These bearings were then forwarded direct to the Admiralty, where they were collated, part of them with each other, by which means the position of the sender was located, and part of them with the message picked up by listening-in, whereby it was usually discovered who the sender was. "As to how the organisation was worked in detail, so that one could be sure that the bearings determined, notwithstanding the vast number of messages, referred to one and the same sender, and also as to how it was possible to fit the bearings to the right message, I have not been able to find any information. But it is hinted that great skill and training on the part of tho personnel were essential, and that especially during the first year of the war many mistakes were made. Directional Stations Reliable. "But, thanks to the energetic work and far-sighted vision, the information furnished by the directional stations gradually became absolutely reliable, and Jellicoe observes on this point that in consequence he was able to reduce considerably the scouting forces which the Grand Fleet was obliged to keep at sea". German warships or craft at sea almost invariably betrayed themselves by their wireless signals. All German attacks on a large scale were preceded by a lively wireless conversation, as the Germans, never dreaming anything was wrong, generally issued their preparatory orders by wireless. Consequently, as a general rule, the British most always knew in advance where the German warships were and also what they had to expect. "In course of time the English operators at the listening-in and directional stations became so familiar with the peculiar features of the various German ships with respect to sound, etc., that as a rule as soon as they heard a German wireless message they were at once able to name the class of the sending vessel and frequently its name as well.

The British Were Cautious. "From the very beginning of the war the British had been cautious in their wireless communications and the more they learned to profit by the German system, the more clearly they saw the necessity of avoiding wireless telcgrnphy for the" transmission of orders and intelligence. In port or at anchor the senior commanders were always in connection with the telegraph system on shore. Wireless signals were permitted from one ship only at Scapa, the statiouary telegrapli ship, and these mostly related to flotillas of small vessels only, guard ships and the like, which did not reply to them. "To keep the <~ .-and Fleet together and well in hand without using wireless telegraphy was no light ta*k. To render this possible every attention was devoted to optical signalling, using (he heliograph in the daytime. For distances at night the British used low-candle-power Hash lights with beams of very small diameter and a radius of about 500 metres. Gradually the Grand Fleet succeeded in preserving practically absolute wireless silence during it's scouting expeditions in the North Sea."