LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Auckland Star, Volume LVI, Issue 103, 4 May 1925, Page 7

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

WAR PREVENTION. A VITAL QUESTION. The development of the League of Nations is a question of \ilal importan, c 10 Australia. Australia cannot afford f adopt a negative or apathetic attitude to what is in effect a world-wide at tempi so to develop the League ~1 Nations that through its medium national security may lie guaranteed ami the dangers of a recurrence of another world-wide conllict be reduced to a minimum, writes 11. K. Hyde, the note 1 .' ustralian publicist. in the "Sydney Mm ling Herald." It has been generally coiisidc d by Kuropean nations that the League, iv its present form (mainly on account of the vagueness of its obliga tiotisi did not give a sufficiently reliable guarantee of security. The Geneva, Protocol, which is to all intents and purposes a series of amendments to the Leagues existing covenant, was the immediate result of this general feeling of insecurity, and indubitably is the strongest attempt that hasyct been made to extenrl aud define the scope of the League. Three plans were tallied anil considered when ihe protocol was being formulated. The draft treaty of mutual assistance, the result of a special commission set up liy the League, winch had been at work for three years under the .aide chairmanship of Lord Robert Cecil. An unoilicial American plan, which nevertheless had a very important backing in the I'nited States. And a plan prepared by the author, and known as the Hyde Draft Treaty, which was presented by Sir James Allen, chief delegate for New Zealand, and accepted for discussion by the Assembly. Certain features from those three plans went to form ithe protocol. The flcnevti Protocol was hastily constructed,..and in my opinion was in some respects quite opposed to the interests of tlie British Knipire. To have made it acceptable to Client Britain and tlie dominions it would have had to he very drastically amended —so much so that it would have been a totally different document. To a certain extent the protocol was not free from the charge that it had become the field for exploitation on tlie part of certain States. But, for all its faults, tlie protocol is evidence that the Kuropean countries are prepared to go very much further in the direction of co-operation than ever before. Substitute for Protocol. I believe that the present British Government was quite right in refusing to ratify the protocol in its present form, but they will guilty of a terrible blunder if they do not propose something in its place, which (m tlie one hand we (.nil reconcile to the widespread interests of our Knipire, and on the other would be wortliy of the spirit of.co-operation tlfa,t tlie other Kuropean States have shown. Jn this connection it may be t>! interest to note that the Hyde Draft Treaty I which goes in some respects further than the protocol to guarantee security) was" strongly supported by most of the European countries. It was pointed out very emphatically by various Kuropean delegates, as well as liy several prominent secretariat officials,' that if the consent of Great Britain could be obtained little difficulty need lie anticipated in getting the rest of Europe to agree. It is to be feared that the rather negative attitude adopted by tlie British Cabinet was to a certain extent the result of- the negative altitude shown by the dominions. Tlie British Cabinet,' very wisely and fairly, wished to call an imperial conference on the protocol before deciding what action could be taken. It was most important at that stage that there should be an imperial conference, and that tlie basis of a broad imperial policy should be formulated for tbe Empire as a whole. It was most unfortunate that the dominions did not consider the matter sufficiently vital to send representatives. It is very much to lie desired in this connection that much closer co-operation between the Dominion Government and the British Government on all imperial • questions (especially as concern foreign affairs) should be established. Responsibilities of Empire. If we are to remain a united Empire— nnd there can be no question but that it will pay us to do s."> —then we must be prepared to play our part and' accept a fair share of responsibility together with the rest of the Empire. To do this, it is essential that we forge a still closer bond in our relationship, and either give our Dominion High Commissioners pow- " ers to speak on Imperial questions for the ' Dominions or appoint special Dominion ' representatives to be resident in Lon- - 11 doii, and empowered to speak and art ' j when the occasion demands. 1 The attitude of the Dominions on the I question of league development has been 'negative (mainly duo to a rather apathe- • tic international outlook), with a result " I that the Rritish Government did not ' j respond very cordially to the Kurop.-an •oilers of co-operation. It is to be feared ; that in Europe generally our reply, as I voiced by Mr. Chamberlain, will be' cou- ; sidereil us reactionary rather than proIt is obvious thai we can no longer j profitably pursue a policy of isolation, aud it behoves our Knipire to corißiuer the situation very seriously indeed before refusing Kuropean offers of co-operation. As an Knipire we do not want another war—if through any mischance we lost. it would deal our Empire a blow from which we would probably never recover, and even another victory like that of the last war would probably mill us from an economic point of view. As waged in these days, from tlie nature of things, be an unprofitable venture to our Umpire. We have nothing to gain, and much to lose. Control of Armed Forces. To a very large extent, the objections brought against League development are objections to things that have never been seriously proposed that the League should do. and opponents of the League, of Nations (of which there are many), are continually raising bogies for the special purpose of demolishing them, through such devices the pliblii—especially of Australia—has gained a totally (wrong impression of what closer eo-opera-j tion within the League ~f Nations really | involves. It should 1„- realised by ail | who are prepared lo give the League of Nations fair consideration, that it is not suggested that a nation's right to .control and administer it- nun forces be. ill any way interfere,l with. Our national Coveriimeuls can decide on what occasion and to what extent. our forces shall he utilised. It is only suggested that nations, in the common i interests, shall pledge themselves to Use | their combined forces against tho warmaker. Such pledges involve no greater sacrifice of national sovereignty, no greater loss of control of forces, and no greater obligation fo act. than did such pre-war pledges and alliances as those formed between Great Britain, France , and Belgium, etc. I