The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATES The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1921. FIXED AT LAST.

Auckland Star, Volume LII, Issue 26, 31 January 1921, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATES The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1921. FIXED AT LAST.

For the cause that lacks aeeistanem. For the wrong that need* resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that ice can da.

The main point about the momentous decision reached by the Allies in conference about the reparation to be exacted from Germany is that apparently j tho amount to be imposed has been dciinitely and finally fixed, and that the Allies have declared their intention to collect it by force if necessary. An end [ hae been put to the long and dangerous period of disagreement, which \va« punc j tuatcd by conferences and announce- , j ments of agreement that turned out to , [be false. The Conference at Paris came! 1 to an agreement, after a tense situation | | in which Mr. Lloyd George threatened to leave, that Germany should be called! j upon to pay £ 11 ,300.000,000, spread over ] 42 years, in instalments ranging from j £100,000,000 a year in the immediate 1 ! future to £3110,000,000 a dozen years: hence. There are three obscure points in the summary we have received. No mention is made of interest on tinunpaid instalments. There is no explana- i I tion of the statement that "the Allies ] will also receive \2_ per cent of all German exports." Is this to be n tax or to be received in goods? The item is important, for in the year before the war Germany's exports amounted to, nearly _j00,000,000. Then, what is meant by the statement that "there will j be no fixed sum which Germany shall ' finally pay"? The greatest weakness in the reparation section of the treaty has been -that it did not fix the sum that j Germany would huve to pay. and so j | remove all doubt from the Germans' ! mind as to their ability. The sooner they knew what they had to do the j sooner they would set about doing it. If I this settlement perpetuates this vague- ■ ness it will be a weakness. The position j is therefore this, that Germany has to j find in the next forty-two years ! £11,300,000,000, plus, apparently," 12J per cent of her exports, and in addition she has to pay the cost of the armiee of occupation, and will doubtless have to j meet the Allies' expenses if the Allies are ' compelled to take over her Customs iv payment of the debt. There will be very sharp difference of opinion as to Germany's ability to pay '' this colossal amount, and the wisdom of spreading a debt over 42 years. The arguments of the Keynes school will be repeated, in effect that you cannot extract so much from a country which ; before the war raised in the height of ! its prosperity only £158,000,000 in Federal revenue, and Is now staggering ' under an enormous war debt of its own, and has been deprived, not only of population, but of much of its wealth in coal and iron. But one must assume one of two things about this Conference—either that the Conference has satisfied itself that Germany can pay the amount stipulated, or that the Prime Ministers, partly for the sake of agreement, and partly to satisfy public opinion — inshort, to tide over a difficult time—have ' put their hands to a settlement of tho permanence of which they are not sure. The 42 years' provision seems to us the weakest part of the agreement. Much j may happen in 42 years. Supposing at the end of, say, twenty years, Germany feels strong enough to resist—and if she | is able to pay £300,000,000 a year she may feel strong enough—are we to go to war to compel her to pay up? In other words, what is to be the cost in military preparation of enforcing our will on Germany over a period nearly as long as I the period between th* Franco-German war and the Great War? That we should seize German Customs if she cannot pay her debt is certainly a logical step from imposing the penalty, but what is this likely to involve in naval, military and civil expenditure?' j We «are told that the compromise reached by the Conference was a triumph for Mr. Lloyd George. From the diplomatic point of view that may be so, but the real triumph is France's. It is true that France will get considerably less than she thinks she should get, and that Mr. Lloyd George succeeded in modifying the French demands, but tiie polxy adopted is thait of France rather than -England. Broadly, , French opinion has been in favour of enormous indemnities, while English opinion has to a large extent leaned towards leniency, and been much impressed by Mr. Keynes' estimate that the most that could be expected of «Germany was £2,000,000,000. If the Allies succeed in exacting five times that amount, the main credit will lie -with France. The next word is with Germany. Every step taken by the Allies since the Armistice has been met by protests and cries of -"We cannof," and these cries and pro- j tests will ; be' redoubled when the Allies' latest decision is known. Germany,' however, cannot help herself. She must j now set her house in order, and malccj the .best preparations she can for meet-j. ing the Ml. In return she is entitled, if she needs them, to aslk the Allies to' grant her facilities to trade, for unless she can manufacture and exchange shecannot pay her debt. It is for the Allies to say how they are going to give her such encouragement, and at tbe same time protect themselves from the possibility of their markets being flooded by cheap German goods. Germany's -best chance of securing a mitigation of the terms of the reparation agreement is to show her sincerity; in the meantime she must set j

Ito work to pay for part of the incalcuj lable amount of wrong and suffering she brought on the world. She now knows what is expected of her, and she faces a group of creditors who have just declared their determination to stand together to defend their common interests. The period of evasion is nt an end.