The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1910. BRITAIN AND JAPAN.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 265, 7 November 1919, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1910. BRITAIN AND JAPAN.

Tot the caute that torfar MtbftMm, For the vrrong that needs refinance, For the future in fTie ditlance, And the good that we 9am. do.

A few days ago a. cable message reported that public opinion in Japan is exercising itself just now on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The reason for the rovival of interest in this matter at present is that the period for which this famous agreement was fixed is now approaching ite end. The original treaty was arranged in 1905 by Lord Lansdowne, but three years before this the British and Japanese Governments had come to a mutual understanding for the protection of their several interests in the Far East, which permitted Japan to enter on hor greut contest with Hussia without fear of molestation by any apprehensive third party. In 191!, ■when grave European complications warned Britain that she must be prepared for all emergencies, the agreement, with modifications, was renewed for a further ten years, and it thus expires in July, 1021. But any desire to withdraw from this convention on the part of either Britain or Jupan ie supposed to bo notified beforehand, and as the treaty, if it is to be dropped, must be denounced before the middle of July next year, it is time for the contracting parties to make up their minds definitely about their intentions regarding it. Wo need hardly add that it is the wish and purpose of the rulers of Japan to renew thoir agreement with Britain, and that they will make almost any sacrifice to secure that end. This general statement, however, is open to one exception or reservation, the significance of which will appear a little later on. We know that, so long as the Anglo-Japanese agreement serves Japan's purposed, it will be maintained by her, but beyond that wo have no ground for certainty.

It may bo as well to review briefly the chief clauses of this extremely important compact as signed in 1005 and revised in 1011. Its declared objects are to consolidate and maintain peace in Eastern Aeia and India; to defend the common interests of all Powers in China by securing the territorial integrity of China, and upholding there the commercial principle of equal opportunities—"the open door"; and to maintain and defend unimpaired the territorial rights of the contracting parties in Eastern Asia and India. The only substantial difference made in the treaty by the revision of 1911 concerned the possibilities of arbitration in place of war in regard to any dispute in which either of tho signatory Powers might bo involved. Th 0 general effect of this agreement ie thus to bind Britain to defend Japanese interests, and Japan to defend British interests, in their respective spheres; and it is important to observe that to some extent thie implies Britain's dependence upon the goodwill and strength of Japan for the maintenance of the Asiatic section of her Empire. The force of this very suggestive fact has bj' no means been lost upon the acute and observant Japanese. They were particularly pleased to receive sympathy, moral and political, and support from Britain in their etruggle with Russia. But they did not fail to comment on the fact that Britain not only expected Japan to assist in repelling encroachments upon British interests ih the Yang-tse Valley (then acknowledged as a British "sphere of influence"), but also looked to Japan for help in defending India as well. But though Britain's evident anxiety to secure and retain Japan's help made a profound impression on the Japanese, it has not altered their conviction that the Anglo-Japaneee agreement is an asset of inestimable value which they must for their own sakes guard and preserve.

On these points we might quote a large amount of evidence from the public and official declarations of most of the leading statesmen of Japan. They all regard those agreements of 1905 and 1911 as virtually constituting an alliance, and Japan's entry into the Great War on the side of the Entente Powers has confirmed her status in this respect. Early in 1916, when Japan's activities in China had aroused criticism in Britain and America, the "Japan Times" published a series of interviews on this subject, in which Count Okuma, Count Terauchi, Baron Kato, Baron Takahaehi, Baron Shiusawa—in fact, all the most authoritative political and financial representatives of the Japanese peopledeclared with one voice in favour of the Alliance, emphasised its value to Japan, and insisted on the necessity for prolonging it. But there is one important phase of the question, to which we have already referred, which seems to demand careful attention here. Of all th e advantages secured to Japan by the sympathy and support of Britain, infinitely the most important has been the opportunity thus afforded her to establish herself in a political as well as a commercial sense in the Asiatic mainland. It is not to be inferred that Japan in so many words specifies the continuance of Britain's help in this direction ns a condition on which the renewal of the Alliance depends. But at least one of the leaders, of Japan, Baron Megata, has put the argument from this point ol view co clearly that we can hardly do better than quote his precise -words: "Japan is th e next-door neighbour of .China; becauee of this propinquity, geographically; and economically, Japan

must be prompt to assert her opinion, exert her influence, and insist upon her righto in China. So long iw thie ie done, and clearly understood, so long ac rights of position and sincerity of purpose are recognfeed by the people of the two nations, all will go well, and there will be nothing to stay or to hinder the working of the Anglo-Japanse Alliance or the progreee of good understanding between the two peoples." It would be difficult to put more plainly and bluntly the opinion held by a large section of the Japanese that they have a right to a paramount position in China, and that Britain has bound herself by the AngloJapaneee agreements to assist them to gain and hold it; and most unfortunately th e secret compact by which Britain pledged herself to support the transfer of Germany's stolen rights in Shantung to Japan has helped to strengthen thia conviction. This is surely one of the most important facts that British statesmen will need to consider before they decide whether they H hall or shall not denounce the Anglo-Japaneee agreement next year.