LAW OF BIGAMY.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 164, 11 July 1919, Page 7

LAW OF BIGAMY.

VALIDITY OF STATUTE. CONSIDERED BY FULL COURT. (3y Telegtaph.— Press Association.) WELLINGTON, this day. The Full Court is hearing the ease of Rex versus Jackson, which involves the present position of the 'Bigamy Law in New Zealand. The Chief Justice had decided that the whole law was bad, and the question now 'before the Appeal Court is whether the whole law is bad or only that part dealing with bigamy outside New Zealand. The Solicitor-General and Mr Macassey appear for the Crown, and Sir John Findlay, K.C., and .Mr Jackson for accused. The Solicitor-General argues that though there can 'be** no c|iicetion ot severability in the case, of the Imperial Statute, yet in the Statute of a subordinate legislature a section of the Act might be divisible, provided both, in form and substance, the section was capable of severability. Continuing his argument, the SolicitorGeneral said: In dividing the section of the Act there were two essentials—(l) the section when amended must be left grammatically intelligible, and (2) in substance the part left must be left without any change in the meaning and intention of the Legislature as to the part left. It was not permissible in the operation of this doctrine to add or substitute words, if the words "'in any part of the world" were struck out of the section the rest of the section would be quite intelligible, as it would necessarily apply, as all the rest of the Crimes Act does, to New Zealand only. Sir John Kindlay submitted that in the Landers case the Court of Appeal had decided that the whole of section 224 was invalid, or that was the proper deduction from the decision in MeLeod's, case. There were only two possible alternatives: —(1) To confine the application of the section in that case to NewSouth Wales, or (2) to declare the whole section invalid. The Privy Council had adopted the first course to avoid the second. Australian cases show that wherein the statute good and bad are wrapped up together, the whole must fall. In the present case the words "in any part of the world" could not be divided so as to make the section apply to New Zealand, while the extra territorial jurisdiction is excluded. The section does not consist of two separate parts, so that one part might be declared good and the other part bad. The Solicitor-General had asked that the section should be declared valid as far as it would go, but that was what the Courts in Australia had declined to do. The Legislature might well have intended to include all bigamists under the tseetion as being for the peace, order, and pood government of New Zealand, and unless the Legislature intended the limited application now suggested, the Court could not cut down the plain meaning of the section eeeing that the section had no separate parts. If it read "in New Zealand or elsewhere" he admitted that probably the word.* "or elsewhere" might be declared bad and: the rest remain rrood, but here there were no such separate part*. To hold that the section might lie read us applying to New Zealand alone would be legislating and not interpreting tho law. Judgment was reserved.